Explore the vast range of titles available.

Ideational variables have frequently been employed in positivist-minded and materialist analyses of state behaviour. Almost inevitably, because of these commitments, such studies run into theoretical challenges relating to the use of ideas. In this article, I suggest that integrating ideational factors in positivist and materialist approaches to state behaviour requires: (1) distinguishing conceptually between interests and ideation as well as between individual beliefs and social ideas; and (2) addressing challenges of operationalisation and measurability. To that end, I employ neoclassical realism as a case study. I argue that a re-conceptualisation of ideas as externalised individual beliefs employed in political deliberation allows neoclassical realists to focus on how ideas and ideational competition intervene in the transmission belt from materially given interests to foreign policy choice. At the same time, it more clearly operationalises ideas as identifiable in language and communication. I suggest this reconceptualisation, while consistent with realist paradigmatic assumptions, need not be limited to neoclassical realism. Instead, transposed to different paradigms, it would similarly allow positivist-minded constructivists and institutionalists to avoid a conceptually and methodologically awkward equation of different ideational factors.

How do right-wing-populist incumbents navigate rhetorical strategic choices when they seek to manage external crises? Relevant literature has paid increasing attention to the role of ‘crisis’ in boosting the electoral success of right-wing populist candidates. We know a lot less about the rhetorical strategies used by right-wing populist incumbents seeking re-election. We draw on literatures on populism, crisis management and political rhetoric to conceptualize the rhetorical strategic choices of right-wing populist incumbents in times of crisis. We propose a framework for the choice of rhetorical strategy available to right-wing populist incumbents and illustrate it with a qualitative content analysis of Trump's tweets and White House press briefings during the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic. We find limited rhetorical adaptation to crisis and high degrees of continuity with previous rhetoric grounded in right-wing populism. This challenges prevalent assumptions regarding the likelihood of incumbent rhetorical flexibility in the face of crisis.

Altmetrics are an emerging form of bibliometric measurement that capture the online dimension of scholarly exchange. Against the backdrop of both a higher education landscape increasingly focused on quantifying research productivity and impact, as well as literature emphasising the need to address gender bias in the discipline, we consider whether and how altmetrics (re)produce gendered dynamics in political science. Using a novel dataset on the Altmetric Attention Scores (AAS) of political science research, we investigate two questions: Do AAS vary by gender? And how do AAS relate to gendered social media dynamics? We find that AAS reproduce gendered dynamics found in disciplinary publication and citation practices. For example, journal articles authored exclusively by female scholars score 27% lower on average than exclusively male-authored outputs. However, men are also more likely to write articles with an AAS of zero. These patterns are shaped by the presence of high-scoring male “superstars” whose research attracts much online attention. Complementing existing scholarship, we show that the AAS closely overlaps with virality dynamics on Twitter. We suggest that these gendered dynamics may be hidden behind the seemingly neutral, technical character of altmetrics, which is worrisome where they are used to evaluate scholarship.

Literature that deals with the 2011 Libyan intervention tends to ignore the practical means of the intervention, and instead focuses on its justifications. In particular, rational-actor and two-stage decision-making models often artificially differentiate between the choice to intervene and the choice of tools to do so. This paper argues that this differentiation ignores the interactive effects between these supposedly different choices, and that the perceived availability and attractiveness of particular tools may influence the choice to intervene. The paper probes this suggestion with a case study on the Libyan intervention. It argues that the suggestion of a no-fly zone majorly influenced the international decision-making process in the UN Security Council, and proved a “silver bullet” to compromise, because the no-fly zone appeared attractive both to supporters and critics of an intervention. To its proponents, the no-fly zone suggested a low-cost, low-risk alternative to more forceful measures while still signaling strong commitment and the will to “do something” against the Gaddafi regime. To opponents of intervention, previous uses of the nofly zone in Iraq and Bosnia supposedly made the tool a known concept that entailed its passiveness and strictly rule-bound character. The flaws in these assessments and the hasty process of mandating UN resolution 1973 already foreshadowed later dissent over the correct interpretation of the no-fly zone mandate. Continuing political differences in the international community were thus painted over, rather than resolved: this had consequences in Syria, where calls for a no-fly zone were refused with explicit reference to the Libyan experience.