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Patronage systems in public service are reviled as undemocratic and corrupt. Yet patronage was the prevailing method of staffing government for centuries, and in some countries it still is. Grindle considers why patronage has been ubiquitous in history and explores the processes through which it is replaced by merit-based civil service systems.

Audacious Reforms examines the creation of new political institutions in three Latin American countries: direct elections for governors and mayors in Venezuela, radical municipalization in Bolivia, and direct election of the mayor of Buenos Aires in Argentina. Diverging from the usual incremental processes of political change, these cases marked a significant departure from traditional centralized governments. Such \"audacious reforms, \" explains Merilee S. Grindle, reinvent the ways in which public problems are manifested and resolved, the ways in which political actors calculate the costs and benefits of their activities, and the ways in which social groups relate to the political process. Grindle considers three central questions: Why would rational politicians choose to give up power? What accounts for the selection of some institutions rather than others? And how does the introduction of new institutions alter the nature of political actions? The case studies of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Argentina demonstrate that institutional invention must be understood from theoretical perspectives that stretch beyond immediate concerns about electoral gains and political support building. Broader theoretical perspectives on the definition of nation and state, the nature of political contests, the legitimacy of political systems, and the role of elites all must be considered. While past conflicts are not erased by reforms, in the new order there is often greater potential for more responsible, accountable, and democratic government.

Effective government performance is central to the creation of market‐oriented economies, secure and productive populations, and democratic political systems in developing countries. Capacity building to improve public sector performance is thus an important focus of development initiatives. Several implicit assumptions underlie most such efforts: that organizations or training activities are the logical site for capacity‐building interventions; that administrative structures and monetary rewards determine organizational and individual performance; that organizations work well when structures and control mechanisms are in place; and that individual performance improves as a result of skill and technology transfer through training activities. Each of these assumptions is called into question by the findings of research carried out in six developing countries and reported in this article. Our studies indicate designing interventions that most constructively address sources of poor performance must follow from an assessment of a relatively broad set of variables, including the action environment in which all such activities take place. We also found that effective public sector performance is more often driven by strong organizational cultures, good management practices, and effective communication networks than it is by rules and regulations or procedures and pay scales. Our case studies further indicate that individual performance is more affected by opportunities for meaningful work, shared professional norms, teamwork, and promotion based on performance rather than it is by training in specific skills. In this article, we describe a framework or conceptual map that emphasizes that training activities, organizational performance and administrative structures are embedded within complex environments that significantly constrain their success and that often account for training or organizational failure. When it was applied in the six case study countries, the framework proved useful in identifying capacity gaps and providing a tool for the strategic design of interventions that are sensitive to the roots of performance deficits. This allows us to conclude that the assumptions underlying many capacity‐building initiatives may focus attention on interventions that do not generate the highest payoffs in terms of improved performance.

Patronage systems in public service are reviled as undemocratic and corrupt. Yet patronage was the prevailing method of staffing government for centuries, and in some countries it still is. Grindle considers why patronage has been ubiquitous in history and explores the processes through which it is replaced by merit-based civil service systems.

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, career civil services were constructed in the now developed countries of the world. Prior to their creation, public service recruitment systems based on patronage had been of use to kings, party politicians, class elites, revolutionaries, reformers, and rascals, and had demonstrated adaptability to a wide variety of purposes. The transition from patronage to a formal career service was generally a long process, fraught with conflict between those who sought reform and those who found benefits in a continuation of the status quo. Moreover, the introduction of new systems did not end contestation about reform;

Traditions of public service in Latin America owe much to the patronage system inherited from colonial empires. Kings and viceroys, nineteenth- and twentieth-century presidents, cabinet ministers, party leaders, agency and department heads, among many others, personally appointed the officials who carried out the work of government. As elsewhere, positions in government were awarded for a variety of purposes, and appointments were often the result of pulling strings and pleading for the attention of potential patrons.¹ Across broad expanses of time, this system of personal appointments remained a fundamental aspect of politics and administration. Yet its use had distinct consequences for

Introducing career civil services in Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and Chile was surprisingly easy. Small groups of reformers generated ideas, little public and intra-governmental discussion accompanied the planning process, and negotiations and approval processes took place under conditions that eased acceptance of the new systems. A new and centralizing regime in Brazil, an economic crisis in Argentina, an electoral standoff among parties in Mexico, a corruption scandal in Chile—the story for each is distinct, but in all, unusual circumstances surrounded how the well-institutionalized patronage process was challenged and replaced in law. These unusual circumstances limited the extent to which opposition

Career civil service systems were constructed in the United States, Europe, and Japan in the nineteenth century. In some cases, their introduction was established through laws or regulations that set up commissions to oversee the recruitment, promotion, monitoring, and pensioning of public servants; in other cases, the systems evolved without a single legitimizing moment, but became accepted fact through gradual accretion of practice and regulations. However they emerged, reform initiatives were everywhere subject to questioning and contestation, and they took shape in ways that reflected these conflicts. In addition to the difficulties of their birth, new systems faced further challenges,