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Using a new dataset of UK-syndicated loans, we document a significant loan cost disadvantage incurred by privately held firms. For identification, we use the distance of a firm's headquarters to London's capital markets as a plausibly exogenous variation in corporate structure (i.e., public/private) choice. We analyze the channels of the loan cost disadvantage of being private by documenting the importance of: the higher costs of information production, the lower bargaining power, the differences in ownership structure, and the differences in secondary market trading. Interestingly, we find no evidence that lenders price expected future performance into the loan spread differential.

We find that repeated borrowing from the same lender translates into a 10—17 bps lowering of loan spreads and that relationships are especially valuable when borrower transparency is low. These results hold using multiple approaches (propensity score matching, instrumental variables, and treatment effects model) that control for the endogeneity of relationships. We also provide a demarcation line between relationship and transactional lending. Spreads charged for relationship loans and nonrelationship loans are statistically identical if the borrower is in the largest 30% by asset size; has public rated debt; or is part of the S&P 500 index. Past relationships reduce collateral requirements and are also associated with obtaining larger loans. Our results imply that, even for firms that have multiple sources of outside financing, borrowing from a prior lender obtains better loan terms.

Secondary market trading in loans elicits a significant positive stock price response by a borrowing firm's equity investors. We find the major reason for this response is the alleviation of borrowing firms' financial constraints. We also find that new loan announcements are associated with a positive stock price effect even when prior loans made to the same borrower already trade on the secondary market. We conclude that the special role of banks has changed due to their ability to create an active secondary loan market while simultaneously maintaining their traditional role as information producers.

More than 80% of U.S. syndicated loans contain at least one fee type and contracts typically specify a menu of spreads and fee types. We test the predictions of existing theories on the main purposes of fees and provide supporting evidence that: (1) fees are used to price options embedded in loan contracts such as the drawdown option for credit lines and the cancellation option in term loans, and (2) fees are used to screen borrowers based on the likelihood of exercising these options. We also propose a new total-cost-of-borrowing measure that includes various fees charged by lenders.

Here, the capability of the chemical weather forecasting model CHIMERE (version 2017r4) to reproduce surface ozone, particulate matter and nitrogen dioxide concentrations in complex terrain is investigated for the period from 21 June to 21 August 2018. The study area is the northwestern Iberian Peninsula, where both coastal and mountain climates can be found in direct vicinity and a large fraction of the land area is covered by forests. Driven by lateral boundary conditions from the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) Composition Integrated Forecast System, anthropogenic emissions from two commonly used top-down inventories and meteorological data from the Weather Research and Forecasting Model, CHIMERE's performance with respect to observations is tested with a range of sensitivity experiments. We assess the effects of (1) an increase in horizontal resolution, (2) an increase in vertical resolution, (3) the use of distinct model chemistries, and (4) the use of distinct anthropogenic emissions inventories, downscaling techniques and land use databases. In comparison with the older HTAP emission inventory downscaled with basic options, the updated and sophistically downscaled EMEP inventory only leads to partial model improvements, and so does the computationally costly horizontal resolution increase. Model performance changes caused by the choice of distinct chemical mechanisms are not systematic either and rather depend on the considered anthropogenic emission configuration and pollutant. Although the results are thus heterogeneous in general terms, the model's response to a vertical resolution increase confined to the lower to middle troposphere is homogeneous in the sense of improving virtually all verification aspects. For our study region and the two aforementioned top-down emission inventories, we conclude that it is not necessary to run CHIMERE on a horizontal mesh much finer than the native grid of these inventories. A relatively coarse horizontal mesh combined with 20 model layers between 999 and 500 hPa is sufficient to yield balanced results. The chemical mechanism should be chosen as a function of the intended application.

We use a unique data set of bank loans to examine the wealth effects on lead lending banks when their borrowers suffer financial distress. We find a significant negative announcement return for the lead lending bank when a major corporate borrower announces default or bankruptcy. Banks with higher exposure to the distressed firm have larger negative announcement-period returns. The existence of a past lending relationship with the distressed firm results in larger wealth declines for the bank shareholders. Finally, financial distress also has a significant negative effect on borrower's returns.

We use loan-specific data to document a significant inverse relation between a firm's dividend payouts and the intensity of a firm's reliance on bank loan financing. Banks limit dividend payouts to protect the integrity of their senior claims on the firm's assets. Moreover, dividend payouts decline in the presence of monitoring by relationship banks, which acts as an effective governance mechanism, thereby reducing the gains from precommitting to costly dividend payouts. Bank monitoring and corporate governance (insider stake and institutional block holdings) are complementary mechanisms to resolve firm agency problems, both reducing the firm's reliance on dividend policy.

We show that concentrating bank regulation on bank capital ratios may be ineffective in controlling risk taking. We propose, instead, a more direct mechanism of influencing bank risk-taking incentives, in which the FDIC insurance premium scheme incorporates incentive features of top-management compensation. With this scheme, we show that bank owners choose an optimal management compensation structure that induces first-best value-maximizing investment choices by a bank's management. We explicitly characterize the parameters of the optimal management compensation structure and the fairly priced FDIC insurance premium in the presence of a single or multiple sources of agency problems.

A classic book on credit risk management is updated to reflect the current economic crisis Credit Risk Management In and Out of the Financial Crisis dissects the 2007-2008 credit crisis and provides solutions for professionals looking to better manage risk through modeling and new technology. This book is a complete update to Credit Risk Measurement: New Approaches to Value at Risk and Other Paradigms, reflecting events stemming from the recent credit crisis. Authors Anthony Saunders and Linda Allen address everything from the implications of new regulations to how the new rules will change everyday activity in the finance industry. They also provide techniques for modeling-credit scoring, structural, and reduced form models-while offering sound advice for stress testing credit risk models and when to accept or reject loans. Breaks down the latest credit risk measurement and modeling techniques and simplifies many of the technical and analytical details surrounding them Concentrates on the underlying economics to objectively evaluate new models Includes new chapters on how to prevent another crisis from occurring Understanding credit risk measurement is now more important than ever. Credit Risk Management In and Out of the Financial Crisis will solidify your knowledge of this dynamic discipline.

We analyze pricing differences between U.S. and European syndicated loans over the 1992–2014 period. We explicitly distinguish credit lines from term loans. For credit lines, U.S. borrowers pay significantly higher spreads, but lower fees, resulting in similar total costs of borrowing in both markets. Credit line usage is more cyclical in the United States, which provides a rationale for the pricing structure difference. For term loans, we analyze the channels of the cross-country loan price differential and document the importance of: the composition of term loan borrowers and the loan supply by institutional investors and foreign banks.