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\"Explores the depth of anti-Americanism felt by Muslim populations in the Middle East and South Asia by reporting on opinions expressed during focus group sessions and in-depth surveys over several years, complemented by data from Gallup polls, World Values Survey, and Arab Barometer\"--Provided by publisher.

Though it has been nearly a decade since the attacks of September 11, the threat of terrorism emanating from the Muslim world has not subsided. U.S. troops fight against radical Islamists overseas, and on a daily basis, Americans pass through body scanners as part of the effort to defend against another attack. Naturally, many Americans wonder what is occurring in Muslim society that breeds such hostility toward the United States. Steven Kull, a political psychologist and acknowledged authority on international public opinion, has sought to understand more deeply how Muslims see America. How widespread is hostility toward the United States in the Muslim world? And what are its roots? How much support is there for radical groups that attack Americans, and why? Kull conducted focus groups with representative samples in Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, Jordan, Iran, and Indonesia; conducted numerous in-depth surveys in eleven majority-Muslim nations over a period of several years; and comprehensively analyzed data from other organizations such as Gallup, World Values Survey and the Arab Barometer. He writes: \"A premise of this book is that the problem of terrorism does not simply lie in the small number of people who join terrorist organizations. Rather, the existence of terrorist organizations is a symptom of a tension in the larger society that finds a particularly virulent expression in certain individuals. The hostility toward the United States in the broader society plays a critical role in sustaining terrorist groups, even if most disapprove of those groups' tactics. The essential 'problem,' then, is one of America's relationship with the society as a whole.\" Through quotes from focus groups as well as survey data, Kull digs below the surface of Muslim anger at America to reveal the underlying narrative of America as oppressing - and at a deeper level, as having betrayed -the Muslim people. With the subtlety of a psychologist he shows how this anger is fed by an \"inner clash of civilizations,\" between Muslims' desire to connect with America and all that it represents, and their fear that America will overwhelm and destroy their traditional Islamic culture. Finally, Kull maps out the implications of these findings for U.S. foreign policy, showing how many U.S. actions antagonize the larger Muslim population and help al Qaeda by improving their capacity for recruitment. He specifies steps that can mitigate Muslim hostility and draw on some of the underlying shared values that can support more respectful and, possibly, even amicable Muslim-American relations.

The battle for public opinion in the Islamic world is an ongoing priority for U.S. diplomacy. The current debate over why many Muslims hold anti-American views revolves around whether they dislike fundamental aspects of American culture and government, or what Americans do in international affairs. We argue, instead, that Muslim anti-Americanism is predominantly a domestic, elite-led phenomenon that intensifies when there is greater competition between Islamist and secular-nationalist political factions within a country. Although more observant Muslims tend to be more anti-American, paradoxically the most anti-American countries are those in which Muslim populations are less religious overall, and thus more divided on the religious–secular issue dimension. We provide case study evidence consistent with this explanation, as well as a multilevel statistical analysis of public opinion data from nearly 13,000 Muslim respondents in 21 countries.

This analysis uses survey data representing three of the world's most populous Muslim majority countries to challenge conventional wisdom on what shapes Muslim public opinion on political violence against the United States. It improves previous analysis by clearly distinguishing support for violence against civilians from support for violence against military targets and by featuring independent variables that clearly separate views on US foreign policies from views on US culture. Logistic regression shows that, among Egyptian, Pakistani and Indonesian Muslims, perceptions of controversial US policies toward Israel, Middle Eastern oil, or the perceived attempt to weaken and divide the Muslim world are not related to support for attacks on civilians in the United States, but only to support for attacks on US military targets. Approval of attacks on US civilians is shaped, instead, by negative views of US freedom of expression, culture, and people, disapproval of the domestic political status quo and the notion of general US hostility toward democracy in the Middle East. This last finding has important implications for US and Western policies toward the post-Arab Spring Middle East in particular and the broader relationship with the Muslim World in general.

Recent surveys in the United States and the Muslim world show widespread misinformation about the events of September 11, 2001. Using data from 9 predominantly Muslim countries, we study how such beliefs depend on exposure to news media and levels of education. Standard economic theory would predict that increased access to information should cause beliefs to converge. More recent models of biased belief formation suggest that this result might hinge critically on who is providing the information. Consistent with the latter, we find that overall intensity of media use and level of education have at best a weak correlation with beliefs, while particular information sources have strong and divergent effects. Compared to those with little media exposure or schooling, individuals watching Arab news channels or educated in schools with little Western influence are less likely to agree that the September 11 attacks were carried out by Arab terrorists. Those exposed to media or education from Western sources are more likely to agree. Belief that the attacks were morally justified and general attitudes toward the US are also strongly correlated with source of information. These findings survive controls for demographic characteristics and are robust to identifying media effects using cross-country variation in language.

This article compares and contrasts democratic Islamization in Pakistan and Turkey, two countries where Islamic parties came to power through electoral means. Based on a comparative analysis of these experiences, this article will make the case that democratic Islamization can be best understood through a three-fold approach focusing on Islamization of educational systems, economies, and social policies. This analysis introduces two models of Islamic democracy: the \"Conflicted Repressive Islamization\" of Pakistan, and the \"Subtle Islamization\" of Turkey. It also suggests that the Turkish model will serve as the inspiration for future reformers in the Muslim world.

There is a sizable gulf of perception between many in America and many in the Muslim world. One broad notion is that America seeks to dominate locals in the Middle East, and to exploit and even steal the region's oil resources. This notion has not been limited to jihadi radicals but has also resonated in lesser doses among many in the Muslim world. The U.S. role in oil-related issues feeds into historical, political, and religious perspectives of an imperialist and power-hungry America. I argue that the history of America's role in the region suggests that this broad notion about America is largely a misconception with important consequences. This misconception raises the cost of the use of oil and of American regional intervention. It also stokes terrorism and anti-Americanism, complicates America's relations with Middle Eastern countries, and affects its image among Muslims.

We have readily assumed that, within Muslim countries, fundamentalists will most oppose American influence and policies, but Lisa Blaydes and Drew A. Linzer find a striking and perhaps surprising regularity: Anti-Americanism is most pronounced in the least observant Islamic countries. Moreover, opposition to the United States does not seem to be related to any particular American policies or to American culture generally. Anti-Americanism arises instead, they argue in “Elite Competition, Religiosity, and Anti-Americanism in the Islamic World,” from elite strategy, in which fundamentalist political factions fan anti-American sentiments to compete with more secular groups. That competition is most intense, and hence the anti-American strategy most frequently employed, in Islamic countries in which divisions between secular and religious forces are most pronounced. Employing a mix of statistical and case study methods, Blaydes and Linzer find that, within countries, observant Muslims are likelier to express anti-American sentiments; between countries, competition between secular and religious forces, and not fundamentalism, inspires anti-U.S. sentiment.

The U.S. drone program in Pakistan faces strong resistance in Pakistan. Because the program solely seeks to eliminate terrorist groups and leaders through bombing campaigns, with no built in social support, the local population’s anti-American sentiment has reached the highest level in history. This angry mood against U.S. drone programs is spreading throughout the Islamic world. To counter this anti-American sentiment, and increase the drone program’s effectiveness, the U.S. must invest in multifaceted, socio-economic support efforts to educate the population and rebuild the gratuity, trust, and commitment of Pakistan’s people to the “War on Terror.”