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Under the bottom-up architecture of the Paris Agreement, countries pledge Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Current NDCs individually align, at best, with divergent concepts of equity and are collectively inconsistent with the Paris Agreement. We show that the global 2030-emissions of NDCs match the sum of each country adopting the least-stringent of five effort-sharing allocations of a well-below 2 °C-scenario. Extending such a self-interested bottom-up aggregation of equity might lead to a median 2100-warming of 2.3 °C. Tightening the warming goal of each country’s effort-sharing approach to aspirational levels of 1.1 °C and 1.3 °C could achieve the 1.5 °C and well-below 2 °C-thresholds, respectively. This new hybrid allocation reconciles the bottom-up nature of the Paris Agreement with its top-down warming thresholds and provides a temperature metric to assess NDCs. When taken as benchmark by other countries, the NDCs of India, the EU, the USA and China lead to 2.6 °C, 3.2 °C, 4 °C and over 5.1 °C warmings, respectively. The Paris Agreement includes bottom-up pledges and top-down warming threshold. Under this setting where countries effectively choose their own fairness principle, this article assesses the global warming implied by each Nationally Determined Contribution to inform the future ratcheting-up process.

Over the last five years prior to the Glasgow Climate Pact 1 , 154 Parties have submitted new or updated 2030 mitigation goals in their nationally determined contributions and 76 have put forward longer-term pledges. Quantifications of the pledges before the 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26) suggested a less than 50 per cent chance of keeping warming below 2 degrees Celsius 2 – 5 . Here we show that warming can be kept just below 2 degrees Celsius if all conditional and unconditional pledges are implemented in full and on time. Peak warming could be limited to 1.9–2.0 degrees Celsius (5%–95% range 1.4–2.8 °C) in the full implementation case—building on a probabilistic characterization of Earth system uncertainties in line with the Working Group I contribution to the Sixth Assessment Report 6 of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). We retrospectively project twenty-first-century warming to show how the aggregate level of ambition changed from 2015 to 2021. Our results rely on the extrapolation of time-limited targets beyond 2030 or 2050, characteristics of the IPCC 1.5 °C Special Report (SR1.5) scenario database 7 and the full implementation of pledges. More pessimistic assumptions on these factors would lead to higher temperature projections. A second, independent emissions modelling framework projected peak warming of 1.8 degrees Celsius, supporting the finding that realized pledges could limit warming to just below 2 degrees Celsius. Limiting warming not only to ‘just below’ but to ‘well below’ 2 degrees Celsius or 1.5 degrees Celsius urgently requires policies and actions to bring about steep emission reductions this decade, aligned with mid-century global net-zero CO 2 emissions. If all new and updated national climate change mitigation pledges stemming from the Paris Agreement are implemented in full and on time, then 21st-century warming could be limited to just below 2 degrees Celsius.

Emissions inevitably approach zero with a “carbon law” Although the Paris Agreement's goals ( 1 ) are aligned with science ( 2 ) and can, in principle, be technically and economically achieved ( 3 ), alarming inconsistencies remain between science-based targets and national commitments. Despite progress during the 2016 Marrakech climate negotiations, long-term goals can be trumped by political short-termism. Following the Agreement, which became international law earlier than expected, several countries published mid-century decarbonization strategies, with more due soon. Model-based decarbonization assessments ( 4 ) and scenarios often struggle to capture transformative change and the dynamics associated with it: disruption, innovation, and nonlinear change in human behavior. For example, in just 2 years, China's coal use swung from 3.7% growth in 2013 to a decline of 3.7% in 2015 ( 5 ). To harness these dynamics and to calibrate for short-term realpolitik, we propose framing the decarbonization challenge in terms of a global decadal roadmap based on a simple heuristic—a “carbon law”—of halving gross anthropogenic carbon-dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions every decade. Complemented by immediately instigated, scalable carbon removal and efforts to ramp down land-use CO 2 emissions, this can lead to net-zero emissions around mid-century, a path necessary to limit warming to well below 2°C.

To understand how global warming can be kept well below 2 degrees Celsius and even 1.5 degrees Celsius, climate policy uses scenarios that describe how society could reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. However, current scenarios have a key weakness: they typically focus on reaching specific climate goals in 2100. This choice may encourage risky pathways that delay action, reach higher-than-acceptable mid-century warming, and rely on net removal of carbon dioxide thereafter to undo their initial shortfall in reductions of emissions. Here we draw on insights from physical science to propose a scenario framework that focuses on capping global warming at a specific maximum level with either temperature stabilization or reversal thereafter. The ambition of climate action until carbon neutrality determines peak warming, and can be followed by a variety of long-term states with different sustainability implications. The approach proposed here closely mirrors the intentions of the United Nations Paris Agreement, and makes questions of intergenerational equity into explicit design choices. Fundamental value judgments about acceptable maximum levels of climate change and future reliance on controversial technologies can be made explicitly in climate scenarios, thereby addressing the intergenerational bias present in the scenario literature.

Climate extremes, such as droughts or heat waves, can lead to harvest failures and threaten the livelihoods of agricultural producers and the food security of communities worldwide. Improving our understanding of their impacts on crop yields is crucial to enhance the resilience of the global food system. This study analyses, to our knowledge for the first time, the impacts of climate extremes on yield anomalies of maize, soybeans, rice and spring wheat at the global scale using sub-national yield data and applying a machine-learning algorithm. We find that growing season climate factors-including mean climate as well as climate extremes-explain 20%-49% of the variance of yield anomalies (the range describes the differences between crop types), with 18%-43% of the explained variance attributable to climate extremes, depending on crop type. Temperature-related extremes show a stronger association with yield anomalies than precipitation-related factors, while irrigation partly mitigates negative effects of high temperature extremes. We developed a composite indicator to identify hotspot regions that are critical for global production and particularly susceptible to the effects of climate extremes. These regions include North America for maize, spring wheat and soy production, Asia in the case of maize and rice production as well as Europe for spring wheat production. Our study highlights the importance of considering climate extremes for agricultural predictions and adaptation planning and provides an overview of critical regions that are most susceptible to variations in growing season climate and climate extremes.

Models and scenarios on which climate projection are based vary between IPCC reports. To facilitate meaningful comparison, this study provides probabilistic climate projections for different scenarios in a single consistent framework, incorporating the overall consensus understanding of the uncertainty in climate sensitivity, and constrained by the observed historical warming. Climate projections for the fourth assessment report 1 (AR4) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) were based on scenarios from the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios 2 (SRES) and simulations of the third phase of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project 3 (CMIP3). Since then, a new set of four scenarios (the representative concentration pathways or RCPs) was designed 4 . Climate projections in the IPCC fifth assessment report (AR5) will be based on the fifth phase of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project 5 (CMIP5), which incorporates the latest versions of climate models and focuses on RCPs. This implies that by AR5 both models and scenarios will have changed, making a comparison with earlier literature challenging. To facilitate this comparison, we provide probabilistic climate projections of both SRES scenarios and RCPs in a single consistent framework. These estimates are based on a model set-up that probabilistically takes into account the overall consensus understanding of climate sensitivity uncertainty, synthesizes the understanding of climate system and carbon-cycle behaviour, and is at the same time constrained by the observed historical warming.

The Paris climate agreement aims at holding global warming to well below 2 degrees Celsius and to “pursue efforts” to limit it to 1.5 degrees Celsius. To accomplish this, countries have submitted Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) outlining their post-2020 climate action. Here we assess the effect of current INDCs on reducing aggregate greenhouse gas emissions, its implications for achieving the temperature objective of the Paris climate agreement, and potential options for overachievement. The INDCs collectively lower greenhouse gas emissions compared to where current policies stand, but still imply a median warming of 2.6–3.1 degrees Celsius by 2100. More can be achieved, because the agreement stipulates that targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions are strengthened over time, both in ambition and scope. Substantial enhancement or over-delivery on current INDCs by additional national, sub-national and non-state actions is required to maintain a reasonable chance of meeting the target of keeping warming well below 2 degrees Celsius. The objective of the Paris climate agreement is to limit global-average temperature increase to well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and to further pursue limiting it to 1.5 degrees Celsius; here, the adequacy of the national plans submitted in preparation for this agreement is assessed, and it is concluded that substantial enhancement or over-delivery on these plans is required to have a reasonable chance of achieving the Paris climate objective. Paris climate action plans assessed The principal climate goal of the Paris Agreement of December 2015 is to hold the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees above pre-industrial levels. This Perspective assesses the national plans submitted to the Paris meeting for post-2020 action to reduce global greenhouse gas emission by 2030. It also provides projections for global mean temperature increase over the twenty-first century that would be consistent with the present national plans and discusses options that may help to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to levels that are more consistent with maintaining a reasonable chance of meeting the well below 2 degrees Celsius climate target.

The Paris climate goals and the Glasgow Climate Pact require anthropogenic carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions to decline to net zero by mid-century. This will require overcoming carbon lock-in throughout the energy system. Previous studies have focused on ‘committed emissions’ from capital investments in energy-consuming infrastructure, or potential (committed and uncommitted) emissions from fossil fuel reserves. Here we make the first bottom-up assessment of committed CO 2 emissions from fossil fuel-producing infrastructure, defined as existing and under-construction oil and gas fields and coal mines. We use a commercial model of the world’s 25 000 oil and gas fields and build a new dataset on coal mines in the nine largest coal-producing countries. Our central estimate of committed emissions is 936 Gt CO 2 , comprising 47% from coal, 35% from oil and 18% from gas. We find that staying within a 1.5 °C carbon budget (50% probability) implies leaving almost 40% of ‘developed reserves’ of fossil fuels unextracted. The finding that developed reserves substantially exceed the 1.5 °C carbon budget is robust to a Monte Carlo analysis of reserves data limitations, carbon budget uncertainties and oil prices. This study contributes to growing scholarship on the relevance of fossil fuel supply to climate mitigation. Going beyond recent warnings by the International Energy Agency, our results suggest that staying below 1.5 °C may require governments and companies not only to cease licensing and development of new fields and mines, but also to prematurely decommission a significant portion of those already developed.