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The development of mineral resources in the Arctic territories is one of the priorities of the state policy of Russia. This endeavor requires modern technologies, high-quality personnel, and a large number of labor resources. However, the regions of the Arctic are characterized by difficult working and living conditions, which makes them unattractive to the working population. The research objectives were to study the importance of Arctic mineral resources for the Russian economy, the Arctic mineral resource potential, and the migration attractiveness of Arctic regions. The migration processes in these locations were analyzed and modeled using a new econometric tool—complex-valued regression models. The authors assume that the attractiveness of the Arctic regions is determined by the level of their social and economic development and can be assessed using a number of indicators. A comparative analysis of four regions that are entirely in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation was carried out based on the calculation of integral indicators of the social and economic attractiveness of these territories. Forecasting migration growth using the proposed complex-valued models produced better results than simple trend extrapolation. The authors conclude that complex-valued economic models can be successfully used to forecast migration processes in the Arctic regions of Russia. Understanding and predicting migration processes in the Arctic will make it possible to develop recommendations for attracting labor resources to the region, which will contribute to the successful development of its resource potential. The methodology of this study includes desk studies, a graphical method, arithmetic calculations, correlation analysis, statistical analysis, and the methods of the complex-valued economy.

The American Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which aims to fight corruption of foreign officials, applies under some circumstances to foreign firms located outside the United States. Empirical evidence shows that when the Department of Justice or the Securities and Exchange Commission opens a case for an alleged violation of the FCPA against a foreign firm, the latter systematically accepts to settle. We argue that the structure of the pretrial phase led by the prosecutor results in a settlement even when a trial would have led to a more favorable outcome for the defendant. We use a Contest Success Function á la Tullock that we modify to capture the specificities of the procedure under the FCPA. First, we consider the parties’ expenditures during the ‘bargaining process (as opposed to the actual litigation costs) determine the outcome of the trial. Second, we assume that the effect of the prosecuting authority’s expenditures on the probability of winning in case of trial is stronger than that of the defendant’s. We show that in this framework, the case is always settled out of court. Systematic settlement entails a social cost which consists in the total absence of case law regarding the extraterritorial effect of the FCPA.

With debates surrounding the decriminalisation of certain illegal drugs raging in many countries around the world, this new book is a timely and sober reflection on one of the biggest social problems facing the world at large. Of interest not only to economists, but also to criminologists and those involved in policy-making, The Economics of Illegal Drugsis an accessible, comprehensive and international review of the topic and the usefulness of applying microeconomic analysis to drug production and distribution.

The social cost of drugs is the monetary cost of both the consequences of their trade and their consumption. In this paper, drugs considered are tobacco and alcohol, which are legal, plus those that are illegal. The social cost is the sum of the external cost: value of loss in quality of life, value of years of life lost and value of loss in productivity, plus public expenditure. Public expenditure consists of public spending on medical care, prevention, and law enforcement, minus savings from unpaid pensions and taxes levied on tobacco and alcohol. The parameters for the calculations have used the recommendations of a French governmental working group (2013) Quinet, L'évaluation socioéconomique des investissements publics [Internet], Centre d'Analyse Stratégique, 2013, http://www.strategie.gouv.fr/sites/strategie.gouv.fr/files/archives/CGSP_Evaluation_socioeconomique_17092013.pdf, and the health data were derived from the scientific literature. The social costs are €122 billion for tobacco, €118 billion for alcohol, and €8.7 billion for illegal drugs. The largest fraction of the costs (53, 56, and 31 %, respectively) derives from the number of deaths, 79,000 for tobacco, 49,000 for alcohol, and 1600 for illegal drugs, given the high cost of a year of life lost (€115,000). The external cost corresponds to 86, 97, and 68 % of the social cost, respectively, for tobacco, alcohol, and illegal drugs. The annual drug-related net expenditure represents €13.9, €3.0, and €2.3 billion, respectively, for tobacco, alcohol, and illegal drugs. The tax revenues on tobacco and alcohol, €10.4 and €3.2 billion, represent less than half of the corresponding healthcare costs, which are €25.9 and €7.7 billion.

Frankreich erlebte mit Napoleon Bonaparte die Wiedergeburt der Casaren. Knapp funfunddreiig Jahre spater ergriff sein Neffe Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte die Macht. Von Anfang an stellte sich fur beide Regime die Frage nach der Legimation ihrer Macht. Bilder spielten in diesem Zusammenhang eine entscheidende Rolle. Anhand der Gemalde jener Jahre erklart Kopp den bonapartistischen Casarismus und betrachtet dabei erstmals das Erste und Zweite Kaiserreich gemeinsam.Der Einsatz von Kunst in der Politik hat in Frankreich spatestens seit Ludwig XIV. Tradition. Da kein Autor je eine politische Theorie des Bonapartismus verfasste, bleibt uns heute nur noch der ikonographische Weg. Die im Band untersuchten Bilder funktionieren wie ein Schlussel und bieten die Moglichkeit, die charakteristischen Merkmale des bonapartistischen Casarismus zu definieren.

With debates surrounding the decriminalisation of certain illegal drugs raging in many countries around the world, this new book is a timely and sober reflection on one of the biggest social problems facing the world at large. Of interest not only to economists, but also to criminologists and those involved in policy-making, The Economics of Illegal Drugs is an accessible, comprehensive and international review of the topic and the usefulness of applying microeconomic analysis to drug production and distribution. Pierre Kopp is Professor of Economics at Pantheon-Sorbonne University, Paris I, France.

L’autorité de la concurrence (ARCEP) a autorisé en 2011 l’introduction d’un quatrième opérateur de communications mobiles (Free) aux côtés d’Orange, SFR et Bouygues. L’accroissement du nombre d’acteurs devait améliorer l’efficience du secteur en renforçant la concurrence. Ce choix a été contesté par Deffains [2012] qui a montré que l’introduction de Free s’accompagnerait de la destruction de 50 000 emplois. A contrario , Thesmar et Landier [2012] attendaient de cette mesure la création nette de 16 000 à 30 000 emplois. Ces études ne s’intéressent qu’à l’effet sur l’emploi. Nous menons ici une analyse coût-bénéfices qui prend en compte toutes les conséquences de cette mesure, pour le consommateur, les entreprises et pour les finances publiques. L’arrivée de Free s’est traduite par un gain annuel d’environ 1,2 milliard d’euros pour les consommateurs. Ce gain est compensé par une perte d’un montant un peu plus élevé pour les producteurs. Mais il s’accompagne d’une perte annuelle d’environ 0,4 milliard pour les finances publiques. Au total, la décision politique prise apparaît regrettable. On examine aussi les raisons pour lesquelles, dans le secteur considéré, un renforcement de la concurrence n’est pas forcément bénéfique. A new player on the french mobile phone market : a cost benefit analysis The competition authority (ARCEP) authorized in 2011 the introduction of a fourth mobile operator (Free) alongside Orange, SFR and Bouygues. More competitors was expected to mean more competition, which was supposed to improve the efficiency of the sector. This choice was questioned by Deffains [2012] who showed that the introduction of Free would entail the destruction of 50.000 jobs. Conversely Thesmar and Landier [2012] expected from that measure the net creation of 16.000 to 30.000 jobs. These studies were focussed on the effect on employment. Here, we conduct a cost-benefit study that takes into account all the consequences of this measure to consumers, businesses and public finance. The arrival of Free has resulted in an annual increase of the consumer surplus of approximately € 1.2 billion. This gain is offset by a loss of a slightly higher amount for producers. But it is accompanied by a loss of about € 0.4 billion for public finance. In the end, the welfare impact of this decision is regrettable. The paper also discusses the reasons for which the benefits of competition were unlikely to materialize in the mobile phone sector.

RésuméCet article marque une rupture avec la littérature consacrée à évaluer le coût social des drogues légales (alcool et tabac) et illicites car il prend également en compte, dans une analyse « coût-bénéfice », les bénéfices engendrés par les drogues afin de mesurer leur impact sur le bien-être, en France, dans les années 2000.Il s’avère que toutes les drogues ont un impact négatif sur le bien-être. Le tabac diminue le bien-être de 14 milliards d’euros, l’alcool de 7 milliards et les drogues illégales de 1 milliard.La différence entre les effets sur le bien-être de l’alcool et du tabac tient à plusieurs facteurs : le chiffre d’affaires et le surplus du consommateur sont plus élevés pour l’alcool que pour le tabac. Les finances publiques sont très favorablement affectées par l’alcool. Le coût externe est à peu près identique.Les conséquences négatives des drogues illégales sont engendrées par l’usage dit « problématique » dont l’essentiel concerne la cocaïne et l’héroïne. Ces drogues étant peu consommées, l’effet négatif sur le bien-être est faible.Il conviendrait de prolonger cette recherche en tentant d’affecter précisément l’impact négatif des drogues à des modalités spécifiques de consommation afin de calibrer des politiques publiques plus finement adaptées à chacun des groupes de consommateurs (occasionnels, réguliers, abusifs). Are drugs beneficial for France ?This article marks a break from the literature dedicated to assess the social cost of legal drugs (alcohol and tobacco) and illegal drugs because it also takes into account, in an Cost-Benefit analysis, the profits generated by drugs in order to measure their impact on the welfare in France in the 2000s.It turns out that all drugs have a negative impact on the welfare. Smoking decreases the welfare of €14 billion, alcohol (€7 billions) and illegal drugs (€1 billion).The difference between the effects on the welfare of the alcohol and tobacco are due to several factors: revenue and consumer surplus are higher for alcohol than for tobacco. Public finances are very favourably affected by alcohol. The external cost is almost identical.Most of the negative consequences of illegal drug use are caused by so-called “problematic drug users” most of which relates to cocaine and heroin. These drugs are little used; the negative effect on welfare is low. This research should be extended by attempting to assign precisely the negative impact of drugs for each specific patterns of consumption in order to calibrate public policies tailored to each consumer group (casual, regular, abusive).Classification JEL  : H 51, D 61, D 62

In 2001, the newly elected Paris Mayor started to implement an active probicycle policy, mainly based on investments in bike paths and on the launching of a bike rental system in July 2007 (Vélibs). This article aims at appraising such a public policy by measuring its welfare impact, expressed as the Net Present Value (NPV) of the overall changes generated over 2007-2010. Faster bikes perform more kilometres in Paris. Some people shift from cars, buses, and subway to bikes and Vélibs. Switching from a passive mode of transportation to bicycle has a positive health impact. The amounts of C02, local pollutants, noise and congestion externalities generated by each mode are also changing. By contrast, the speed of car is slightly reduced, partially because of a narrowed road capacity. Public finance is affected by the change in fiscal revenues collected whereas the bike rental system's operator (Decaux) realizes some profits. Finally, the pro-bicycle policy has an initial investment cost and a residual value. All these changes are calculated and computed in a same monetary unit. This policy is (slightly) beneficial for society (a total NPV of + 136 M€) even if the cost for public finance (-704 M∊) is close to the bikers' benefit (+859 M∊). Velibers are highly subsidized by the city. This policy is also working at the expense of the cars' drivers (-286 M∊) while positive externalities are not very important (+101 M∊) and Decaux's profits are moderated (+166 M∊). Several sensitivity analyses are conducted to identify the key drivers of the policy's success.