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Throughout the Cold War there were longstanding efforts to control the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) through extensive arms control, deterrence, and defense programs. Since then counterproliferation efforts by the U.S. and international community have accelerated. Given the attention to counterproliferation in the last decade, how effective was the leadership provided by President Clinton and his Secretaries of Defense, Aspin, Perry and Cohen, in providing innovative and effective policies for countering the proliferation of WMD? Comparing the cases of U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and U.S. and U.N. efforts in Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Joseph R. Cerami examines patterns of organizational leadership and policy innovation in the development and implementation of WMD policy initiatives. Rather than criticize the framework of American and international political institutions, this leadership perspective draws important insights on the capabilities of institutions to further U.S. and international goals and objectives in security policymaking. In doing so, the book argues that the U.S.'s role and the roles of its internal government agencies are most significant in international affairs. Smartly and appealingly positioned at the intersection of theory and practice, Cerami's book crafts a new perspective in international relations and public administration offering great potential for understanding as well as designing policy innovations to counter the proliferation of WMD in the 21st century.

Purpose-This article examines power asymmetry as an independent variable within nonproliferation negotiations. Using North Korea as a case study, this article demonstrates that the further a nation's nuclear weapon program develops, the less potential there is to achieve denuclearization. Design, Methodology, and Approach-To reconcile the nebulous definition of power, this paper examines power as a perception rather than ascribing it to an objective reality. It seeks to explore how North Korean sources of identity have affected the leadership's view of power, and how resulting perceptions of power asymmetry have influenced the course of denuclearization negotiations. Findings-The greatest progress towards North Korea's denuclearization was made when power asymmetry between Pyongyang and Washington was at its highest. However, upon formally declaring and testing nuclear weapons, Pyongyang became inflexible, less likely to compromise, and more willing to issue ultimatums. Practical Implications-By examining the role of power asymmetry within a nonproliferation framework, future negotiations can be calibrated with the understanding that identity matters and sooner is better. Originality, Value-This paper presents an original approach to examining how North Korea perceives power and how these perceptions have influenced negotiations.

The emergence of new nuclear aspirants has posed a great threat to the post-Cold War global non-proliferation regime. These states have adopted a nuclear hedging strategy that has been deemed both strategically risky and politically difficult to maintain. Yet, hedging has not automatically resulted in nuclearisation. We analyse the conditions under which a nuclear hedger shifts its nuclear policy towards one of restraint. Drawing insights from prospect theory, we argue that a nuclear policy shift occurs when a nuclear hedger gains an asymmetric leverage vis-à-vis its adversary. Specifically, a hedging strategy that is based on loss aversion will only be abandoned when a shift in the nuclear aspirant's reference point occurs during negotiations. To test our theoretical arguments, we conduct an in-depth case study of North Korea's nuclear policies throughout the 1990s and 2000s. The empirical study of the changes in North Korea's negotiating stance during the Agreed Framework negotiations and the Six-Party Talks supports our asymmetric leverage thesis. We conclude with broad policy implications for the non-proliferation regime.

The executive branch has been the chief architect of U.S. policy to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. However, Congress has also played an important role influencing that policy. Using North Korea policy, the authors examine the increasing role members of Congress play as foreign-policy entrepreneurs.

To reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, we must prevent terrorists from obtaining nuclear weapons or materials. This will require, among other things, a sustained effort to keep dangerous nations from going nuclear-in particular North Korea. This article reviews the efforts the United States has undertaken through the years to keep North Korea from building a nuclear arsenal, arguing that the history of proliferation on the Korean Peninsula is marked by five nuclear crises. A sixth could be on the horizon, further compromising American efforts to lessen the likelihood of a nuclear attack on U.S. soil.

The recent North Korean crisis is the latest phase in a lengthy U.S.-North Korean deterrence relationship. That relationship, particularly its problems and limitations, is reviewed and the effectiveness of each side's contemporary deterrence posture is assessed. It is noted that deterrence and compellence have not prevented the emergence of the North's nuclear proliferation efforts, nor has it brought North Korea a large improvement in security. The recent crisis is also examined to assess the mistakes in U.S. efforts to further pursue deterrence and compellence to end the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Lessons of the crisis for the use of deterrence for system security management are briefly discussed.

In June 1994 the United States went to the brink of war with North Korea. With economic sanctions impending, President Bill Clinton approved the dispatch of substantial reinforcements to Korea, and plans were prepared for attacking the North's nuclear weapons complex. The turning point came in an extraordinary private diplomatic initiative by former President Jimmy Carter and others to reverse the dangerous American course and open the way to a diplomatic settlement of the nuclear crisis. Few Americans know the full details behind this story or perhaps realize the devastating impact it could have had on the nation's post-Cold War foreign policy. In this lively and authoritative book, Leon Sigal offers an inside look at how the Korean nuclear crisis originated, escalated, and was ultimately defused. He begins by exploring a web of intelligence failures by the United States and intransigence within South Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Sigal pays particular attention to an American mindset that prefers coercion to cooperation in dealing with aggressive nations. Drawing upon in-depth interviews with policymakers from the countries involved, he discloses the details of the buildup to confrontation, American refusal to engage in diplomatic give-and-take, the Carter mission, and the diplomatic deal of October 1994. In the post-Cold War era, the United States is less willing and able than before to expend unlimited resources abroad; as a result it will need to act less unilaterally and more in concert with other nations. What will become of an American foreign policy that prefers coercion when conciliation is more likely to serve its national interests? Using the events that nearly led the United States into a second Korean War, Sigal explores the need for policy change when it comes to addressing the challenge of nuclear proliferation and avoiding conflict with nations like Russia, Iran, and Iraq. What the Cuban missile crisis was to fifty years of superpower conflict, the North Korean nuclear crisis is to the coming era.

This article argues that the continued delays in the lightwater reactor construction project are endangering the ultimate success of the project on a number of levels. The longer that the construction of the reactors is delayed, the higher the costs to the members of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, and the less likely that the discrepancies in the DPRK's initial declaration to the International Atomic Energy Agency can be cleared up. A number of incentives are proposed to induce the various parties involved to fulfill their commitments under the Agreed Framework more quickly than currently required. Among these are that South and North Korea can learn a great deal through the decommissioning and dismantling of the DPRK's old graphite-moderated reactor, which might have commercial viability in the future.

Contrary to the early skepticism, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) has not only survived; in some ways it has actually flourished. KEDO and the DPRK (North Korea) have been able to forge a solid working relationship, which has been reflected in numerous agreements that interpret and implement the original commitments set forth in the 1994 Agreed Framework. More important is what KEDO has prevented—including the halting of its reprocessing of fissile material for atomic bombs. Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have been allowed continuous access to monitor this \"freeze.\" To date, there have been no publicly confirmed reports of the North cheating on this arrangement. Yet If KEDO were judged on its ability to efficiently manage an international construction project, it would be fortunate to receive a \"gentleman's C.\" But that may be the wrong way to assess its performance. Fundamentally, KEDO is a political endeavor, not a commercial project, and in that respect it has made a substantial contribution to peace building. Even without knowing the ultimate outcome of the KEDO project, its stabilizing presence has allowed the DPRK and the major powers in the region to begin a process of diplomatic and economic engagement.

This article examines the problems with the implementation of the October 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework and suggests possible modifications. The Agreed Framework is a set of guidelines that help to regulate and render more predictable the behavior of the parties toward each other. There is nothing in the Framework to stop the two parties from reformulating and updating the agreement. The Bush administration and the DPRK will need to come to terms on a new, modernized agreement that serves their current needs while maintaining the diplomatic gains of the Framework to date. The nature of the DPRK's energy-sector problems means a multi-pronged approach on a number of fronts is required. In this article, we identify five priority areas where we see DPRK energy sector assistance as both necessary and in the best interests of all parties. A U.S.-backed, coordinated program of grassroots energy-sector assistance to the DPRK would yield huge dividends in terms of confidence building and regional security. At the same time, in order to retain credibility with the DPRK, the United States must abide by its commitments to date, including the Agreed Framework.