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Why is the rate of teen childbearing is so unusually high in the United States as a whole, and in some U.S. states in particular? U.S. teens are two and a half times as likely to give birth as compared to teens in Canada, around four times as likely as teens in Germany or Norway, and almost ten times as likely as teens in Switzerland. A teenage girl in Mississippi is four times more likely to give birth than a teenage girl in New Hampshire—and 15 times more likely to give birth as a teen compared to a teenage girl in Switzerland. We examine teen birth rates alongside pregnancy, abortion, and “shotgun” marriage rates as well as the antecedent behaviors of sexual activity and contraceptive use. We demonstrate that variation in income inequality across U.S. states and developed countries can explain a sizable share of the geographic variation in teen childbearing. Our reading of the totality of evidence leads us to conclude that being on a low economic trajectory in life leads many teenage girls to have children while they are young and unmarried. Teen childbearing is explained by the low economic trajectory but is not an additional cause of later difficulties in life. Surprisingly, teen birth itself does not appear to have much direct economic consequence. Our view is that teen childbearing is so high in the United States because of underlying social and economic problems. It reflects a decision among a set of girls to “drop-out” of the economic mainstream; they choose nonmarital motherhood at a young age instead of investing in their own economic progress because they feel they have little chance of advancement.

In this study, teens who were given free contraception and educated about reversible methods, with an emphasis on the benefits of long-acting methods, had rates of pregnancy, birth, and abortion that were much lower than the national rates for sexually experienced teens. Although it has declined substantially over the past two decades, the pregnancy rate among girls and women 15 to 19 years of age remains a stubborn public health problem. Each year, more than 600,000 teens become pregnant, and 3 in 10 teens will become pregnant before they reach 20 years of age. 1 , 2 Rates are higher among black and Hispanic teens, with 4 in 10 becoming pregnant by 20 years of age, as compared with 2 in 10 white teens. 2 – 4 In addition to the negative health and social consequences borne by teenage mothers and their children, the national financial . . .

This study discusses fertility trends and variation in countries that completed the transition from high to around-replacement fertility in the 1950s to 1980s, especially in Europe, East Asia and North America, and summarizes the key relevant findings for those countries with a more recent experience of fertility decline towards replacement level. A central finding is that there is no obvious theoretical or empirical threshold around which period fertility tends to stabilize. Period fertility rates usually continue falling once the threshold of replacement fertility is crossed, often to very low levels. While cohort fertility rates frequently stabilize or change gradually, period fertility typically remains unstable. This instability also includes marked upturns and reversals in Total Fertility Rates (TFRs), as experienced in many countries in Europe in the early 2000s. The long-lasting trend towards delayed parenthood is central for understanding diverse, low and unstable post-transitional fertility patterns. In many countries in Europe this shift to a late childbearing pattern has negatively affected the TFR for more than four decades. Many emerging post-transitional countries and regions are likely to experience a similar shift over the next two to three decades, with a depression of their TFRs to very low levels.

Childbearing behavior in East Asian countries has changed rapidly during the past half century from an average of five to seven children per family, to replacement-level fertility, and subsequently to unprecedentedly low levels, the lowest in the world. This article analyzes fertility trends in Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan using cohort fertility data and methods, then examines social and economic causes of the childbearing trends, and surveys policies pursued to reverse the fertility trends. Postponement of childbearing started in the 1970s with continuously fewer delayed births being \"recuperated,\" which resulted in ultra-low fertility. A rapid expansion of education and employment among women in a patriarchal environment has generated a stark dilemma for women who would like to combine childbearing with a career. Policy responses have been slow, with a more serious attempt to address issues in recent years. Thus far public and private institutions are not devoting sufficient attention to generating broad social change supportive of parenting.

Background The health and survival of women and their new-born babies in low income countries has been a key priority in public health since the 1990s. However, basic planning data, such as numbers of pregnancies and births, remain difficult to obtain and information is also lacking on geographic access to key services, such as facilities with skilled health workers. For maternal and newborn health and survival, planning for safer births and healthier newborns could be improved by more accurate estimations of the distributions of women of childbearing age. Moreover, subnational estimates of projected future numbers of pregnancies are needed for more effective strategies on human resources and infrastructure, while there is a need to link information on pregnancies to better information on health facilities in districts and regions so that coverage of services can be assessed. Methods This paper outlines demographic mapping methods based on freely available data for the production of high resolution datasets depicting estimates of numbers of people, women of childbearing age, live births and pregnancies, and distribution of comprehensive EmONC facilities in four large high burden countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Tanzania. Satellite derived maps of settlements and land cover were constructed and used to redistribute areal census counts to produce detailed maps of the distributions of women of childbearing age. Household survey data, UN statistics and other sources on growth rates, age specific fertility rates, live births, stillbirths and abortions were then integrated to convert the population distribution datasets to gridded estimates of births and pregnancies. Results and conclusions These estimates, which can be produced for current, past or future years based on standard demographic projections, can provide the basis for strategic intelligence, planning services, and provide denominators for subnational indicators to track progress. The datasets produced are part of national midwifery workforce assessments conducted in collaboration with the respective Ministries of Health and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) to identify disparities between population needs, health infrastructure and workforce supply. The datasets are available to the respective Ministries as part of the UNFPA programme to inform midwifery workforce planning and also publicly available through the WorldPop population mapping project.

This article reviews research on the effects of economic recessions on fertility in the developed world. We study how economic downturns, as measured by various indicators, especially by declining GDP levels, falling consumer confidence, and rising unemployment, were found to affect fertility. We also discuss particular mechanisms through which the recession may have influenced fertility behavior, including the effects of economic uncertainty, falling income, changes in the housing market, and rising enrollment in higher education, and also factors that influence fertility indirectly such as declining marriage rates. Most studies find that fertility tends to be pro-cyclical and often rises and declines with the ups and downs of the business cycle. Usually, these aggregate effects are relatively small (typically, a few percentage points) and of short durations; in addition they often influence especially the timing of childbearing and in most cases do not leave an imprint on cohort fertility levels. Therefore, major long-term fertility shifts often continue seemingly uninterrupted during the recession—including the fertility declines before and during the Great Depression of the 1930s and before and during the oil shock crises of the 1970s. Changes in the opportunity costs of childbearing and fertility behavior during economic downturn vary by sex, age, social status, and number of children; childless young adults are usually most affected. Furthermore, various policies and institutions may modify or even reverse the relationship between recessions and fertility. The first evidence pertaining to the recent recession falls in line with these findings. In most countries, the recession has brought a decline in the number of births and fertility rates, often marking a sharp halt to the previous decade of rising fertility rates.

Using North Carolina data for the period 1990-2010, we estimate the effects of economic downturns on the birthrates of 15- to 19-year-olds, using county-level business closings and layoffs as a plausibly exogenous source of variation in the strength of the local economy. We find little effect of job losses on the white teen birthrate. For black teens, however, job losses to 1 % of the working-age population decrease the birthrate by around 2 %. Birth declines start five months after the job loss and then last for more than one year. Linking the timing of job losses and conceptions suggests that black teen births decline because of increased terminations and perhaps also because of changes in prepregnancy behaviors. National data on risk behaviors also provide evidence that black teens reduce sexual activity and increase contraception use in response to job losses. Job losses seven to nine months after conception do not affect teen birthrates, indicating that teens do not anticipate job losses and lending confidence that job losses are \"shocks\" that can be viewed as quasi-experimental variation. We also find evidence that relatively advantaged black teens disproportionately abort after job losses, implying that the average child born to a black teen in the wake of job loss is relatively more disadvantaged.

Between 1998 and 2008 European countries experienced the first continent-wide increase in the period total fertility rate (TFR) since the 1960s. After discussing period and cohort influences on fertility trends, we examine the role of tempo distortions of period fertility and different methods for removing them. We highlight the usefulness of a new indicator: the tempo- and parity-adjusted total fertility rate (TFRp*). This variant of the adjusted total fertility rate proposed by Bongaarts and Feeney also controls for the parity composition of the female population and provides more stable values than the indicators proposed in the past. Finally, we estimate levels and trends in tempo and parity distribution distortions in selected countries in Europe. Our analysis of period and cohort fertility indicators in the Czech Republic, Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden shows that the new adjusted measure gives a remarkable fit with the completed fertility of women in prime childbearing years in a given period, which suggests that it provides an accurate adjustment for tempo and parity composition distortions. Using an expanded dataset for ten countries, we demonstrate that adjusted fertility as measured by TFRp* remained nearly stable since the late 1990s. This finding implies that the recent upturns in the period TFR in Europe are largely explained by a decline in the pace of fertility postponement. Other tempo-adjusted fertility indicators have not indicated such a large role for the diminishing tempo effect in these TFR upturns. As countries proceed through their postponement transitions, tempo effects will decline further and eventually disappear, thus putting continued upward pressure on period fertility. However, such an upward trend may be obscured for a few years by the effects of economic recession.

Objectives. To investigate the effect of minimum wage laws on adolescent birth rates in the United States. Methods. I used a difference-in-differences approach and vital statistics data measured quarterly at the state level from 2003 to 2014. All models included state covariates, state and quarter-year fixed effects, and state-specific quarter-year nonlinear time trends, which provided plausibly causal estimates of the effect of minimum wage on adolescent birth rates. Results. A$1 increase in minimum wage reduces adolescent birth rates by about 2%. The effects are driven by non-Hispanic White and Hispanic adolescents. Conclusions. Nationwide, increasing minimum wages by $ 1 would likely result in roughly 5000 fewer adolescent births annually.

Background The purpose of this study was to determine the utilization and live birth rates of assisted reproductive technology (ART) modalities among various racial and ethnic groups in recent years. Methods We reviewed ART data reported to the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technologies Clinic Outcome Reporting System (SART CORS) for autologous ART and third-party ART (3ART) cycles which involved donor oocytes, sperm, embryos and gestational carrier, performed in the U.S. between 2004 and 2013. To gauge demand by various racial/ethnic groups for ART services, we examined fertility rates and demographics of the entire U.S. birth cohort over the same time interval. Results Of 1,132,844 autologous ART cycles 335,462 resulted in a live birth (29.6%). An additional, 217,030 3ART cycles resulted in 86,063 live births (39.7%). Hispanic and Black women demonstrated high fertility and lower utilization rates of autologous ART and 3ART. Caucasian and Asian women exhibited lower fertility rates and higher autologous ART and 3ART utilization. Autologous ART resulted in higher live birth rates among Caucasian and Hispanic women and lower rates among Asian and especially Black women. 3ART improved live birth rates in all races/ethnicities, though Black women experienced lower live birth rates with most modalities. Spontaneous abortion rates were higher among Black women following autologous ART and some 3ART modalities than those among Caucasian women. Conclusion Utilization of ART is inversely related to fertility rates. Autologous ART produces lower live birth rates among Asian and Black women. 3ART results in relatively low live birth rates among Black women. Trial registration SART CORS #57 , Registered 5/14/2015