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This report summarizes the results of a recent review of the emerging experience with the design and implementation of policy instruments to promote the development of renewable energy (RE) in a sample of six representative developing countries and transition economies ('developing countries') (World Bank 2010). The review focused mainly on price- and quantity-setting policies, but it also covered fiscal and financial incentives, as well as relevant market facilitation measures. The lessons learned were taken from the rapidly growing literature and reports that analyze and discuss RE policy instruments in the context of different types of power market structures. The analysis considered all types of grid-connected RE options except large hydropower: wind (on-shore and off-shore), solar (photovoltaic and concentrated solar power), small hydropower (SHP) (with capacities below 30 megawatts), biomass, bioelectricity (cogeneration), landfill gas, and geothermal. The six countries selected for the review included Brazil, India, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, and Turkey.

This report assesses the potential of electricity contract auctions as a procurement option for the World Bank's client countries. It focuses on the role of auctions of electricity contracts designed to expand and retain existing generation capacity. It is not meant to be a 'how-to' manual. Rather, it highlights some major issues and options that need to be taken into account when a country considers moving towards competitive electricity procurement through the introduction of electricity auctions. Auctions have played an important role in the effort to match supply and demand. Ever since the 1990s, the use of long-term contract auctions to procure new generation capacity, notably from private sector suppliers, has garnered increased affection from investors, governments, and multilateral agencies in general, as a means to achieve a competitive and transparent procurement process while providing certainty of supply for the medium to long term. However, the liberalization of electricity markets and the move from single-buyer procurement models increased the nature of the challenge facing system planners in their efforts to ensure an adequate and secure supply of electricity in the future at the best price. While auctions as general propositions are a means to match supply with demand in a cost-effective manner, they can also be and have been used to meet a variety of goals.

At present, different concentrating solar thermal technologies (CST) have reached varying degrees of commercial availability. This emerging nature of CST means that there are market and technical impediments to accelerating its acceptance, including cost competitiveness, an understanding of technology capability and limitations, intermittency, and benefits of electricity storage. Many developed and some developing countries are currently working to address these barriers in order to scale up CST-based power generation.Given the considerable growth of CST development in several World Bank Group partner countries, there is a need to assess the recent experience of developed countries in designing and implementing regulatory frameworks and draw lesson that could facilitate the deployment of CST technologies in developing countries. Merely replicating developed countries’ schemes in the context of a developing country may not generate the desired outcomes.Against this background, this report (a) analyzes and draws lessons from the efforts of some developed countries and adapts them to the characteristics of developing economies; (b) assesses the cost reduction potential and economic and financial affordability of various CST technologies in emerging markets; (c) evaluates the potential for cost reduction and associated economic benefits derived from local manufacturing; and (d) suggests ways to tailor bidding models and practices, bid selection criteria, and structures for power purchase agreements (PPAs) for CST projects in developing market conditions.

In order to better handle the dynamic task allocation of UAV swarms, this paper first models the task allocation problem of UAV swarms. Then, improvements were made to the previous auction-based methods in terms of two aspects—the auction function and auction mechanism, and a two-stage task allocation method for UAV swarms based on an improved auction mechanism was proposed. When improving the auction function, an auction function with a parameter considering both UAVs and tasks was designed. By using machine learning to obtain the parameter, relatively stable experimental performance can be achieved. To further optimize the performance, a re-auction mechanism was proposed. Finally, by comparing with commonly used methods based on auction mechanisms, including the method of a linear combination of the MiniSum and MiniMax team objectives for task allocation and the other method, the feasibility of improving the auction function and auction mechanism was verified, and better experimental results were obtained.

The transition towards renewable energy has increased the importance of virtual power plants (VPPs) in integrating distributed energy resources (DERs). However, questions remain regarding the most appropriate auction mechanisms (pay-as-bid (PAB) versus pay-as-clear (PAC)) and imbalance penalty structures, which significantly influence VPP bidding strategies and market operations. This study employs a three-stage stochastic programming model to evaluate VPP bidding behaviors under these auction mechanisms while also considering the effects of imbalance penalty structures. By simulating various market scenarios, the results reveal that PAC markets offer higher VPP revenues due to settlement at the market-clearing price; they also exhibit greater volatility and elevated imbalance penalties. For instance, power deviations in PAC markets were 52.60% higher than in PAB markets under specific penalty structures, and imbalance penalty cost ranges differed by up to 82.32%. In contrast, PAB markets foster stable, stepwise bidding strategies that minimize imbalance penalties and improve renewable energy utilization, particularly during high- and moderate-generation periods. The findings emphasize the advantages of the PAB mechanism in electricity markets with substantial renewable energy integration, providing significant insights for the design of auction mechanisms that facilitate reliable and sustainable market operations.

Sponsored search plays a major role in the revenue contribution of e-commerce platforms. Advertising systems are designed to maximize platform revenue, but other goals also need to be considered, such as user experience, advertiser utility, and how to achieve the long-term revenue goal. A key component of a sponsored search system is online allocation, which makes real-time decisions to match users’ search requests with relevant ad campaigns to maximize platform revenue within constraints such as campaign budgets. Although much progress has been made, most of the research work on allocation problem has focused on satisfying guaranteed deals for display ads, and those challenges for allocation problems in sponsored search are not properly addressed. In this paper, we develop a framework to solve the large-scale sponsored search ad allocation problem, consisting of two main parts. One is an optimization problem solved offline by a parameter-server based architecture, and the other is an online strategy to alleviate the conflict with the auction mechanism during online service. Comprehensive offline evaluation on real production data and online A/B testing on real production system have been made. The experimental results demonstrate that through better allocating user queries to appropriate ads, the proposed model can significantly increase the platform’s revenue without sacrificing advertisers’ ROI.

This study presents an architectural framework for the blockchain-based usage-based insurance (UBI) policy auction mechanism in the internet of vehicles (IoV) applications. The main objective of this study is to analyze and design the specific blockchain architecture and management considerations for the UBI environment. An auction mechanism is developed for the UBI blockchain platform to enhance consumer trust. The study identifies correlations between driving behaviors and associated risks to determine a driver’s score. A decentralized bidding algorithm is proposed and implemented on a blockchain platform using elliptic curve cryptography and first-price sealed-bid auctions. Additionally, the model incorporates intelligent contract functionality to prevent unauthorized modifications and ensure that insurance prices align with the prevailing market value. An experimental study evaluates the system’s efficacy by expanding the participant pool in the bidding process to identify the winning bidder and is investigated under scenarios where varying numbers of insurance companies submit bids. The experimental results demonstrate that as the number of insurance companies increases exponentially, the temporal overhead incurred by the system exhibits only marginal growth. Moreover, the allocation of bids is accomplished within a significantly abbreviated timeframe. These findings provide evidence that supports the efficiency of the proposed algorithm.

We propose a new, easy-to-implement class of payment rules, \"Reference Rules\" to make core-selecting package auctions more robust. Small, almost-riskless, profitable deviations from \"truthful bidding\" are often easy for bidders to find under currently used payment rules. Reference Rules perform better than existing rules on our marginal-incentive-to-deviate criterion, and are as robust as existing rules to large deviations. Other considerations, including fairness and comprehensibility, also support the use of Reference Rules.

We experimentally study auctions versus grandfathering in the initial assignment of pollution permits that can be traded in a secondary spot market. Low and high emitters compete for permits in the auction, whereas permits are assigned for free under grandfathering. In theory, trading in the spot market should erase inefficiencies due to initial mis-allocations. In the experiment, high emitters exercise market power in the spot market, and permit holdings under grandfathering remain skewed towards high emitters. Furthermore, the opportunity costs of \"free\" permits are fully \"passed through.\" In the auction, the majority of permits are won by low emitters, reducing the need for spot-market trading. Auctions generate higher consumer surplus and slightly lower product prices in the laboratory markets. Moreover, auctions eliminate the large \"windfall profits\" that are observed in the treatment with free, grandfathered permit allocations.