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25 result(s) for "Dobos, Ned"
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Insurrection and intervention : the two faces of sovereignty
\"Domestic sovereignty (the right of a government not to be resisted by its people) and international sovereignty (the moral immunity from outside intervention) have both been eroded in recent years, but the former to a much greater extent than the latter. An oppressed people's right to fight for liberal democratic reforms in their own country is treated as axiomatic, as the international responses to the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya illustrate. But there is a reluctance to accept that foreign intervention is always justified in the same circumstances. Ned Dobos assesses the moral cogency of this double standard and asks whether intervention can be consistently and coherently opposed given our attitudes towards other kinds of political violence. His thought-provoking book will interest a wide range of readers in political philosophy and international relations\"-- Provided by publisher.
Are strikes extortionate?
Workers who go on strike are sometimes accused of holding their employer \"to ransom\", the implication being that strike action is a kind of extortion. The paper provides an analytical reconstruction of this objection, before presenting and interrogating different strategies for countering it. The first says that work-stoppages can only be extortionate if they infringe an employer's rightful claim to productive labour, but that no employer has any such claim under capitalism. The second says that work-stoppages cannot be extortionate because, by themselves, they cannot put an employer under duress. The third and most promising strategy says that an employer's claim to the productive labour of workers is conditional upon his/her not exploiting them. This approach does not produce a blanket exoneration; it tells us that the aptness of describing a strike as extortionate depends on a prior appraisal of the conditions that the strikers work under, and the fairness with which they are treated.
Networking, Corruption, and Subversion
This paper explores the ethics of networking as a means of competition, specifically networking to improve one's prospects of prevailing in formal competitive processes for jobs or university placements. There are broadly two ways that networking might be used to influence the outcome of some such process: through the \"exchange of affect\" between networker and selector, and through the demonstration of merit by networker to selector. Both raise ethical problems that have been overlooked but need to be addressed.
International Rescue and Mediated Consequences
It is generally assumed that, when judging the proportionality of a humanitarian intervention, the relevant costs that must be factored into the equation are not only those brought about directly and immediately, but also those brought about via the interceding agency of other parties; the mediated consequences. Here I want to challenge that assumption. First, I argue that rebels fighting off an oppressive regime cannot reasonably be held to a standard of proportionality under which mediated consequences count fully in the calculus. Given this, I ask whether we can justify holding international rescuers – using similar means in pursuit of similar ends – to a more stringent standard. If the answer is yes, then curiously it turns out that an intervention might fail to satisfy the principle of proportionality despite its expected costs and consequences being identical to those of an insurrection which is rightly judged to satisfy that principle. I argue, however, that every attempt to justify the asymmetry has shortcomings. If this is right, then the standard of proportionality to which we hold states or coalitions engaged in armed international rescue operations should be reviewed and, arguably, relaxed.
Are States under a Prospective Duty to Create and Maintain Militaries?
Suppose it is foreseeable that you will soon encounter a drowning child, whom you will only be able to rescue if you learn to swim. In this scenario we might think that you have a “prospective duty” to take swimming lessons given that this will be necessary to perform the future rescue. Cécile Fabre argues that, by parity of reasoning, states have a prospective duty to build and maintain military establishments. My argument in this essay pulls in the opposite direction. First, I emphasize that learning to swim is only a prospective duty under very specific circumstances. Normally there is no such duty; hence, we do not normally think that people deserve moral censure for choosing to forego swimming lessons. I then argue that, similarly, while a prospective duty to build a military can arise under some conceivable circumstances, these are not the circumstances that most states today find themselves in. I then suggest a more fitting domestic analogy to guide our thinking about this issue: Maintaining a standing army is less like learning to swim and more like keeping an assault weapon in the home “just in case.” This analogy supports a defeasible presumption against militarization.
The Duty to Hire on Merit: Mapping the Terrain
To say that employers ought to hire on merit is to say that jobs should be awarded purely on the basis of job-relevant qualications. Whichever candidate is expected to full the duties associated with a position most successfully (in light of her education, native talents, work experience etc.) is the one that ought to be appointed to that position. While this principle is now widely accepted and deeply entrenched, the moral basis of it remains elusive.1 If employers are under a duty to appoint the most qualied candidate, to whom exactly is this duty owed, and on what grounds? There are broadly two kinds of answers to this question. Some insist that qualications generate entitlements for their bearer, such that the most qualied candidate has some moral claim or right to the job she is competing for. Being passed over in favor of a less qualied contender gives her grounds for complaint. I will refer to arguments of this kind as candidate-centered. But of course job-seekers are not the only parties with a stake in the decision. The existing employees of an organization, its clients and creditors, its shareholders, and society more generally are also (potentially) affected. The duty to hire on merit, one might argue, is owed ultimately to one or more of these stakeholder groups. I will be referring to arguments with this structure as stakeholder-centered. The purpose of this paper is to carefully distinguish, organize and scrutinize the various arguments within these
Exploitation, Working Poverty, and the Expressive Power of Wages
The ‘working poor’ are paid below-subsistence wages for full-time employment. What, if anything, is wrong with this? The extant philosophical literature offers two kinds of answers. The first says that failing to pay workers enough to live on takes unfair advantage of them; the workers are exploited. The second says that employers who fail to pay living wages default on a duty of care grounded in a special relationship; the workers are neglected. These arguments, though generally sound, provide an incomplete picture of the wrongdoing involved. Neither adequately captures the intuition that a firm treats its employees not just badly, but disdainfully, by failing to pay them a living wage. My goal is to bring this particular feature of the relationship to salience. Working full-time in return for below-subsistence, I will argue, is an arrangement under which the worker is demeaned. This becomes apparent once we appreciate the expressive power of wages, and the intimate connection between one’s labour and one’s self.
What's So Deviant about Production Deviance? The Ethics of 'Withholding Effort' in the Workplace
In the world of human resource management employees who deliberately \"withhold effort\" on the job are called \"production deviants.\" The implication is that workers are under a duty to perform as best they can, but why should we accept this? Three answers are presented and interrogated. The first says that employees who withhold effort are guilty of \"time-banditry\" or theft from their employers. The second says that withholding effort harms one's colleagues or co-workers. The third suggests that employees owe their employers a debt of gratitude, whose discharge requires that they be as productive as they reasonably can be.