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Characterization of Revenue Equivalence

by Müller, Rudolf , Uetz, Marc , Heydenreich, Birgit , Vohra, Rakesh V.

in Applications / Auction theory / Auctions / Budget allocation / Dominant strategy / Econometrics / Economic incentives / Economic theory / Equivalence / Equivalence relation / Exact sciences and technology / Graph theory / incentive compatibility / Incentive pay / Insurance, economics, finance / Market theory / Mathematical vectors / Mathematics / Mechanism design / Notes and Comments / Probability and statistics / Probability theory and stochastic processes / Public revenue / Revenue / Revenue equivalence / Sciences and techniques of general use / Special processes (renewal theory, markov renewal processes, semi-markov processes, statistical mechanics type models, applications) / Statistics / Studies / Sufficient conditions

2009

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Characterization of Revenue Equivalence

by Müller, Rudolf , Uetz, Marc , Heydenreich, Birgit , Vohra, Rakesh V.

2009

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Characterization of Revenue Equivalence

by Müller, Rudolf , Uetz, Marc , Heydenreich, Birgit , Vohra, Rakesh V.

2009

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Journal Article

Characterization of Revenue Equivalence

Müller, Rudolf,

Uetz, Marc,

Heydenreich, Birgit,

Vohra, Rakesh V.

2009

Overview

The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. We give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds for any (possibly infinite) outcome space and many of the known results are immediate consequences. Moreover, revenue equivalence can be identified in cases where existing theorems are silent.

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Publisher

Blackwell Publishing Ltd,Econometric Society,Wiley-Blackwell

Subject

/ Economic incentives