Asset Details
MbrlCatalogueTitleDetail
Do you wish to reserve the book?
Over-optimism in forecasts by official budget agencies and its implications
by
Frankel, Jeffrey
in
Analytical forecasting
/ Balanced budgets
/ Bias
/ Budget deficit
/ Budget deficits
/ Budget policy
/ Budget, Government
/ Budgets
/ Business cycles
/ Chile
/ Deficit financing
/ Deficits
/ Economic conditions
/ Economic forecasts
/ Economic growth
/ Economic policy
/ Federal budget deficit
/ Fiscal policy
/ Forecasting
/ Forecasts
/ Government agencies
/ Government budgets
/ Gross domestic product
/ Institutions
/ Manycountries
/ Mathematical constants
/ Neutrality
/ Optimism
/ Public debt policy
/ Public officials
/ Studies
/ Surpluses
/ Variable budgets
/ Violations
2011
Hey, we have placed the reservation for you!
By the way, why not check out events that you can attend while you pick your title.
You are currently in the queue to collect this book. You will be notified once it is your turn to collect the book.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place the reservation. Kindly try again later.
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
Over-optimism in forecasts by official budget agencies and its implications
by
Frankel, Jeffrey
in
Analytical forecasting
/ Balanced budgets
/ Bias
/ Budget deficit
/ Budget deficits
/ Budget policy
/ Budget, Government
/ Budgets
/ Business cycles
/ Chile
/ Deficit financing
/ Deficits
/ Economic conditions
/ Economic forecasts
/ Economic growth
/ Economic policy
/ Federal budget deficit
/ Fiscal policy
/ Forecasting
/ Forecasts
/ Government agencies
/ Government budgets
/ Gross domestic product
/ Institutions
/ Manycountries
/ Mathematical constants
/ Neutrality
/ Optimism
/ Public debt policy
/ Public officials
/ Studies
/ Surpluses
/ Variable budgets
/ Violations
2011
Oops! Something went wrong.
While trying to remove the title from your shelf something went wrong :( Kindly try again later!
Do you wish to request the book?
Over-optimism in forecasts by official budget agencies and its implications
by
Frankel, Jeffrey
in
Analytical forecasting
/ Balanced budgets
/ Bias
/ Budget deficit
/ Budget deficits
/ Budget policy
/ Budget, Government
/ Budgets
/ Business cycles
/ Chile
/ Deficit financing
/ Deficits
/ Economic conditions
/ Economic forecasts
/ Economic growth
/ Economic policy
/ Federal budget deficit
/ Fiscal policy
/ Forecasting
/ Forecasts
/ Government agencies
/ Government budgets
/ Gross domestic product
/ Institutions
/ Manycountries
/ Mathematical constants
/ Neutrality
/ Optimism
/ Public debt policy
/ Public officials
/ Studies
/ Surpluses
/ Variable budgets
/ Violations
2011
Please be aware that the book you have requested cannot be checked out. If you would like to checkout this book, you can reserve another copy
We have requested the book for you!
Your request is successful and it will be processed during the Library working hours. Please check the status of your request in My Requests.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place your request. Kindly try again later.
Over-optimism in forecasts by official budget agencies and its implications
Journal Article
Over-optimism in forecasts by official budget agencies and its implications
2011
Request Book From Autostore
and Choose the Collection Method
Overview
The paper studies forecasts of real growth rates and budget balances made by official government agencies among 33 countries. In general, the forecasts are found: (i) to have a positive average bias, (ii) to be more biased in booms, and (iii) to be even more biased at the 3-year horizon than at shorter horizons. This over-optimism in official forecasts can help explain excessive budget deficits, especially the failure to run surpluses during periods of high output: if a boom is forecasted to last indefinitely, retrenchment is treated as unnecessary. Many believe that better fiscal policy can be obtained by means of rules such as ceilings for the deficit or, better yet, the structural deficit. But we also find: (iv) countries subject to a budget rule, in the form of euroland's Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), make official forecasts of growth and budget deficits that are even more biased and more correlated with booms than do other countries. This effect may help explain frequent violations of the SGP. The question becomes how to overcome governments' tendency to satisfy fiscal targets by wishful thinking rather than by action. Chile in 2000 created structural budget institutions that may have solved the problem. Independent expert panels, insulated from political pressures, are responsible for estimating the long-run trends that determine whether a given deficit is deemed structural or cyclical. The result is that Chile's official forecasts of growth and the budget have not been overly optimistic, even in booms. Unlike many countries in the North, Chile took advantage of the 2002—7 expansion to run budget surpluses, and so was able to ease in the 2008—9 recession.
This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website.