Catalogue Search | MBRL
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
{{itemTitle}}
82
result(s) for
"Vohra, Rakesh V"
Sort by:
Mechanism design : a linear programming approach
\"Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify results from disparate areas of mechanism design. The third is reach: the technique offers the ability to solve problems that appear to be beyond solutions offered by traditional methods. No claim is made that the approach advocated should supplant traditional mathematical machinery. Rather, the approach represents an addition to the tools of the economic theorist who proposes to understand economic phenomena through the lens of mechanism design\"-- Provided by publisher.
Book
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey
Many auctions involve the sale of a variety of distinct assets. Examples are airport time slots, delivery routes, network routing, and furniture. Because of complementarities or substitution effects between the different assets, bidders have preferences not just for particular items but for sets of items. For this reason, economic efficiency is enhanced if bidders are allowed to bid on bundles or combinations of different assets. This paper surveys the state of knowledge about the design of combinatorial auctions and presents some new insights. Periodic updates of portions of this survey will be posted to this journal's Online Supplements web page at http://joc.pubs.informs.org/OnlineSupplements.html
Journal Article
Mechanism Design
Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify results from disparate areas of mechanism design. The third is reach: the technique offers the ability to solve problems that appear to be beyond solutions offered by traditional methods. No claim is made that the approach advocated should supplant traditional mathematical machinery. Rather, the approach represents an addition to the tools of the economic theorist who proposes to understand economic phenomena through the lens of mechanism design.
eBook
Assignment of Arrival Slots
Industry participants agree that, when inclement weather forces the FAA to reassign airport landing slots, incentives and property rights should be respected. We show that the FAA's Compression algorithm is incentive compatible, but fails to guarantee a form of property rights. This is significant since these conditions were the motivation for introducing Compression a decade ago. We give an alternative mechanism that does satisfy these conditions. It has the flavor of Top Trading Cycle variants of Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (1999) and Pápai (2000) for related but distinct models. Finally, both mechanisms may fail another condition: the incentive to vacate unusable landing slots.
Journal Article
An Ascending Vickrey Auction for Selling Bases of a Matroid
Consider selling bundles of indivisible goods to buyers with concave utilities that are additively separable in money and goods. We propose an ascending auction for the case when the seller is constrained to sell bundles whose elements form a basis of a matroid. It extends easily to polymatroids. Applications include scheduling, allocation of homogeneous goods, and spatially distributed markets, among others. Our ascending auction induces buyers to bid truthfully and returns the economically efficient basis. Unlike other ascending auctions for this environment, ours runs in pseudopolynomial or polynomial time. Furthermore, we prove the impossibility of an ascending auction for nonmatroidal independence
set
-systems.
Journal Article
INSTABILITY OF CENTRALIZED MARKETS
Centralized markets reduce search for buyers and sellers. Their “thickness” increases the chance of order execution at nearly competitive prices. In spite of the incentives to consolidate, some markets, securities markets and on-line advertising being the most notable, are fragmented into multiple trading venues. We argue that fragmentation is an inevitable feature of any centralized market except in special circumstances.
Journal Article
Optimization and mechanism design
Mechanism design is about optimizing the allocation of resources when the parameters needed to determine an optimal allocation are privately held by the agents who will consume the resources. An agent’s report of her information will influence the resulting allocation which in turn will affect her utility. In such a situation, how can one simultaneously elicit the information that is privately held and choose the optimal allocation? This paper illustrates how standard results in linear programming play a role in the analysis of mechanism design problems. It is not a comprehensive survey. Rather, it focuses on two variations of a particular problem: the allocation of a single object.
Journal Article
Advanced Mathematical Economics
This concise textbook presents students with all they need for advancing in mathematical economics. Detailed yet student-friendly, Vohra's book contains chapters in, amongst others:
* Feasibility * Convex Sets * Linear and Non-linear Programming * Lattices and Supermodularity.
Higher level undergraduates as well as postgraduate students in mathematical economics will find this book extremely useful in their development as economists.
1. Things to Know 2. Feasibility 3. Convex Sets 4. Linear Programming 5. Non-linear Programming 6. Fixed Points 7. Lattices and Supermodularity 8. Matroids
eBook
Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. We give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds for any (possibly infinite) outcome space and many of the known results are immediate consequences. Moreover, revenue equivalence can be identified in cases where existing theorems are silent.
Journal Article