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Quine's conception of philosophy, his doctrine of naturalism, is analyzed as springing from a negative side, the rejection of first philosophy, through holism and unregenerate realism, and leading to an affirmative side, the acceptance of science as the ultimate instance. Quine's position is compared with Lauener's pragmatic or open transcendentalism, which is conventionalist and explicitly non-naturalistic but in spite of a whole string of differences nevertheless similar to the former. Finally a naturalistic position gains preference because it has more explanatory power and a purely conventionalist account of logic (and mathematics) seems quite unrealistic.

Quine has long maintained in connection with his theses of under-determination of physical theory and indeterminacy of translation that there is a fact of the matter to physics but no fact of the matter to translation. In this paper, I investigate Quine's reasoning for this claim. I show that Quine's thinking about under-determination over the last twenty-five years has landed him in a contradiction: he says of two global physical theories that are empirically equivalent but logically incompatible that only one is true and that they are both true. In accord with the former position, I explain Quine's semantical argument for the claim that there is a fact of the matter to physics but not to translation. However, Quine has apparently come to regard this position as inconsistent with his empiricistic scruples: if both theories imply all and only true observation categoricals, then in what sense could one of them be false? Quine's trivial expedient argument construes such pairs of theories as merely two true descriptions of the same world in different terms. In accord with this latter position, I suggest that Quine is left without a way to differentiate under-determination and indeterminacy. In short, Quine's contradiction poses a serious dilemma: either only one such theory is true and his empiricism is sacrificed, or both theories are true and his distinction between under-determination and indeterminacy is sacrificed.

Quine's doctrine of underdetermination of physical theory presents him with a dilemma: Should he say of two global theory formulations that are empirically equivalent, logically compatible, equally simple, but which cannot be rendered logically equivalent by any known reconstrual of predicates, that they are both true (the ecumenical view) or that only one of them is true (the sectarian view)? If the former, then Quine's commitment to naturalism is at risk; if the latter, then his commitment to empiricism is at risk. When confronted with the dilemma Quine initially opted for the sectarian view. A.C. Genova finds Quine's sectarian resolution of the dilemma unsatisfactory. He advocates, instead, an ecumenical resolution of the dilemma which, he maintains, is compatible with Quine's (and Davidson's) most prominent views. I disagree; I argue that Genova's way out involves a relativistic notion of true that is incompatible with Quine's (and Davidson's) absolutist view of truth. I then present Quine's latest thoughts on the dilemma of underdetermination. La doctrine de Quine sur la sous-détermination de la théorie physique place celui-ci devant un dilemme: doit-il dire, de deux formulations d'une théorie globale qui sont empiriquement équivalentes, logiquement compatibles, également simples, mais qui ne peuvent être rendues logiquement équivalentes par aucune réinterprétation connue des prédicats, qu'elles sont toutes deux vraies (thèse œcuménique) ou qu'une seule d'entre elles est vraie (thèse sectaire)? — Dans le premier cas, l'engagement de Quine pour le naturalisme est menacé, dans le second, c'est son engagement pour l'empirisme qui est menacé. Placé devant ce dilemme, Quine a d'abord choisi la thèse sectaire. A.C. Genova trouve insuffisante cette solution sectaire du dilemme. Il défend au con-, traire une solution oecuménique qui, prétend-il, est compatible avec les thèses principales de Quine (et de Davidson). Je conteste; je montre que la solution de Genova suppose une conception relativiste de la vérité qui est incompatible avec la conception absolutiste de Quine (et de Davidson). Je présente ensuite les dernières positions de Quine sur le dilemme de la sous-détermination. Quines Doktrin von der Unterbestimmtheit physikalischer Theorien konfrontiert ihn mit einem Dilemma: Sollte er von zwei globalen, empirisch äquivalenten, logisch kompatiblen und gleich einfachen Theorieformulierungen, die durch keine bekannte Rekonstruktion der Prädikate logisch äquivalent gemacht werden können, behaupten, dass sie beide wahr sind (die ökumenische Position) oder dass nur eine von ihnen wahr ist (die sektiererische Position)? Entscheidet sich Quine für ersteres, so gerät sein Naturalismus ins Wanken; entscheidet er sich für letzteres, so ist sein Empirismus bedroht. Als Quine mit dem Dilemma konfrontiert worden ist, entschied er sich ursprünglich für die sektiererische Position. A.C. Genova hält Quines sektiererische Behebung des Dilemmas für unbefriedigend. Er befürwortet stattdessen eine ökumenische Lösung, die, wie er behauptet, mit den wichtigsten Quineschen (und Davisonschen) Ansichten verträglich ist. Damit bin ich nicht einverstanden; ich argumentiere, dass Genovas Ausweg einen relativistischen Wahrheitsbegriff bedingt, der mit Quines (und Davidsons) absolutistischer Wahrheitsauffassung unverträglich ist. Anschliessend erläutere ich Quines neuste Ansichten zum Dilemma der Unterbestimmtheit.