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Background Psychiatric disorders can pose problems in the assessment of decision-making capacity (DMC). This is so particularly where psychopathology is seen as the extreme end of a dimension that includes normality. Depression is an example of such a psychiatric disorder. Four abilities ( understanding , appreciating , reasoning and ability to express a choice ) are commonly assessed when determining DMC in psychiatry and uncertainty exists about the extent to which depression impacts capacity to make treatment or research participation decisions. Methods A systematic review of the medical ethical and empirical literature concerning depression and DMC was conducted. Medline, EMBASE and PsycInfo databases were searched for studies of depression and consent and DMC. Empirical studies and papers containing ethical analysis were extracted and analysed. Results 17 publications were identified. The clinical ethics studies highlighted appreciation of information as the ability that can be impaired in depression, indicating that emotional factors can impact on DMC. The empirical studies reporting decision-making ability scores also highlighted impairment of appreciation but without evidence of strong impact. Measurement problems, however, looked likely. The frequency of clinical judgements of lack of DMC in people with depression varied greatly according to acuity of illness and whether judgements are structured or unstructured. Conclusions Depression can impair DMC especially if severe. Most evidence indicates appreciation as the ability primarily impaired by depressive illness. Understanding and measuring the appreciation ability in depression remains a problem in need of further research.

Many jurisdictions use a functional model of capacity with similar legal criteria, but there is a lack of agreed understanding as to how to apply these criteria in practice. We aimed to develop a typology of capacity rationales to describe court practice in making capacity determinations and to guide professionals approaching capacity assessments. We analysed all published cases from courts in England and Wales [Court of Protection (CoP) judgments, or Court of Appeal cases from the CoP] containing rationales for incapacity or intact capacity(n = 131). Qualitative content analysis was used to develop a typology of capacity rationales or abilities. Relationships between the typology and legal criteria for capacity [Mental Capacity Act (MCA)] and diagnoses were analysed. The typology had nine categories (reliability: kappa = 0.63): 1) to grasp information or concepts, 2) to imagine/ abstract, 3) to remember, 4) to appreciate, 5) to value/ care, 6) to think through the decision non-impulsively, 7) to reason, 8) to give coherent reasons, and 9) to express a stable preference. Rationales most frequently linked to MCA criterion 'understand' were ability to grasp information or concepts (43%) or to appreciate (42%), and to MCA criterion 'use or weigh' were abilities to appreciate (45%) or to reason (32%). Appreciation was the most frequently cited rationale across all diagnoses. Judges often used rationales without linking them specifically to any MCA criteria (42%). A new typology of rationales could bridge the gap between legal criteria for decision-making capacity and phenomena encountered in practice, increase reliability and transparency of assessments, and provide targets for decision-making support.

Is the nature of decision-making capacity (DMC) for treatment significantly different in medical and psychiatric patients? To compare the abilities relevant to DMC for treatment in medical and psychiatric patients who are able to communicate a treatment choice. A secondary analysis of two cross-sectional studies of consecutive admissions: 125 to a psychiatric hospital and 164 to a medical hospital. The MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool - Treatment and a clinical interview were used to assess decision-making abilities (understanding, appreciating and reasoning) and judgements of DMC. We limited analysis to patients able to express a choice about treatment and stratified the analysis by low and high understanding ability. Most people scoring low on understanding were judged to lack DMC and there was no difference by hospital (P = 0.14). In both hospitals there were patients who were able to understand yet lacked DMC (39% psychiatric v. 13% medical in-patients, P<0.001). Appreciation was a better 'test' of DMC in the psychiatric hospital (where psychotic and severe affective disorders predominated) (P<0.001), whereas reasoning was a better test of DMC in the medical hospital (where cognitive impairment was common) (P = 0.02). Among those with good understanding, the appreciation ability had more salience to DMC for treatment in a psychiatric setting and the reasoning ability had more salience in a medical setting.

The question of whether assisted dying is a treatment is of legal, philosophical, and clinical importance, write Gareth S Owen, Alex Ruck Keene, and Katherine Sleeman

Decision-making capacity (DMC) among psychiatric inpatients is a pivotal clinical concern. A review by Okai et al. (2007) suggested that most psychiatric inpatients have DMC for treatment, and its assessment is reliable. Nevertheless, the high heterogeneity and mixed results from other studies mean there is considerable uncertainty around this topic. This study aimed to update Okai's research by conducting a systematic review with meta-analysis to address heterogeneity. We performed a systematic search across four databases, yielding 5351 results. We extracted data from 20 eligible studies on adult psychiatric inpatients, covering DMC assessments from 2006 to May 2022. A meta-analysis was conducted on 11 papers, and a quality assessment was performed. The study protocol was registered on PROSPERO (ID: CRD42022330074). The proportion of patients with DMC for treatment varied widely based on treatment setting, the specific decision and assessment methods. Reliable capacity assessment was feasible. The Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE), Global Assessment of Function (GAF), and Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS) predicted clinical judgments of capacity. Schizophrenia and bipolar mania were linked to the highest incapacity rates, while depression and anxiety symptoms were associated with better capacity and insight. Unemployment was the only sociodemographic factor correlated with incapacity. Assessing mental capacity is replicable, with most psychiatric inpatients able to make treatment decisions. However, this capacity varies with admission stage, formal status (involuntary or voluntary), and information provided. The severity of psychopathology is linked to mental capacity, though detailed psychopathological data are limited.

Consent to research with decision-making capacity for research (DMC-R) is normally a requirement for study participation. Although the symptoms of schizophrenia and related psychoses are known to affect decision-making capacity for treatment (DMC-T), we know little about their effect on DMC-R.AimsWe aimed to determine if DMC-R differs from DMC-T in proportion and associated symptoms in an in-patient sample of people with schizophrenia and related psychoses. Cross-sectional study of psychiatric in-patients admitted for assessment and/or treatment of schizophrenia and related psychoses. We measured DMC-R and DMC-T using 'expert judgement' clinical assessment guided by the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Clinical Research, the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Treatment and the legal framework of the Mental Capacity Act (2005), in addition to symptoms of psychosis. There were 84 participants in the study. Half the participants had DMC-R (51%, 95% CI 40-62%) and a third had DMC-T (31%, 95% CI 21-43%) and this difference was statistically significant (P < 0.01). Thought disorder was most associated with lacking DMC-R (odds ratio 5.72, 95% CI 2.01-16.31, P = 0.001), whereas lack of insight was most associated with lacking DMC-T (odds ratio 26.34, 95% CI 3.60-192.66, P = 0.001). With the exception of improved education status and better DMC-R, there was no effect of sociodemographic variables on either DMC-R or DMC-T. We have shown that even when severely unwell, people with schizophrenia and related psychoses in in-patient settings commonly retain DMC-R despite lacking DMC-T. Furthermore, different symptoms have different effects on decision-making abilities for different decisions. We should not view in-patient psychiatric settings as a research 'no-go area' and, where appropriate, should recruit in these settings.Declaration of interestNone.

The COVID-19 pandemic put a large burden on many healthcare systems, causing fears about resource scarcity and triage. Several COVID-19 guidelines included age as an explicit factor and practices of both triage and ‘anticipatory triage’ likely limited access to hospital care for elderly patients, especially those in care homes. To ensure the legitimacy of triage guidelines, which affect the public, it is important to engage the public’s moral intuitions. Our study aimed to explore general public views in the UK on the role of age, and related factors like frailty and quality of life, in triage during the COVID-19 pandemic. We held online deliberative workshops with members of the general public (n=22). Participants were guided through a deliberative process to maximise eliciting informed and considered preferences. Participants generally accepted the need for triage but strongly rejected ‘fair innings’ and ‘life projects’ principles as justifications for age-based allocation. They were also wary of the ‘maximise life-years’ principle, preferring to maximise the number of lives rather than life years saved. Although they did not arrive at a unified recommendation of one principle, a concern for three core principles and values eventually emerged: equality, efficiency and vulnerability. While these remain difficult to fully respect at once, they captured a considered, multifaceted consensus: utilitarian considerations of efficiency should be tempered with a concern for equality and vulnerability. This ‘triad’ of ethical principles may be a useful structure to guide ethical deliberation as societies negotiate the conflicting ethical demands of triage.

Most jurisdictions require that a mental capacity assessment be conducted using a functional model whose definition includes several abilities. In England and Wales and in increasing number of countries, the law requires a person be able to understand, to retain, to use or weigh relevant information and to communicate one’s decision. But interpreting and applying broad and vague criteria, such as the ability ‘to use or weigh’ to a diverse range of presentations is challenging. By examining actual court judgements of capacity, we previously developed a descriptive typology of justifications (rationales) used in the application of the Mental Capacity Act (MCA) criteria. We here critically optimise this typology by showing how clear definitions—and thus boundaries—between the criteria can be achieved if the ‘understanding’ criterion is used narrowly and the multiple rationales that fall under the ability to ‘use or weigh’ are specifically enumerated in practice. Such a typology-aided practice, in theory, could make functional capacity assessments more transparent, accountable, reliable and valid. It may also help to create targeted supports for decision making by the vulnerable. We also discuss how the typology could evolve legally and scientifically, and how it lays the groundwork for clinical research on the abilities enumerated by the MCA.

Objective To estimate the prevalence of mental capacity to make decisions on treatment in people from different diagnostic and legal groups admitted to psychiatric hospital.Design Cross sectional study.Setting General adult acute psychiatric inpatient units.Participants 350 consecutive people admitted to psychiatric wards from the community over 16 months.Main outcome measure Mental capacity assessed by clinical interview and the MacArthur competence assessment tool for treatment.Results Estimates of mental capacity were obtained on 97% (n=338) of the 350 people admitted. Of those an estimated 60% (95% confidence interval 55% to 65%) lacked mental capacity to make decisions on treatment. This proportion varied according to diagnosis, ranging from 97% (n=36) in people with mania to 4% (n=24) in people with personality disorder. Mental incapacity was common in patients admitted informally to the psychiatric wards (n=188; 39%, 32% to 46%). Incapacity and detention are closely associated under non-capacity based mental health law.Conclusions Mental incapacity to make decisions on treatment is common in people admitted to psychiatric wards from the community but cannot be presumed. It is usual in those detained under the Mental Health Act and common in those admitted voluntarily.

The assessment of decision-making capacity in patients with acquired brain injury presents a range of clinical and legal challenges. The existing guidance on the conduct of such assessments is often generic; guidance specific to patients with brain injury is sparse and coarse grained. We report on the results of an interview-based study of decision-making capacity in patients suffering from acquired brain injury and organic personality disorder. We identify the clinical and legal challenges associated with the assessment of decision-making capacity in this patient population, review three bodies of relevant research from cognitive neuropsychology and neurophysiology, and draw on phenomenological analysis to identify three distinct abilities that play a role in decision making, but that can be compromised in patients with organic personality disorder. We address the challenge of translating clinical findings into legally attestable results.