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We estimate the effect of temporary tax incentives on equipment investment using shifts in accelerated depreciation. Analyzing data for over 120,000 firms, we present three findings. First, bonus depreciation raised investment in eligible capital relative to ineligible capital by 10.4 percent between 2001 and 2004 and 16.9 percent between 2008 and 2010. Second, small firms respond 95 percent more than big firms. Third, firms respond strongly when the policy generates immediate cash flows, but not when cash flows only come in the future. This heterogeneity materially affects investment-weighted estimates and supports models in which financial frictions or fixed costs amplify investment responses.

Does tax code complexity alter corporate behavior? We investigate this question by studying the decision to claim refunds for tax losses. In a sample of 1.2 million observations from the population of corporate tax returns, only 37 percent of eligible firms claim their refund. A simple cost-benefit analysis of the tax loss choice cannot explain low take-up, motivating an exploration of how complexity alters this calculation. Research designs exploiting tax preparer switches, deaths, and relocations show that sophisticated preparers increase claim rates for small firms. Imperfect take-up has implications for measuring marginal tax rates and for the design of fiscal policy.

Business income constitutes a large and increasing share of income and wealth at the top of the distribution. We discuss how tax policy treats and shapes how businesses are organized and how they distribute economic gains to owners, with the focus on closely held and pass-through firms. These considerations influence whether and how labor and capital income is observed in economic data and feed into research controversies regarding the measurement of inequality and the progressivity of the tax code. We discuss the importance of these issues in the United States and highlight that limited evidence from other countries suggests that they are likely to be important elsewhere.

We study temporary fiscal stimulus designed to support distressed housing markets by inducing demand from buyers in the private market. Using difference-in-differences and regression kink research designs, we find that the First-Time Homebuyer Credit increased home sales by 490,000 (9.8%), median home prices by $2,400 (1.1%) per standard deviation increase in program exposure, and the transition rate into homeownership by 53%. The policy response did not reverse immediately. Instead, demand comes from several years in the future: induced buyers were three years younger in 2009 than typical first-time buyers. The program's market-stabilizing benefits likely exceeded its direct stimulus effects.

How important is human capital at the top of the U.S. income distribution? A primary source of top income is private “pass-through” business profit, which can include entrepreneurial labor income for tax reasons. This article asks whether top pass-through profit mostly reflects human capital, defined as all inalienable factors embodied in business owners, rather than financial capital. Tax data linking 11 million firms to their owners show that top pass-through profit accrues to working-age owners of closely held mid-market firms in skill-intensive industries. Pass-through profit falls by three-quarters after owner retirement or premature death. Classifying three-quarters of pass-through profit as human capital income, we find that the typical top earner derives most of her income from human capital, not financial capital. Growth in pass-through profit is explained by both rising productivity and a rising share of value added accruing to owners.

This paper studies the role of disagreement in amplifying housing cycles. Speculation is easier in the land market than in the housing market due to frictions that make renting less efficient than owner-occupancy. As a result, undeveloped land facilitates construction and intensifies the speculation that causes booms and busts in house prices. This observation challenges the standard intuition that in cities where construction is easier, house price booms are smaller. It can also explain why the largest house price booms in the United States between 2000 and 2006 occurred in areas with elastic housing supply.

We assess the business provisions of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, the biggest corporate tax cut in US history. We draw five lessons. First, corporate tax revenue fell by 40 percent due to the lower rate and more generous expensing. Second, firms with larger declines in their effective tax wedge increased investment relatively more. In aggregate, we suggest a loose consensus from the literature that total tangible corporate investment increased by 11 percent. Third, the business tax provisions increased economic growth and wages by less than advertised by the Act's proponents, with long-run GDP higher by less than 1 percent and labor income by less than $1,000 per employee. Fourth, provisions that increase foreign investment by US-based multinationals also boost their domestic operations. Fifth, some of the expired and expiring provisions, such as accelerated depreciation, generate more investment per dollar of tax revenue than others.

We develop a pair of models that speak to the goals and design of the sort of business lending and corporate bond purchase programs that have been introduced by governments in response to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. An overarching theme is that, in contrast to the classic lender-of-last-resort thinking that underpinned much of the response to the 2007–2009 global financial crisis, an effective policy response to the pandemic will require the government to accept the prospect of significant losses on credit extended to private sector firms.