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Sustainable development prospects are not substantially visible in the comparative analysis of models of capitalism. The concept of sustainable development does not appear in the initial theoretical framework of the \"variety of capitalism\" approach or in the \"diversity of capitalism\" approach. This article aims to contribute to current thinking about the interaction between the diversity of capitalism and sustainable development, based on the concepts of institutional complementarity and hierarchy, and to question the dynamics of various forms of capitalism in this perspective. The example of economic policies aimed at tackling global warming shows how each form of capitalism adopts measures that are compatible with its own unique configuration of complementary institutions, helping to make it \"greener.\" However, this trend fits into a dynamic of \"limited sustainability\" that does not challenge the finance-dominated institutional hierarchy or the current growth regime. The non-viability of our production/consumption model on a global scale calls for a more radical change in capitalism, combined with a shift in the institutional hierarchy.

From the fourth quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 2020, the monetary base in the euro area grew by 330%, the money supply by 61% and inflation measured by the consumer price index - only 17%. Interest rates are around zero and negative, inflation is low, and we often register deflation. This discrepancy between the growth of money and prices has not only practical dimensions for the ECB and FED monetary policy, but also a theoretical significance. In this contribution, we propose an interpretation of these trends on the basis of concepts developed by J. Kornai in his Economics of Shortage analysis, from which we derive our insights on the sovereign debt market situation in European countries. J. Kornai was an unclassifiable economist whose work reflected to some extent the influence of the Austrian School of economics. The point here is not to transpose Kornai’s shortage economy analysis to European capitalist economies, but to show that similar phenomena are appearing today in a different institutional context.

Après avoir mis en évidence la concurrence fiscale qui sévit entre membres de l’Union européenne, phénomène qui s’est accentué depuis le début des années 1990 et que le dernier élargissement de 2004-2007 a encore renforcé, l’auteur en analyse les effets positifs et négatifs avec une attention particulière portée au régime de la flat tax adopté par les nouveaux pays membres. Si le risque de délocalisation des activités et surtout des bases d’imposition est souligné, la remise en cause du caractère redistributif de l’impôt qui en découle apparaît comme une menace sérieuse pour le système de protection sociale. C’est pourquoi, l’auteur s’interroge in fine sur l’avenir du ou des modèles sociaux européens et sur l’attraction respective exercée dans ce contexte par les capitalismes anglo-saxon et social-démocrate. Tax competition among EU member states is not new, and has increased since 1990 and even more following the 2004–2007 enlargment to eastern European countries. Its positive and negative aspects are analyzed while paying close attention to the flat tax system adopted by new member states. Given the risk of production plants and tax bases relocating elsewhere, the tax system’s redistributive function would be impaired, whence a threat to the European welfare model. For this reason, questions are raised about this model’s prospects and about the attraction exerted by the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic models of capitalism.

Tax competition among EU member states is not new, and has increased since 1990 and even more following the 2004-2007 enlargement to eastern European countries. Its positive and negative aspects are analyzed while paying close attention to the flat tax system adopted by new member states. Given the risk of production plants and tax bases relocating elsewhere, the tax systems redistributive function would be impaired, whence a threat to the European welfare model. For this reason, questions are raised about this models prospects and about the attraction exerted by the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic models of capitalism. Adapted from the source document.

Analyse des effets positifs et négatifs, sur le modèle social et le système de protection sociale, de la concurrence fiscale qui sévit entre membres de l'Union européenne, phénomène qui s'est accentué depuis le début des années 1990 et que le dernier élargissement de 2004-2007 a encore renforcé. Une attention particulière est portée au régime de la flat tax adopté par les nouveaux pays membres. Reproduced by permission of Bibliothèque de Sciences Po

Les programmes de privatisation hongrois et tchèque engagés au début des années 1990 ont conduit à la formation de relations de propriété entre banques, entreprises et État. Cette structure de détention du capital ne semble pas avoir favorisé une allocation efficace du crédit, ni permis de soutenir durablement investissement dans le contexte institutionnel post-socialiste. Face à l'augmentation des prêts improductifs, les deux pays ont réagi de façon comparable. La Hongrie a procédé à une restructuration financière des banques et des entreprises en 1993-94 qui a ouvert la voie à leur privatisation entre 1995 et 1997. La République tchèque a entamé en 1997 une réforme de ses institutions financières et la privatisation de ses principales banques. Dans les deux cas, ces mesures modifient l'appropriation du capital connue jusque-là, en désenchevêtrant les relations de propriété banque-État-industrie, et incitent les banques à une gestion plus prudente. Toutefois, les expériences hongroise et tchèque semblent indiquer que la propriété n'est pas le seul déterminant d'une distribution efficace du crédit. The Hungarian and Czech privatization programs launched in the early 1990s involved banks, firms and the state as owners. This share-holding structure apparently did not lead to an efficient allocation of credit; nor did it provide lasting support for investment in the post-Communist institutional context. Given the increase in nonperforming loans, these two countries have reacted alike. Hungary financially restructured banks and firms in 1993-1994, and thus opened the way to their privatization in 1995-1997. In 1997, the Czech Republic started reforming its financial institutions and privatizing major banks. In both cases, these measures have modified the structure of capital and share-holding by \"sorting out\" the property relations between banks, state and industries and by making banks adopt a more prudent loan management practice. However, these two experiences seem to suggest that ownership is not the only determinant of an efficient allocation of credit.