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461,074 result(s) for "BUDGET DEFICIT"
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White House burning : our national debt and why it matters to you
\"America is mired in debt--more than $30,000 for every man, woman, and child. Bitter fighting over deficits, taxes, and spending bedevils Washington, D.C., even as partisan gridlock has brought the government to the brink of default. Yet the more politicians on both sides of the aisle rant and the citizenry fumes, the more things seem to remain the same. In White House Burning, Simon Johnson and James Kwak--authors of the national best seller 13 Bankers and cofounders of The Baseline Scenario, a widely cited blog on economics and public policy--demystify the national debt, explaining whence it came and, even more important, what it means to you and to future generations. They tell the story of the Founding Fathers' divisive struggles over taxes and spending. They chart the rise of the almighty dollar, which makes it easy for the United States to borrow money. They account for the debasement of our political system in the 1980s and 1990s, which produced today's dysfunctional and impotent Congress. And they show how, if we persist on our current course, the national debt will harm ordinary Americans by reducing the number of jobs, lowering living standards, increasing inequality, and forcing a sudden and drastic reduction in the government services we now take for granted. But Johnson and Kwak also provide a clear and compelling vision for how our debt crisis can be solved while strengthening our economy and preserving the essential functions of government. They debunk the myth that such crucial programs as Social Security and Medicare must be slashed to the bone. White House Burning looks squarely at the burgeoning national debt and proposes to defuse its threat to our wellbeing without forcing struggling middle-class families and the elderly into poverty. Carefully researched and informed by the same compelling storytelling and lucid analysis as 13 Bankers, White House Burning is an invaluable guide to the central political and economic issue of our time. It is certain to provoke vigorous debate\"-- Provided by publisher.
The Fiscal Effects of Immigration to the UK
We investigate the fiscal impact of immigration on the UK economy, with a focus on the period since 1995. Our findings indicate that, when considering the resident immigrant population in each year from 1995 to 2011, immigrants from the European Economic Area (EEA) have made a positive fiscal contribution, even during periods when the UK was running budget deficits, while Non-EEA immigrants, not dissimilar to natives, have made a negative contribution. For immigrants that arrived since 2000, contributions have been positive throughout, and particularly so for immigrants from EEA countries. Notable is the strong positive contribution made by immigrants from countries that joined the EU in 2004.
How Do Budget Deficits and Economic Growth Affect Reelection Prospects? Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries
We test whether good economic conditions and expansionary fiscal policy help incumbents get reelected in a large panel of democracies. We find no evidence that deficits help reelection in any group of countries independent of income level, level of democracy, or government or electoral system. In developed countries and old democracies, deficits in election years or over the term of office reduce reelection probabilities. Higher growth rates over the term raise reelection probabilities only in developing countries and new democracies. Low inflation is rewarded by voters only in developed countries. These effects are both statistically significant and quite substantial quantitatively. (JEL D72, E62, H62, O47)
Over-optimism in forecasts by official budget agencies and its implications
The paper studies forecasts of real growth rates and budget balances made by official government agencies among 33 countries. In general, the forecasts are found: (i) to have a positive average bias, (ii) to be more biased in booms, and (iii) to be even more biased at the 3-year horizon than at shorter horizons. This over-optimism in official forecasts can help explain excessive budget deficits, especially the failure to run surpluses during periods of high output: if a boom is forecasted to last indefinitely, retrenchment is treated as unnecessary. Many believe that better fiscal policy can be obtained by means of rules such as ceilings for the deficit or, better yet, the structural deficit. But we also find: (iv) countries subject to a budget rule, in the form of euroland's Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), make official forecasts of growth and budget deficits that are even more biased and more correlated with booms than do other countries. This effect may help explain frequent violations of the SGP. The question becomes how to overcome governments' tendency to satisfy fiscal targets by wishful thinking rather than by action. Chile in 2000 created structural budget institutions that may have solved the problem. Independent expert panels, insulated from political pressures, are responsible for estimating the long-run trends that determine whether a given deficit is deemed structural or cyclical. The result is that Chile's official forecasts of growth and the budget have not been overly optimistic, even in booms. Unlike many countries in the North, Chile took advantage of the 2002—7 expansion to run budget surpluses, and so was able to ease in the 2008—9 recession.
NEW EVIDENCE ON THE INTEREST RATE EFFECTS OF BUDGET DEFICITS AND DEBT
Estimating the effects of government debt and deficits on Treasury yields is complicated by the need to isolate the effects of fiscal policy from other influences. To control for the effects of the business cycle, and associated monetary policy actions, on debt, deficits, and interest rates, this paper studies the relationship between long-horizon forward rates and future federal government deficits and debt as projected by the Congressional Budget Office. For the entire 30-year sample for which these projections are available, the estimated effects of government deficits and debt on interest rates are statistically significant and economically relevant: about 25 basis points per percentage point increase in the projected deficit/GDP ratio, and 3 to 4 basis points for the debt/GDP ratio. Under plausible assumptions the parameter estimates are shown to be consistent with predictions from the neoclassical growth model.
Budget Transparency, Fiscal Performance, and Political Turnout: An International Approach
This paper attempts, for the first time, to assess the relationships between budget transparency, fiscal situation, and political turnout using a comparative international approach. With this aim, the authors build a comprehensive index of budget transparency encompassing 40 budget features based on international standards for a sample of 41 countries. They find a positive relationship between national government fiscal balance and budget transparency: The more information the budget discloses, the less the politicians can use fiscal deficits to achieve opportunistic goals. The univariate analysis shows a positive relationship between political turnout and transparency. This result gives some evidence of a positive answer to the question raised by James Alt and David Dreyer Lassen: Does transparency affect political outcomes such as turnout? To some extent, that the more transparent the budget reports are, the more incentives people have to vote. With respect to three variables—transparency, government fiscal balance, and electoral turnout—three clusters of countries arise: low transparency–fiscal imbalance, low transparency–small fiscal imbalance and high transparency–fiscal surplus.
Debt Financing and Financial Flexibility Evidence from Proactive Leverage Increases
Firms that intentionally increase leverage through substantial debt issuances do so primarily as a response to operating needs rather than a desire to make a large equity payout. Subsequent debt reductions are neither rapid, nor the result of proactive attempts to rebalance the firm's capital structure toward a long-run target. Instead, the evolution of the firm's leverage ratio depends primarily on whether or not the firm produces a financial surplus. In fact, firms that generate subsequent deficits tend to cover these deficits predominantly with more debt even though they exhibit leverage ratios that are well above estimated target levels. Our findings are broadly consistent with a capital structure theory in which financial flexibility, in the form of unused debt capacity, plays an important role in capital structure choices.
Over-optimistic official forecasts and fiscal rules in the eurozone
Eurozone members are supposedly constrained by the fiscal caps of the Stability and Growth Pact. Yet ever since the birth of the euro, members have postponed painful adjustment. Wishful thinking has played an important role in this failure. We find that governments' forecasts are biased in the optimistic direction, especially during booms. Eurozone governments are especially over-optimistic when the budget deficit is over the 3% of GDP ceiling at the time the forecasts are made. Those exceeding this cap systematically but falsely forecast a rapid future improvement. The new fiscal compact among the euro countries is supposed to make budget rules more binding by putting them into laws and constitutions at the national level. But biased forecasts can defeat budget rules. What is the record in Europe with national rules? The bias is less among eurozone countries that have adopted certain rules at the national level, particularly creating an independent fiscal institution that provides independent forecasts.
Instability of government revenues and expenditures: implications for budget deficit in Pakistan
This study investigated the impact of Pakistan's government revenue and expenditure instabilities on its budget deficit from 1972 to 2018. Following Morrison (World Dev 10(6):467–473, 1982), the conditional variance is estimated using the GARCH model to proxy these instabilities. The GMM estimates revealed that the instabilities of government revenues and expenditures caused an increase in the budget deficit. Moreover, the factors like lack of government control over public expenditure, debt servicing, government participation in the economy, and inflation rate also contribute to a rise in the budget deficit. However, government revenues and GDP growth rate reduce the budget deficit simultaneously.
Does the Current Account Still Matter?
Are discrepancies between national exports and imports ever a legitimate cause for government concern or intervention? The question is as old as economic theory itself. Sixteenth-century English writers deplored the drainage of precious metals implied by decits in foreign trade; as a result, the term balance of trade had entered into public discourse by the early seventeenth century. David Hume's account in 1752 of the price-specie-ow mechanism, arguably the greatest set piece of classical monetary economics, vanquished for many years the mercantilist position that the perpetual accumulation of external wealth was both desirable and feasible. More than 250 years later, however, the foreign trade imbalances of national units - including even some that share common currencies - still gure prominently in debates over economic policy.