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BACKGROUND Measures of fertility by level of female education are currently only available for cohorts that have already completed childbearing age. The focus on cohorts whose fertility decisions were made in the past is problematic when the objective is to better understand which specific groups within European countries are currently the most affected by low and/or declining fertility. OBJECTIVE In this article we provide more timely measures of the educational gradient of fertility for Europe by quantifying it for those cohorts that are currently of childbearing age (ages 15 to 49) for most European countries. METHODS To measure period fertility by education for 24 EU and 4 non-EU countries in Europe, we use data from the European Union's Survey of Income and Living Conditions, EUSILC (Eurostat 2020). A semi-retrospective approach is used to observe the parityspecific fertility behavior of cohorts that are of childbearing age, while at the same time recording the educational level correctly. Bayesian statistics allow us to obtain credible intervals for the age-, education-, and parity-specific birth probabilities for each country. These birth probabilities are then combined into a multi-state life table in order to obtain parity-specific and total birth intensities by education. A post-stratification of birth probabilities allows consistency with national fertility estimates, enabling international comparisons of specific groups (e.g., highly educated women) or of particular dimensions of fertility behavior (e.g., childlessness). RESULTS Our analytical set-up reveals whether there are significant differences in fertility behavior between education groups in each European country and how these differentials vary between European countries. More precisely, we answer the question of whether, when all birth orders are combined, heterogeneity in period fertility behavior is greater among the higher- or the lower-educated across Europe. In addition, we show for which parity the heterogeneity between education groups is the largest. CONCLUSIONS Even if low-educated women have the highest period fertility levels in almost all covered European countries, the educational gradient is not always negative. In one-third of European countries, period fertility levels in 2010 exhibit a U-shaped pattern, with the middle-educated having the lowest fertility. The diversity in period fertility levels among highly educated women in Europe is due to the transitions to first and second childbirth of highly educated women being higher in some countries than in others, while higherorder childbirths exhibit a more negative educational gradient across Europe. CONTRIBUTION By delivering a new method for measuring the educational gradient of fertility for women who are of childbearing age rather than for women who have already completed their reproductive years, our research enables a timely analysis of within-country differentials of period fertility behavior.

At the individual level, a very strong negative relationship is observed between age at first birth and total number of children. However, at the country level, it is possible that no relationship exists between factors that reduce fertility at younger ages and stimulate it at older ages. Hence, across countries, the size of the decline in youth fertility is potentially unrelated to the size of the increase in fertility at older ages or the decline in total fertility. We study the fertility of women and their age at childbirth, with particular attention to their evolution over the last 40 years in countries across Europe. Comparing these countries, the increase in births after age 30 has occurred relatively independently of the decline at younger ages according to both period and cohort, and we find no positive relationship between the delay of first birth and decline in total fertility. On the contrary, an inverse relationship evidently exists at the country level, as longer delays generally correspond to smaller declines in total fertility. Context effects largely dominate individual constraints and play an important role in the occurrence of later births.

There is a strong variation in young adults' leaving-home behavior throughout Europe. Earlier research has indicated that individual and parental education are crucial determinants of leaving home. It is, however, unclear how country contexts shape the association between young adults' education as well as parental education and leaving the parental home. The current study examines country differences in the effect of young adults' education and parental education on leaving the parental home for the first time across 17 European countries. We use data from the Harmonized Histories Program for 85,243 young adults (aged 1635 years) in 17 European countries. We estimate discrete-time competing-risks event history models of leaving home to live without a partner versus with a partner. Our results underscore the importance of the country context in shaping young adults' leaving home and how it is affected by educational attainment, enrollment, and parental education. For example, the positive educational gradient in leaving home to live without a partner was found to be stronger in most of the Western European countries (except Austria) and less strong in Sweden and Norway and in most of the Eastern European countries (except the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland).

In August 2003, Western Europe experienced a deadly heat wave. It is estimated that 15,000 people died in France from its direct effects. Applying an indirect estimation technique to the monthly number of deaths by sex, age, and place of residence for the period 1996-2003, we estimate the number of years that would have remained to those who died from the heat wave had they been spared. The paper also evaluates the role of the 'harvesting' effect of the 2003 heat wave in explaining the deficit of deaths recorded in 2004-estimated at 23,000 out of an expected total of 535,000 deaths. The harvesting effect was modest and accounted for fewer than 5,000 of the 'missing' deaths in 2004. The mortality decline in 2004 is thus due mainly to other factors. One hypothesis is that special efforts have been directed towards isolated older people as a consequence of the heat wave.

With the increasing diversity of family situations, growing numbers of people, including children, have more than one home. In France, nearly 4% of inhabitants are likely to be counted twice in surveys; while in Australia, the proportion is less than 2%. Taking into account the possibility that a single individual could have multiple residences is necessary not only to avoid double counting, but also to accurately describe the family situations of adults and children. In this paper, we first estimate the proportion of people living in two dwellings and then describe the consequences of these two-home situations for basic estimates of family situations. Our analysis is based on two large-scale surveys: the 2004 EU-SILC in France and the 2001 HILDA in Australia. A striking result is that, in France, half of all children who are counted as living with their fathers are in fact dividing their time between the homes of separated parents.

The neighbouring countries France and Germany show very different levels of fertility. Differences also exist between the two regions of East and West Germany. The aim of this paper is to help close a remaining gap in explaining these differences by applying a cultural concept of role models. Data is based on the German survey “Family-related role models” (2012) and the French survey “Situation de couple, intentions de fécondité et opinions sur la famille”, ELIPSS (2013) offering a new approach to measuring the impact of social norms. The analysis uses multinomial logistic regression. We identified role models regarding the acceptance of childlessness on the one hand and large families on the other, as well as regarding the link between marriage and parenthood and the importance of financial security, suggesting different fertility-related cultures in France and Germany. There is a strong predominance of one general role model in France – that of having at least two children. In Germany, in contrast, there is a dominant role model – the two child family – but there are also several less central role models. The dominant model in France even leads to a sort of self-stigmatisation of individuals who want to stay childless, whereas childlessness is generally accepted in Germany. Role model differences between East and West Germany show a lower acceptance of large families and a higher acceptance of single-child families in the East. Our results highlight the importance of role models for fertility intentions as well as the relevance of cultural dimensions when studying the impact of the institutional framework on fertility.

De nombreuses études ont cherché à comprendre la tendance à l’union entre individus de même niveau d’éducation. Cependant, l’interaction entre ce phénomène et les différences d’âge entre les conjoints reste peu étudiée. Cette étude apporte une double contribution. Tout d’abord, elle examine comment les écarts d’âge entre conjoints et l’homogamie éducative ont évolué dans la population de quatre pays sur cinq décennies. Deuxièmement, elle analyse les écarts d’âge entre les conjoints, particulièrement au sein des couples homogames dont les deux membres possèdent des niveaux d’étude similaires. L’étude s’appuie sur les données individuelles de recensement harmonisées IPUMSi, disponibles depuis les années 1960, pour le Brésil, la France, le Panama et les États-Unis. Les résultats indiquent une légère augmentation de la proportion des unions entre personnes du même âge parmi les couples composés de deux diplômés du supérieur, tandis que les proportions parmi les couples présentant d’autres combinaisons de niveaux d’études restent stables. De plus, notre étude révèle une hausse du nombre de couples où l’homme est beaucoup plus âgé que sa conjointe, en particulier dans les couples hypergames et les couples homogames à faible niveau d’instruction. Ces tendances sont observées dans les quatre pays examinés. Although extensive research has been conducted on the evolving patterns of educational assortative mating, the interplay between this phenomenon and partners’ age differences has received limited attention. This study offers a twofold contribution. First, it examines trends in both age and educational assortative mating over 5 decades across four countries. Second, it explores age-difference trends in educationally heterogamous and homogamous couples, with a focus on patterns related to educational homogamy. We used IPUMSi harmonized census microdata for Brazil, France, Panama, and the United States, available since the 1960s. Results indicate a slight increase in the proportion of same-age couples among tertiary-educated couples over time, while proportions across other educational pairings remain stable. Additionally, we observe a growing prevalence of relationships in which the man is much older than the woman, particularly among educationally hypergamous and homogamous low-educated couples. These trends are consistent across all contexts examined.

In France, as in all European countries, the birth of a first child has been increasingly delayed over time, but the reasons why individuals decide to postpone the time to become a parent still remain to be deeply investigated at the micro level. In this prospective study we analyse fertility preferences and subsequent reproductive behaviour of childless people, and implement a model that uses desires, or intentions, with their related timing, as key covariates. Results show that desired and intended fertility are a strong predictor of subsequent family formation, even after controlling for the effects of other relevant variables, and people become more realistic about their short-term childbearing plans when asked to assess their personal chance to have a future birth. Moreover, highly educated people anticipate their own transition to parenthood more precisely, as compared to low educated people. Age is the most crucial factor determining the probability to remain involuntarily childless in the interval between the surveys, while persistent childlessness is mostly associated with the lack of a partner if it is a consequence of a deliberate choice to postpone childbearing. Adapted from the source document.

Following the era of the ‘golden age of marriage’ and the baby boom in the 1950s and 1960s, marriage has declined in importance, and its role as the main institution on which family relations are built has been eroded across Europe. Union formation most often takes place without a marriage. Family and living arrangements are currently heterogeneous across Europe, but all countries seem to be making the same shifts: towards fewer people living together as a couple, especially in marriage; an increased number of unmarried couples; more children born outside marriage; and fewer children living with their two parents. The relationship between these changing living arrangements, especially the decline of marriage, on the one hand, and the overall level of fertility, on the other, is not straightforward. In most countries, marriage rates and fertility declined simultaneously. However, the aggregate relationship between marriage and fertility indices has moved from negative (fewer marriages imply fewer births) to positive (fewer marriages imply more births). Thus, the decline of marriage, which is a part of the second demographic transition (see Overview Chapter 6), cannot be considered an important cause of the current low fertility level in many European countries. On the contrary, in European countries where the decline of marriage has been less pronounced, fertility levels are currently lower than in countries where new living arrangements have become most common.