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Registered social workers in English Local Authorities are required to have an expertise in the complex decision-making needed to promote well-being when an adult’s own judgement about their well-being and wishes about how to promote it might, in the circumstances, put their well-being at risk. Such circumstances are complex partly because core professional values – promoting autonomy and protecting from harm – can come into conflict. Given the consequential nature of social workers’ decisions, it is essential to be able to evaluate the quality of social workers’ decision-making. In this paper, we set out the systematic development, in collaboration with expert social workers, of a bespoke methodology to measure decision-making quality and investigate underpinning cognitive processes. Central to our methodology was social workers’ consideration of key legal principles. First, we reviewed the research literature to identify existing measurement schemes aspects of which might be suitable for incorporating into our methodology. No existing measurement schemes were found, but we identified a factorial survey vignette-based scheme which seemed promising as the basis for our own methodology. Second, by reviewing statute and case law, we identified 40 key legal principles which social workers should consider in their decision-making. Next, based on these principles, we developed four hypothetical case vignettes to activate decision-making. Finally, we developed four scoring templates, one for each vignette, setting out exemplar judgements and decisions against which practitioners’ judgements and decisions could be compared and scored. Our new methodology provides a means of assessing the quality of social workers’ decision-making and, as prior- and post-intervention quality can be measured, has the potential to generate evidence of the impact of policy and practice interventions on decision-making.

Exposure to the natural environment is increasingly considered to benefit psychological health. Recent reports in the literature also suggest that outdoor exposure that includes recreational pursuits such as surfing or fishing coupled with opportunities for social interaction with peers may be beneficial to Armed Forces Veterans experiencing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Two studies were conducted to evaluate this possibility. In particular, these studies aimed to test the hypothesis that a brief group outdoor activity would decrease participants’ symptoms as assessed by established measures of PTSD, depression, anxiety and perceived stress, and increase participants’ sense of general social functioning and psychological growth. Experiment one employed a repeated measures design in which UK men and women military veterans with PTSD (N = 30) participated in a group outdoor activity (angling, equine care, or archery and falconry combined). Psychological measures were taken at 2 weeks prior, 2 weeks post, and at 4 month follow up. We obtained a significant within participant main effect indicating significant reduction in PTSD symptoms. Experiment two was a waitlist controlled randomised experiment employing an angling experience (N = 18) and 2 week follow up. In experiment 2 the predicted interaction of Group (Experimental vs. Waitlist Control) X Time (2 weeks pre vs. 2 weeks post) was obtained indicating that the experience resulted in significant reduction in PTSD symptoms relative to waitlist controls. The effect size was large. Additional analyses confirmed that the observed effects might also be considered clinically significant and reliable. In sum, peer outdoor experiences are beneficial and offer potential to complement existing provision for military veterans with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.

Cognitive enhancers (CE) are prescription drugs taken, either without a prescription or at a dose exceeding that which is prescribed, to improve cognitive functions such as concentration, vigilance or memory. Previous research suggests that users believe the drugs to be safer than non-users and that they have sufficient knowledge to judge safety. However, to date no research has compared the information sources used and safety knowledge of users and non-users. This study compared users and non-users of CE in terms of i) their sources of knowledge about the safety of CE and ii) the accuracy of their knowledge of possible adverse effects of a typical cognitive enhancer (modafinil); and iii) how the accuracy of knowledge relates to their safety beliefs. Students (N = 148) from King's College London (UK) completed an anonymous online survey assessing safety beliefs, sources of knowledge and knowledge of the safety of modafinil; and indicated whether they used CE, and, if so, which drug(s). The belief that the drugs are safe was greater in users than non-users. However, both groups used comparable information sources and have similar, relatively poor drug safety knowledge. Furthermore, despite users more strongly believing in the safety of CE there was no relationship between their beliefs and knowledge, in contrast to non-users who did show correlations between beliefs and knowledge. These data suggest that the differences in safety beliefs about CE between users and non-users do not stem from use of different information sources or more accurate safety knowledge.

Economist Frank H. Knight (1885–1972) is commonly credited with defining the distinction between decisions under “risk” (known chance) and decisions under “uncertainty” (unmeasurable probability) in his 1921 book Risk, Uncertainty and Profit . A closer reading of Knight (1921) reveals a host of psychological insights beyond this risk-uncertainty distinction, many of which foreshadow revolutionary advances in psychological decision theory from the latter half of the 20 th century. Knight’s description of economic decision making shared much with Simon’s (1955, 1956) notion of bounded rationality, whereby choice behavior is regulated by cognitive and environmental constraints. Knight described features of risky choice that were to become key components of prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979): the reference dependent valuation of outcomes, and the non-linear weighting of probabilities. Knight also discussed several biases in human decision making, and pointed to two systems of reasoning: one quick, intuitive but error prone, and a slower, more deliberate, rule-based system. A discussion of Knight’s potential contribution to psychological decision theory emphasises the importance of a historical perspective on theory development, and the potential value of sourcing ideas from other disciplines or from earlier periods of time.

Using data from seven microworld experiments (N = 841), we investigated how participants reacted to simulated disasters with different risk profiles in a microworld. Our central focus was to investigate how the scale of a disaster affected the choices and response times of these reactions. We find that one-off large-scale disasters prompted stronger reactions to move away from the affected region than recurrent small-scale adverse events, despite the overall risk of a disaster remaining constant across both types of events. A subset of participants are persistent risk-takers who repeatedly put themselves in harm’s way, despite having all the experience and information required to avoid a disaster. Furthermore, while near-misses prompted a small degree of precautionary movement to reduce one’s subsequent risk exposure, directly experiencing the costs of the disaster substantially increased the desire to move away from the affected region. Together, the results point to ways in which laboratory risk-taking tasks can be used to inform the kinds of communication and interventions that seek to mitigate people’s exposure to risk.

Claims that a period of distraction--designed to promote unconscious thought--improves decisions relative to a period of conscious deliberation are as multifarious as they are controversial. We reviewed 16 experimental studies from two labs, across a range of tasks (multi-attribute choice, creativity, moral dilemmas), only one of which found any significant advantages for unconscious thought. The results of each study were analyzed using Bayesian t tests. Unlike traditional significance tests, these tests allow an assessment of the evidence for the null hypothesis--in this case, no difference between conscious and unconscious thought. This is done by computing the likelihood ratio (or Bayes factor), which compares the probability of the data given the null against the probability of the data given a distribution of plausible alternate hypotheses. Almost without exception, the probability of the data given the null exceeded that for the alternate distribution. A Bayesian t test for the average effect size across all studies (N == 1,071) yielded a Bayes factor of 9, which can be taken as clear evidence supporting the null hypothesis; that is, a period of distraction had no noticeable improving effect on the range of decision-making tasks in our sample.

When decisions involve opting in or out of competition many decision makers will opt-in even when doing so leads to losses on average. In the current paper, we examine the generality of this effect in risky choices not involving competition. We found that re-framing a sure (certain) zero option as an option to observe the results of the other options without choosing would lead to increased consequential choice (i.e., increased selection of risky options rather than the zero option). Specifically, in two studies we compared the rate of consequential choice in a novel paradigm where decision makers decide to observe or to choose with consequence from a set of risky options (decisions-to-engage) to a full-feedback decisions-from-feedback paradigm where the choice set included a labeled sure zero option. Compared to decisions-from-feedback, participants were more likely to choose from mixed (risky) gambles with consequence (over a zero outcome) in decisions-to-engage. This occurred irrespective of whether doing so was advantageous (i.e., when choice led to monetary gains on average) or disadvantageous (i.e., when choice led to monetary losses on average), and when descriptions of the options outcomes and probabilities were provided (Study 2). These findings provide an important boundary condition for the positive effects of experience on the quality of choice, and suggest that decision makers’ preference for agency can sometimes induce poorer choices.

Self-insight assessment compares outcomes from two model-recovery exercises: a statistical exercise to infer a judge's (implicit) policy and an elicitation exercise whereby the judge describes his or her (explicit) policy. When these policies are mismatched, limited self-insight is not necessarily implied: Shortcomings in either exercise could be implicated, whereby Newell & Shanks' (N&S's) relevance or sensitivity criteria for assessing awareness may not be met. Appropriate self-insight assessment requires that both exercises allow the original processes to be captured.

Quantum probability models may supersede existing probabilistic models because they account for behaviour inconsistent with classical probability theory that are attributable to normal limitations of cognition. This intriguing position, however, may overstate weaknesses in classical probability theory by underestimating the role of current knowledge states and may under-employ available knowledge about the limitations of cognitive processes. In addition, flexibility in model specification has risks for the use of quantum probability.

It is often assumed that most people are loss averse, placing more weight on losses than commensurate gains; however, some research identifies variability in loss sensitivity that reflects features of the environment. We examined this plasticity in loss sensitivity by manipulating the size and distribution of possible outcomes in a set of mixed gambles, and assessing individual stability in loss sensitivity. In each of two sessions, participants made accept-reject decisions for 64 mixed-outcome gambles. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions defined by the relative range of losses and gains (wider range of losses vs. wider range of gains), and the currency-units at stake (‘pennies’ vs. ‘pounds’). Participants showed modest but non-trivial consistency in their sensitivity to losses; though loss sensitivity also varied substantially with our manipulations. When possible gains had greater range than possible losses, most participants were loss averse; however, when possible losses had the greater range, reverse loss aversion was the norm (i.e., more weight on gains than losses). This is consistent with decision-by-sampling theory, whereby an outcome’s rank within a consideration-set determines its value, but can also be explained by the gamble’s expected-value rank within the decision-set, or by adapting aspirations to the decision-environment. Loss aversion was also reduced in the second session of decisions when the stakes had been higher in the previous session. This illustrates the influence of prior context on current sensitivity to losses, and suggests a role for idiosyncratic experiences in the development of individual differences in loss sensitivity.