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The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), a partnership tool founded under the Kyoto Protocol, grants potential opportunities to help developing countries achieve sustainable development. The present research examines the CDM projects in Eastern Europe (Moldova, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Albania). Although there were far fewer projects in this region than, for instance, China or India, it has some specific features that make it worth studying. Major findings are that most CDM projects in Eastern Europe involved a changing combination of two or more sources of financing, and the distribution of projects in the region was uneven. Moreover, although there was a small number of projects overall, they were all cost-effective, long-term and large-scale. The findings of the research call for improvements to be made to the governance of the CDM, by strengthening the international and national regulation of projects and by aggregating the scales of decision-making and actions so that real multi-scalar transnational governance — from the global level down to the local level — is implemented in a coherent manner. It is also recommended to carry out ex-post project evaluations, following which readjustments could be made.

Agriculture accounts for the largest share of anthropogenic methane emissions. Rice paddy fields emit a significant amount of methane gas worldwide. Changing paddy water management practices has an enormous potential to reduce greenhouse gases. The clean development mechanism (CDM) project uses a market mechanism to reduce methane through private participation. There are various risks associated with private investment in CDM projects, although carbon credits as an economic incentive assist in mitigating some of these risks. Farmer participation plays a key role in the success of paddy water management projects in rural areas; however, despite the significant potential to reduce global methane emissions, very few projects have been implemented. When designing a Sustainable Development Mechanism (SDM) system, it is crucial to understand why the market mechanism in the existing CDM projects has failed. This study identifies and categorizes the risks and barriers to paddy water management in CDM projects and analyzes risk management options in CDM projects in India, Indonesia, and Mozambique. The results of this study showed that aside from economic risks, barriers to the application of technology in the field pose critical risks. The lack of knowledge and implementation experiences in rural areas increases barriers to practice. This in turn causes risk of difficulties in technology transfer which can be alleviated by improving awareness and introducing new knowledge through education and training in rural project implementation. Additionally, we highlight the importance of international efforts to build governance between the private and public sectors and promote technology transfers through multi-stakeholder engagement. This study provides specific information to encourage methane reduction worldwide and vitalize rice paddy water management in carbon reduction projects.

This article argues that the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)’s conception of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDRRC) was never effectively implemented through the Kyoto Protocol. The investments under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism suggest that CBDRRC has been used by developed countries to buy a “right to pollute”, i.e., maintaining or even increasing their greenhouse gas emissions, while investing in clean energy in developing nations, thus defeating the essence of CBDRRC as intended under the UNFCCC. Second, it points out that the Paris Agreement reflects a significant shift in the overall concept of CBDRRC, both in terms of its textual understanding as well as its implementation. A qualifier, “in the light of national circumstances”, was added to the principle of CBDRRC in the Paris Agreement, allowing a form of voluntary self-differentiation. This qualifier diluted a top-down, objective analysis of States’ commitments. For several scholars, this shift has meant a softening of the principle, making the “differentiation” more dynamic and flexible. In the authors’ opinion, the qualifier is a fundamental modification of the principle to make it politically more palatable. It completely disregards the notion of historical responsibility for climate change, which was the cornerstone of CBDRRC as conceived under the UNFCCC. Therefore, rather than presenting a more flexible understanding of UNFCCC’s conception of CBDRRC, the Paris Agreement marks a total departure from it. Lacking an explicit redefinition of the principle of CBDRRC, it is misleading to contend that the Paris Agreement is still anchored in it.

The architecture of global carbon markets has changed significantly since the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals were both agreed in 2015. Voluntary, international cooperative approaches established in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement allow Parties to work together to achieve the targets set out in their respective Nationally Determined Contributions to limit global warming to an increase below 1.5–2 °C. In Article 6.4, a sustainable mitigation mechanism is established for which rules, modalities and procedures will be developed internationally considering the experience and lessons learned from existing mechanisms, such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and its Sustainable Development (SD) Tool. Historically the issue of making integrated assessments of sustainable development and mitigation actions has been politically and methodologically controversial for many reasons: developing countries fear that an international definition of SD will interfere with their sovereignty and therefore their ability to define their own development pathways; players in the carbon market fear that markets can only handle one objective, namely mitigation outcomes; and sustainable development is regarded as too complex and costly to be measured and quantified. In an effort to address these concerns, the article proposes a new methodology for the sustainability labelling of climate mitigation actions relevant to Article 6 approaches. The article draws on an application of the CDM SD tool to analyse 2098 Component Programme Activities that had entered the CDM Pipeline by January 2017. The article demonstrates that assessment of the sustainable development benefits of climate actions can be graded and labelled based on the analysis of qualitative data, which is less costly than applying a quantitative approach.

The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol allows industrialized countries to use credits from greenhouse gas (GHG) abatement projects in developing countries. A key requirement of the CDM is that the emission reductions be real, measurable and additional. This article evaluates how the additionality of CDM projects has been assessed in practice. The analysis is mainly based on a systematic evaluation of 93 registered CDM projects and comes to the conclusion that the current tools for demonstrating additionality are in need of substantial improvement. In particular, the application of the barrier analysis is highly subjective and difficult to validate in an objective and transparent manner. Key assumptions regarding additionality are often not substantiated with credible, documented evidence. In a considerable number of cases it is questionable whether the emission reductions are actually additional. Based on these findings, practical recommendations for improving the assessment of additionality are provided.

The carbon-offsetting scheme Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has evolved into one of the most important instruments for the funding of renewable energy projects in mountain regions in developing and newly industrializing countries. The CDM allows industrialized states to compensate for greenhouse gas emissions by investing in climate change mitigation activities abroad. These offsetting projects are intended to avoid emissions while simultaneously contributing to sustainable development at the local level. The most common project type under the CDM is hydropower, with the majority of projects being located in the mountain areas of China and India. However, doubts about the scrutinizing methods of the CDM as well as the often controversial impacts of dam building on mountain environments and communities raise questions about the ability of these “clean development” dams to serve as a sustainable means of mitigating climate change. The objective of the present article is to assess the effectiveness of large CDM hydropower projects in the Indian state of Himachal Pradesh. Analysis of planning documents and expert interviews revealed that “clean development” dams in the Himachal Himalaya fall short of achieving the goals of the CDM. Most projects are not in a position to compensate for emissions because they would have been built even without CDM support. Furthermore, it is arguable whether CDM dams contribute to sustainable mountain development, because the consequences of their construction are the same as for many other ordinary large dams, that is, environmental damage and conflicts that arise from the reallocation of land and water resources. Our results suggest that the promotion of large hydropower projects through the CDM in its current form is a highly ambivalent strategy. Shortcomings in the regulatory framework of the CDM may be undermining the environmental and social integrity of the CDM at both the global and local levels.

The clean development mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol allows industrialized countries to use credits from greenhouse gas (GHG) abatement projects in developing countries. A key requirement of the CDM is that the emission reductions be real, measurable and additional. This article uses data from registered projects to evaluate the extent to which these objectives are met by projects that reduce hydrofluorocarbon-23 (HFC-23) emissions in the production of hydrochlorofluorocarbon-22 (HCFC-22). The data show that HCFC-22 plants produced significantly less HFC-23 during periods when no emission credits could be claimed compared with periods when HFC-23 destruction could be credited under the CDM. Moreover, the total amount of HCFC-22 produced appears to be determined mainly by CDM rules. This suggests that the claimed emission reductions may partly not be real and that the CDM provides perverse incentives to generate more HFC-23. The accelerated phase-out of HCFCs under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer could worsen this situation. To address these issues an ambitious emission benchmark for the baseline HFC-23 emissions is proposed.

This research empirically estimates abatement costs under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in India, using project-level data for 830 projects that had been registered as of April 2014. Emphasis lies on assessing the impact of international technology transfer on abatement costs and on testing whether CDM projects in India have experienced a “low-hanging fruits” problem or have benefitted from learning effects. The results suggest that projects that include technology transfer have higher abatement costs. However, this does not appear to be universally applicable when assessing technology transfer by project type. Second, no conclusive evidence is found to support a “low-hanging fruits” problem, both empirically and based on the finding that most Indian projects are conducted unilaterally. On the contrary, some project types showed that abatement costs decrease as more projects are implemented. Finally, results suggest increasing returns to scale as well as economies of time in terms of project duration.

A global target of stabilizing greenhouse-gas concentrations at between 450 and 550 parts per million carbon-dioxide equivalent (ppm CO2e) has proven robust to recent developments in the science and economics of climate change. Retrospective analysis of the Stern Review (2007) suggests that the risks were underestimated, indicating a stabilization target closer to 450 ppm CO2e. Climate policy at the international level is now moving rapidly towards agreeing an emissions pathway, and distributing responsibilities between countries. A feasible framework can be constructed in which each country takes on its own responsibilities and targets, based on a shared understanding of the risks and the need for action and collaboration on climate change. The global deal should contain six key features: (i) a pathway to achieve the world target of 50 per cent reductions by 2050, where rich countries contribute at least 75 per cent of the reductions; (ii) global emissions trading to reduce costs; (iii) reform of the clean development mechanism to scale up emission reductions on a sectoral or benchmark level; (iv) scaling up of R&D funding for low-carbon energy; (v) an agreement on deforestation; and (vi) adaptation finance.

Linking a cap-and-trade with an offset mechanism has many theoretical advantages: it reduces compliance costs, extends the price signal outside the cap-and-trade, and triggers technology transfer. However, it is feared that such linking will induce outsourcing of emissions reduction at a low price and undermine the price incentive in the cap-and-trade. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the first full-scale example of a cap-and-trade system linked to project-based mechanisms such that offsets have effectively been used by industrial installations. This article is an ex post analysis of EU ETS data for the years 2008 and 2009, and the characteristics of the link and its efficiency are evaluated. Although offsets have been much used, their use is concentrated and not very intense or frequent, which allays the fear that offsets will flood the market. Although the majority of surrendered CERs effectively come from the largest and oldest projects, the credits surrendered are similar to those available on the market. Possible factors that contribute towards inefficiency are the rules for using offsets, transaction costs affecting the participation of small installations, awareness and openness to market-based instruments, and uncertainties regarding CERs offer and demand from other markets. However, the impact on EUA equilibrium price still needs to be quantified.