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"Consequentialism"
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Second Order Consequentialism : a Defense
This thesis is a defense of Second Order Consequentialism (SOC). Whereas first order consequentialism is the claim that we should perform the action that results in the best consequences, SOC is the claim that we should adopt the moral theory for which it is true that adopting it would have the best consequences. I argue that this form of consequentialism has many of the traditional virtues of consequentialism, but by virtue of its indirectness it conflicts less with our intuitions and produces more desirable outcomes at the level of moral decision making. I argue that we have good reasons to make a distinction between first and second order theories, independent of any problems with consequentialism. I further argue that certain ethical problems -most notably the problem of demandingness and the concept of threshold deontology -cannot be properly addressed without a second order theory of some kind. I will then apply SOC to these areas to demonstrate how a second order theory can be used to fruitfully address problems like these. Finally, I will explore the idea of first order pluralism with a unifying second order theory. Second-order theories in general provide us with a framework by which we can interrogate our intuitions, particularly those that we have reason to think are in some way suspect or biased. Further, second order theories can be more easily made sensitive to changed circumstances or relevant information, without requiring awkward additions or clauses attached to the theory, as is often the case with first-order theories. Many of these are virtues of all second-order theories, including nonconsequentialist ones, but second order consequentialism is particularly promising due to its relative simplicity, and I think worth considering first before we jump to more, perhaps unnecessarily complicated, second order theories.
Dissertation
Revisiting Rule Consequentialism
Under mounting pressure from the international communities and organizations to curb carbon emission causing disturbing climate change, and the growing pressure of domestic environmentalists and the common man in India, the government is hard-pressed to enact laws on carbon emission. However, the moot problem is whether to consider a pro-active rule of action seriously to curb carbon emission while keeping the collective scenario in view or to consider a case-by-case scenario in view. A number of people argue that a collective approach is much better, and for that matter, pro-active general rules of actions are desirable for their outcomes or consequences are good or worthwhile. This is what we now call rule consequentialism, which is much different from the case-by-case act consequentialism. In this case, the rightness of political action is determined by following some rules (or policies) which are amenable to worthwhile consequences. Similarly, we may conceive of a number of general rules of action such as “curb corruption”, “curb apartheid”, “curb exploitation of woman” and so on. In this paper, I would like to revisit rule consequentialism as a normative theory of rightness of action that is not immoderately overdemanding on moral agents. However, I would justify why rule consequentialism is not only overdemanding of moral agents but immoderate as well. Hence, it is an untenable normative theory of rightness of action.
Journal Article
Epistemic consequentialism
An important issue in epistemology concerns the source of epistemic normativity. Epistemic consequentialism maintains that epistemic norms are genuine norms that are conducive to epistemic value. This volume presents the latest work on epistemic consequentialism by authors that are sympathetic to the view and those who are critical of it.-- Source other than Library of Congress.
Book
Act and Rule Consequentialism: A Synthesis
As an indirect ethical theory, rule consequentialism first evaluates moral codes in terms of how good the consequences of their general adoption are and then individual actions in terms of whether or not the optimific code authorises them. There are three well-known and powerful objections to rule consequentialism’s indirect structure: the ideal-world objection, the rule-worship objection, and the incoherence objection. These objections are all based on cases in which following the optimific code has suboptimal consequences in the real world. After outlining the traditional objections and the cases used to support them, this paper first constructs a new hybrid version of consequentialism that combines elements of both act and rule consequentialism. It then argues that this novel view has sufficient resources for responding to the previous traditional objections to pure rule consequentialism.
Journal Article
Consequentialism and Its Demands: The Role of Institutions
Consequentialism is often criticized as being overly demanding, and this overdemandingness is seen as sufficient to reject it as a moral theory. This paper takes the plausibility and coherence of this objection—the Demandingness Objection—as a given. Our question, therefore, is how to respond to the Objection. We put forward a response relying on the framework of institutional consequentialism we introduced in previous work. On this view, institutions take over the consequentialist burden, whereas individuals, special occasions aside, are required to set up and maintain institutions. We first describe the Objection, then clarify the theory of institutional consequentialism and show how it responds to the Objection. In the remainder of the paper, we defend the view against potential challenges.
Journal Article
After war ends : a philosophical perspective
\"There is extensive discussion in current Just War literature about the normative principles which should govern the initiation of war (jus ad bellum) and also the conduct of war (jus in bello), but this is the first book to treat the important and difficult issue of justice after the end of war. Larry May examines the normative principles which should govern post-war practices such as reparations, restitution, reconciliation, retribution, rebuilding, proportionality and the Responsibility to Protect. He discusses the emerging international law literature on transitional justice and the problem of moving from a position of war and possible mass atrocity to a position of peace and reconciliation. He questions the Just War tradition, arguing that contingent pacifism is most in keeping with normative principles after war ends. His discussion is richly illustrated with contemporary examples and will be of interest to students of political and legal philosophy, law and military studies\"-- Provided by publisher.
BOOK
Against Consequentialist Interpretations of Deontological Principles
The distinction between doing and allowing (DDA); intentional and non-intentional agency (DDE); and agent-relative versus agent-neutral values have been invoked to support the deontological nature of moral thought. Consequentialists claim that, since these distinctions can be incorporated into value theory, all plausible deontological theories ultimately reduce to consequentialism. I argue: first, that while the DDA and DDE can be framed in agent-neutral terms, they must be interpreted in agent-relative terms; second, that even when interpreted in agent-relative terms, the DDA and DDE compel non-consequentialist understandings; and third, that these three distinctions function as non-consequentialist constraints on deliberation about action, thus resisting attempts to ‘consequentialize’ them. The conclusion is that, far from being a mere variant of consequentialism, deontology is a distinct moral theory—one that offers a principled rejection of the consequentialist ‘compelling idea’ that it is always permissible to bring about the outcome with the best possible consequences.
Journal Article