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result(s) for
"Moati, Raoul"
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Levinas and the night of being
by
Wyche, Daniel
,
Moati, Raoul
,
Benoist, Jocelyn
in
Deconstruction
,
Ethics & Moral Philosophy
,
Infinite
2017,2016,2020
Can we say that metaphysics is over? That we live, as post-phenomenology claims, after GÇ£end of metaphysicsGÇ¥? Through a close reading of Levinas's masterpiece Totality and Infinity, Raoul Moati shows that things are much more complicated. Totality and Infinity proposes not so much an alternative to HeideggerGÇÖs ontology as a deeper elucidation of the meaning of GÇ£beingGÇ¥ beyond HeideggerGÇÖs fundamental ontology. The metaphor of the night becomes crucial in order to explore a nocturnal face of the events of being beyond their ontological reduction to the understanding of being. The deployment of being beyond its intentional or ontological reduction coincides with what Levinas calls GÇ£nocturnal events.GÇ¥ Insofar as the light of understanding hides them, it is only through deformalizing the traditional phenomenological approach to phenomena that Levinas leads us to their exploration and their systematic and mutual implications. Following Levinas's account of these nocturnal events, Moati elaborates the possibility of what he calls a metaphysics of society that cannot be integrated into the deconstructive grasp of the metaphysics of presence. Ultimately, Levinas and the Night of Being opens the possibility of a revival of metaphysics after the end of metaphysics.
CONCLUSION
2016
Against certain hasty interpretations that consider Derrida and Levinas together as the philosophers of alterity, and for that reason of the deconstruction of Western metaphysics, let us recall first and foremost that the perspective that Levinas adopts inTotality and Infinityis indeed a metaphysical one. We must also keep in mind that Derrida’s approach to alterity aligns itself with Husserl against Levinas’s critique of the latter. For Derrida, what is at stake is the return of Husserl’s phenomenology to its own intuitionist principle in order to show that by its theory of writing, communication, and above all the finalism
Book Chapter
The Utopia of the Dwelling
2016
Labor allows for a deferral of the dependence on the sensible and makes possible the mastery of the uncertain future of the element through the establishment of possession. For all that, however, labor in turn supposes the dimension of recollection (recueillement), which does not emerge from the singular fact of the ego. Recollection requires the presence of the Other in all of his or her discreteness, the infinite according to a specific ontological modality, in which the other qua other reserves its transcendence. The Other does not reveal himself or herself to the self in an expression and from the
Book Chapter
The Terrestrial Condition
2016
In the early period of his phenomenological development, the Heideggerian concept ofGeworfenheit, or “thrownness,” presented itself to Levinas as a potential alternative to Husserlian representationalism, though he would later move away from thrownness and toward an elaboration of jouissance, “enjoyment.” The question, then, is how the capacity of enjoyment to contest the primacy of representation—which entails the inclusion of the subject within the sensible element—is so radically distinguishable from the tragic condition of a being thrown into existence. The latter would indeed contradict the mere happiness of the atheistic separation that delimits the preliminary horizon of the
Book Chapter
Being toward Infinity
2016
For Levinas, it is a concretized form of Descartes’s idea of the infinite that is revealed in the relation to the face, in a manner not of reasoning but of the ethical ordeal of the finite in relation to the infinite that calls it into question. This notion of the infinite is not constituted by the self. The self can neither give the infinite to itself nor, we must recall, refuse it. The idea of the infinite assumes that the infinite organizes and initiates the idea that we possess; that is, it is the infinite that reveals itself to us,
Book Chapter