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This paper argues that role modeling can explain the impact of boardroom gender diversity on corporate performance. It theorizes that female workers are boosted by female leadership, gain increased motivation, and achieve greater productivity, thereby making their female directors more effective. We test this bottom–up approach to the trickle-down hypothesis on data hand-collected among local cooperatives providing microcredit in Senegal. All the organizations surveyed are similar and small, which allows us to use a homogenous performance metric. All of them outsource their human resource management to the same third party, which mitigates the risk of endogeneity. The data cover over 100,000 triads composed of gender dominance on the board, gender of CEO, and gender of credit officer. A better financial performance is achieved when the triad is gender-uniform—be it male or female—confirming the importance of role modeling and suggesting that the performance of female board members depends on the gender composition of the workforce.Plain English summary Women’s leadership styles differ from men’s. But we still ignore whether the styles adopted by male and female directors make any difference in terms of financial performance. Scholars hold controversial views about whether and how the financial performance of firms depends on gender diversity in the boardroom. This article speculates that female directors act as role models on their subordinates (“trickle-down effect”) and their impact is “bottom–up” in the sense that female workers gain increased motivation when working under female leadership. We hand-collected data from financial cooperatives in Senegal. These organizations enabled us to observe the unlikely situation of boards including over 50% of women. We measured financial performance with loan repayment. Our results confirm that female-dominated boards achieve a better financial performance when they work with female CEOs and female subordinates. The principal implication is that the performance of female board members depends on the gender composition of the workforce.

The evidence on gender discrimination in lending remains controversial. To capture gender biases in banks' loan allocations, we observe the impact on the applicants of a microfinance institution (MF1) and exploit the natural experiment of a regulatory change imposing a strict EUR 10,000 loan ceiling on microcredit. Descriptive statistics indicate that the presence of the ceiling is associated both with bank-MFI co-financing and with harsher treatment of female borrowers. To investigate causal links, we develop an econometric approach that addresses the concerns of selection biases, multicollinearity, and endogeneity. Our empirical findings suggest that the change in the MFI's gender-related attitude was triggered by banks through co-financing. Hence, we speculate that co-financing pushes ceiling-constrained MFIs to import whatever biases in loan granting that the banks are prone to. Overall, this paper stresses that apparently benign regulations such as loan ceilings can significantly harm the women's empowerment efforts made by MFIs.

Bitcoin (BTC) is a major virtual currency. Using weekly data over the 2010–2013 period, we analyze a BTC investment from the standpoint of a US investor with a diversified portfolio including both traditional assets (worldwide stocks, bonds, hard currencies) and alternative investments (commodities, hedge funds, real estate). Over the period under consideration, BTC investment had highly distinctive features, including exceptionally high average return and volatility. Its correlation with other assets was remarkably low. Spanning tests confirm that BTC investment offers significant diversification benefits. We show that the inclusion of even a small proportion of BTCs may dramatically improve the risk-return trade-off of well-diversified portfolios. Results should however be taken with caution as the data may reflect early-stage behavior that may not last in the medium or long run.

We use structural modeling to address the allocation process of a microcredit provider granting loans to a heterogeneous pool of applicants. Our theoretical model accounts for technology, risk preferences, and information asymmetry. We test the model with a hand-collected database that includes detailed information on the applicants of a microcredit institution funding European micro-enterprises. Non-parametric Bayesian methodology is used to unpack between-group differences in approval probabilities associated with gender and country of origin and identify (demand-side differences), while differences in unexplained approval probabilities would suggest supply-side biases. The empirical analysis shows that applicants coming from outside of the European Union tend to be more productive than EU-born citizens. They also enjoy a higher approval probability, except for applicants from Latin America, which appear to be riskier borrowers. This result suggests that the microcredit provider treats immigrants fairly. By contrast, the higher productivity and the lower risk of female entrepreneurial projects is only partially compensated by easier access to credit.

Social banks are financial intermediaries paying attention to non-economic (i.e., social, ethical, and environmental) criteria. To investigate the behavior of social banks on the credit market, this paper proposes both theory and empirics. Our theoretical model rationalizes the idea that reciprocity can generate better repayment performances. Based on a unique hand-collected dataset released by a French social bank, our empirical results are twofold. First, we show that the bank charges below-market interest rates for social projects. Second, regardless of their creditworthiness, motivated borrowers respond to advantageous credit terms by significantly lowering their probability of default. We interpret this outcome as the first evidence of reciprocity in the credit market.

This paper estimates the impact of loan officer subjectivity on microcredit granting by exploiting an exceptionally detailed database from a Brazilian microfinance institution. The loan officers collect field data, meet with applicants, and make recommendations to the credit committee, which has the final say on both loan approval and loan size (LS). The loan officer's subjectivity is captured through gender bias. Our estimations indeed show subjective gender gap in LS. This gap is almost exclusively attributable to loan officers. We interpret this finding as evidence that, despite monitoring and wage incentivization, microcredit officers let their subjective preferences interfere with loan granting. We conclude by suggesting alternative means to curb subjectivity in credit allocation to micro-entrepreneurs.

This paper unpacks the continuum of social finance institutions (SFIs), ranging from foundations offering pure grants to social banks supplying soft loans. The in-between category includes quasi-foundations granting loans requiring partial repayment. In our model, SFIs maximize their social contribution arising from financing successful social projects, under a budget constraint dictated by their funders. We determine the feasibility of each SFI category. Quasi-foundations appear to be efficient and adapted to low market rates. However, reciprocity from SFI borrowers can elicit a so-called hold-up effect, whereby the SFI charges a high interest rate to its loyal clients.

Based on an extensive literature review, this paper proposes to define social banks (SBs) as social enterprises that run banking activities with the social mission of supplying credit to other social enterprises, which are typically less profitable than for‐profit businesses. This definition marks our starting point for developing a theoretical framework to explain how SBs survive without subsidies in the banking market. We build on a two‐pillar business model of value‐based financial intermediation, which comprises an ownership structure that limits residual ownership claims and preferential credit conditions associated with financial sacrifices from motivated depositors. We also clarify the link between SBs and stakeholder banks and weigh up the importance of market interest rates for facilitating the business of SBs. An empirical analysis based on panel regressions on 5,400 European banks over the 1998‐2013 period attests to the relevance of our theoretical framework. It also confirms that a low interest rate environment raises concerns about the sustainability of the SB business model. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Precautionary demand for liquidity manifests itself as a preference for holding assets in an accessible form not because of any current liquidity need but because of a possible future need. We explore such demand by analyzing employer-sponsored retirement saving plans in France, where firms must offer medium-term investment vehicles that cannot be accessed for five years. Some also offer long-term vehicles that cannot be accessed until retirement. Plan take-up is lower when there is a long-term option; more workers opt out of the plan default when it includes one; and when hardship strikes, workers tend to withdraw long-term funds before medium-term funds.

Social banks are financial intermediaries paying attention to non-economic (i.e., social, ethical, and environmental) criteria. To investigate the behavior of social banks on the credit market, this paper proposes both theory and empirics. Our theoretical model rationalizes the idea that reciprocity can generate better repayment performances. Based on a unique hand-collected dataset released by a French social bank, our empirical results are twofold. First, we show that the bank charges below-market interest rates for social projects. Second, regardless of their creditworthiness, motivated borrowers respond to advantageous credit terms by significantly lowering their probability of default. We interpret this outcome as the first evidence of reciprocity in the credit market.