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A rapid and deep decarbonization of power supply worldwide is required to limit global warming to well below 2 °C. Beyond greenhouse gas emissions, the power sector is also responsible for numerous other environmental impacts. Here we combine scenarios from integrated assessment models with a forward-looking life-cycle assessment to explore how alternative technology choices in power sector decarbonization pathways compare in terms of non-climate environmental impacts at the system level. While all decarbonization pathways yield major environmental co-benefits, we find that the scale of co-benefits as well as profiles of adverse side-effects depend strongly on technology choice. Mitigation scenarios focusing on wind and solar power are more effective in reducing human health impacts compared to those with low renewable energy, while inducing a more pronounced shift away from fossil and toward mineral resource depletion. Conversely, non-climate ecosystem damages are highly uncertain but tend to increase, chiefly due to land requirements for bioenergy. There lacks a consistent and holistic evaluation of co-benefits of different mitigation pathways in studies on Integrated Assessment Models. Here the authors quantify environmental co-benefits and adverse side-effects of a portfolio of alternative power sector decarbonisation pathways and show that the scale of co-benefits as well as profiles of adverse side-effects depend strongly on technology choice.

A new analysis shows that global warming could be limited to 1.5 °C by 2100, but that the window for achieving this is small and rapidly closing. Many impacts projected for a global warming level of 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels may exceed the coping capacities of particularly vulnerable countries. Therefore, many countries advocate limiting warming to below 1.5 °C. Here we analyse integrated energy–economy–environment scenarios that keep warming to below 1.5 °C by 2100. We find that in such scenarios, energy-system transformations are in many aspects similar to 2 °C-consistent scenarios, but show a faster scale-up of mitigation action in most sectors, leading to observable differences in emission reductions in 2030 and 2050. The move from a 2 °C- to a 1.5 °C-consistent world will be achieved mainly through additional reductions of CO 2 . This implies an earlier transition to net zero carbon emissions worldwide, to be achieved between 2045 and 2060. Energy efficiency and stringent early reductions are key to retain a possibility for limiting warming to below 1.5 °C by 2100. The window for achieving this goal is small and rapidly closing.

The Paris Agreement—which is aimed at holding global warming well below 2 °C while pursuing efforts to limit it below 1.5 °C—has initiated a bottom-up process of iteratively updating nationally determined contributions to reach these long-term goals. Achieving these goals implies a tight limit on cumulative net CO2 emissions, of which residual CO2 emissions from fossil fuels are the greatest impediment. Here, using an ensemble of seven integrated assessment models (IAMs), we explore the determinants of these residual emissions, focusing on sector-level contributions. Even when strengthened pre-2030 mitigation action is combined with very stringent long-term policies, cumulative residual CO2 emissions from fossil fuels remain at 850–1,150 GtCO2 during 2016–2100, despite carbon prices of US$130–420 per tCO2 by 2030. Thus, 640–950 GtCO2 removal is required for a likely chance of limiting end-of-century warming to 1.5 °C. In the absence of strengthened pre-2030 pledges, long-term CO2 commitments are increased by 160–330 GtCO2, further jeopardizing achievement of the 1.5 °C goal and increasing dependence on CO2 removal.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's fifth assessment report emphasizes the importance of bioenergy and carbon capture and storage for achieving climate goals, but it does not identify solar energy as a strategically important technology option. That is surprising given the strong growth, large resource, and low environmental footprint of photovoltaics (PV). Here we explore how models have consistently underestimated PV deployment and identify the reasons for underlying bias in models. Our analysis reveals that rapid technological learning and technology-specific policy support were crucial to PV deployment in the past, but that future success will depend on adequate financing instruments and the management of system integration. We propose that with coordinated advances in multiple components of the energy system, PV could supply 30–50% of electricity in competitive markets. Despite being currently under-represented in IPCC reports, PV generation represents a growing share of power generation. This Perspective argues that underestimating PV potential led to suboptimal integration measures and that specific deployment strategies for emerging economies should be developed.

The large majority of climate change mitigation scenarios that hold warming below 2 °C show high deployment of carbon dioxide removal (CDR), resulting in a peak-and-decline behavior in global temperature. This is driven by the assumption of an exponentially increasing carbon price trajectory which is perceived to be economically optimal for meeting a carbon budget. However, this optimality relies on the assumption that a finite carbon budget associated with a temperature target is filled up steadily over time. The availability of net carbon removals invalidates this assumption and therefore a different carbon price trajectory should be chosen. We show how the optimal carbon price path for remaining well below 2 °C limits CDR demand and analyze requirements for constructing alternatives, which may be easier to implement in reality. We show that warming can be held at well below 2 °C at much lower long-term economic effort and lower CDR deployment and therefore lower risks if carbon prices are high enough in the beginning to ensure target compliance, but increase at a lower rate after carbon neutrality has been reached. Many trajectories for reaching climate change mitigation targets exaggerate the long-term need for CO 2 removal (CDR) because they assume an exponentially increasing carbon price. Here the authors analyse alternative carbon price pathways that halt warming while limiting CDR, and may be easier to implement.

Given their historic emissions and economic capability, we analyze a leadership role for representative industrialized regions (EU, US, Japan, and Australia) in the global climate mitigation effort. Using the global integrated assessment model REMIND, we systematically compare region-specific mitigation strategies and challenges of reaching domestic net-zero carbon emissions in 2050. Embarking from different emission profiles and trends, we find that all of the regions have technological options and mitigation strategies to reach carbon neutrality by 2050. Regional characteristics are mostly related to different land availability, population density and population trends: While Japan is resource limited with respect to onshore wind and solar power and has constrained options for carbon dioxide removal (CDR), their declining population significantly decreases future energy demand. In contrast, Australia and the US benefit from abundant renewable resources, but face challenges to curb industry and transport emissions given increasing populations and high per-capita energy use. In the EU, lack of social acceptance or EU-wide cooperation might endanger the ongoing transition to a renewable-based power system. CDR technologies are necessary for all regions, as residual emissions cannot be fully avoided by 2050. For Australia and the US, in particular, CDR could reduce the required transition pace, depth and costs. At the same time, this creates the risk of a carbon lock-in, if decarbonization ambition is scaled down in anticipation of CDR technologies that fail to deliver. Our results suggest that industrialized economies can benefit from cooperation based on common themes and complementary strengths. This may include trade of electricity-based fuels and materials as well as the exchange of regional experience on technology scale-up and policy implementation.

Buildings energy consumption is one of the most important contributors to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions worldwide, responsible for 23% of energy-related CO 2 emissions. Decarbonising the energy demand of buildings will require two types of strategies: first, an overall reduction in energy demand, which could, to some extent, be achieved at negative costs; and second through a reduction of the carbon content of energy via fuel switching and supply-side decarbonisation. This study assesses the contributions of each of these strategies for the decarbonisation of the buildings sector in line with a 1.5°C global warming. We show that in a 1.5°C scenario combining mitigation policies and a reduction of market failures in efficiency markets, 81% of the reductions in buildings emissions are achieved through the reduction of the carbon content of energy, while the remaining 19% are due to efficiency improvements which reduce energy demand by 31%. Without supply-side decarbonisation, efficiency improvements almost entirely suppress the doubling of emissions that would otherwise be expected, but fail to induce an absolute decline in emissions. Our modelling and scenarios show the impact of both climate change mitigation policies and of the alleviation of market failures pervading through energy efficiency markets. The results show that the reduction of the carbon content of energy through fuel switching and supply-side decarbonisation is of paramount importance for the decarbonisation of buildings.

A model shows how climate targets could be met by 2030 through a politically feasible mix of carbon pricing, low-carbon technology, and energy policy. Economic theory suggests that comprehensive carbon pricing is most efficient to reach ambitious climate targets 1 , and previous studies indicated that the carbon price required for limiting global mean warming to 2 °C is between US$16 and US$73 per tonne of CO 2 in 2015 (ref.  2 ). Yet, a global implementation of such high carbon prices is unlikely to be politically feasible in the short term. Instead, most climate policies enacted so far are technology policies or fragmented and moderate carbon pricing schemes. This paper shows that ambitious climate targets can be kept within reach until 2030 despite a sub-optimal policy mix. With a state-of-the-art energy–economy model we quantify the interactions and unique effects of three major policy components: (1) a carbon price starting at US$7 per tonne of CO 2 in 2015 to incentivize economy-wide mitigation, flanked by (2) support for low-carbon energy technologies to pave the way for future decarbonization, and (3) a moratorium on new coal-fired power plants to limit stranded assets. We find that such a mix limits the efficiency losses compared with the optimal policy, and at the same time lowers distributional impacts. Therefore, we argue that this instrument mix might be a politically more feasible alternative to the optimal policy based on a comprehensive carbon price alone.

While the international community aims to limit global warming to below 2 ° C to prevent dangerous climate change, little progress has been made towards a global climate agreement to implement the emissions reductions required to reach this target. We use an integrated energy-economy-climate modeling system to examine how a further delay of cooperative action and technology availability affect climate mitigation challenges. With comprehensive emissions reductions starting after 2015 and full technology availability we estimate that maximum 21st century warming may still be limited below 2 ° C with a likely probability and at moderate economic impacts. Achievable temperature targets rise by up to ∼0.4 ° C if the implementation of comprehensive climate policies is delayed by another 15 years, chiefly because of transitional economic impacts. If carbon capture and storage (CCS) is unavailable, the lower limit of achievable targets rises by up to ∼0.3 ° C. Our results show that progress in international climate negotiations within this decade is imperative to keep the 2 ° C target within reach.

In this study, we analyze the effects of technology availability, political coordination, and behavioral change on transformation pathways toward net-zero greenhouse gas emissions in the European Union by 2050. We implemented an iterative stakeholder dialogue to co-design the scenarios that were calculated using a global multi-regional energy-economy-land-climate model. We find that in scenarios without behavioral change and with restriction of technologies, the target of greenhouse gas neutrality in the European Union cannot be reached. Already a target of 200 Mt CO 2 eq/yr requires CO 2 prices above 100 €/tCO 2 in 2030 across all sectors in all scenarios. The required CO 2 price can increase to up to 450 €/tCO 2 by 2030 if technologies are constrained, if no complementary regulatory measures are implemented, and if changes in consumer behavior towards a more sustainable lifestyle do not materialize. This analysis of net-zero strategies designed in an iterative stakeholder dialogue finds that without behavioral change and with restriction of technologies, the target of greenhouse gas neutrality in the European Union cannot be reached.