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"Lapointe, Sandra"
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Bolzano a priori knowledge, and the Classical Model of Science
This paper is aimed at understanding one central aspect of Bolzano's views on deductive knowledge: what it means for a proposition and for a term to be known a priori. I argue that, for Bolzano, a priori knowledge is knowledge by virtue of meaning and that Bolzano has substantial views about meaning and what it is to know the latter. In particular, Bolzano believes that meaning is determined by implicit definition, i.e. the fundamental propositions in a deductive system. I go into some detail in presenting and discussing Bolzano's views on grounding, a priori knowledge and implicit definition. I explain why other aspects of Bolzano's theory and, in particular, his peculiar understanding of analyticity and the related notion of Ableitbarkeit might, as it has invariably in the past, mislead one to believe that Bolzano lacks a significant account oï a priori knowledge. Throughout the paper, I point out to the ways in which, in this respect, Bolzano's antagonistic relationship to Kant directly shaped his own views.
Journal Article
All Hands on Deck: Enabling Social Innovation
Social innovation's rather unsympathetic relationship with promoters of Intellectual Property (IP) and commercialization as the holy grail of economic success is not a deficiency; it is quite intentional. The process of creating lasting change on complex challenges takes time and requires an all-hands-on-deck approach. Intermediary action-oriented agencies like SI Canada can provide the network and process innovation infrastructure to support the development and testing of transformative ideas. Synergistically, academy-based knowledge brokers like The/La Collaborative can help leverage knowledge and skills to produce the evidence needed for systems-level investment in these transformative ideas.
Journal Article
On Bolzano's Alleged Explicativism
Bolzano was the first to establish an explicit distinction between the deductive methods that allow us to recognise the certainty of a given truth and those that provide its objective ground. His conception of the relation between what we, in this paper, call \"subjective consequence\", i.e., the relation from epistemic reason to consequence and \"objective consequence\", i.e., grounding (Abfolge) however allows for an interpretation according to which Bolzano advocates an \"explicativist\" conception of proof: proofs par excellence are those that reflect the objective order of grounding. In this paper, we expose the problems involved by such a conception and argue in favour of a more rigorous demarcation between the ontological and the epistemological concern in the elaboration of a theory of demonstration.
Journal Article
Bolzano, Quine, and Logical Truth
Gary Kemp: Quine's Relationship with Analytic Philosophy: I try to explain why Quine, for all his fame amongst analytic philosophers, has so few explicit followers within analytic philosophy of the past fifty years – despite the fact that naturalism, at least as broadly conceived, is so popular. Partly it's because Quine's particular version of naturalism is so demanding, partly it's because the nature and seriousness of his commitment to extensionalism are not well recognized, and partly because his views were formulated from an extremely general and abstract point of view in the philosophy of science. I focus on the second and especially on the third. Quine is more radical and more alien than is customarily appreciated.
Book Chapter