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The various attempts to rethink the structure and composition of the Parliament of interwar Romania, including or especially its upper chamber, are one of the symptoms of the uneasiness produced by the way Romanian parliamentary democracy was actually functioning. In almost all cases, these projects and possible solutions were not conceived as hostile to the principles of classical constitutionalism and the separation of powers, but rather as a concrétisation or deepening of them. They sometimes depart from the canons of classical constitutionalism, but do not appear hostile to it. Unfortunately, political change has been imposed not through constitutional reform or transformation - including the revision of the Fundamental Law - but through improvised solutions, arbitrariness and political violence.

This article conceptually and empirically explores the Interwar Era’s variant of the ‘electoral authoritarian’ regime-type, relying on a unique recategorisation of all Central and Eastern European states to systematically classify non-democratic regimes between the two World Wars. Modern electoral authoritarian regimes are notable for combining the ‘standard model’ of electoralist structural features common to contemporary democracy with identifiably authoritarian political orders. Electoralist regimes of the period were distinct from those of today, with a greater emphasis on anti-political dominant parties, the inheritance of 19 th century-style parliamentarism in terms of both institutional and political culture, and a reliance on unaccountable apex executives who nevertheless allowed authoritarian forms of multiparty politics. The article also introduces the era’s primary alternative for institutionalized regimes that do not fit the simple label of traditional dictatorship or electoral authoritarianism: the ‘institutional-hierarchical’ model. This characterizes innovations in corporatist-style economic and sectoral representation, as well as explicitly top-down, non-electoralist authoritarian constitutional structures and mobilized, single-party institutions. The article reviews all Interwar regimes in the region, providing alternative regime conceptualizations, exploratory classifications, and an illustrative case-study of Poland’s post-1926 Interwar style electoral authoritarian regime, highlighting both the survival of older electoralist models alongside a growing movement towards both more personalist and institutional-hierarchical formats by the 1930s.

Çalışmanın konusu Türk siyasal yaşamında önemli bir aktör olan Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliğidir (TOBB). Siyaset ve ekonominin birbirini etkilediği gerçeğinden hareketle çalışmada ithal ikameci kalkınma politikasının geçerli olduğu 1950-1980 arası dönemde TOBB'un Türk siyasal hayatına etkisi incelenmiştir. Bu çerçevede TOBB'un salt bir baskı grubu olarak ele alınamayacağı belirtilmiştir. Türk siyasi hayatında korporatist anlayışın önemli aktörlerinden biri olan TOBB'un parti içi demokrasi ve siyasetin finansmanı konularında demokrasiye olumsuz etkileri olduğu iddia edilmiştir. Diğer taraftan TOBB bünyesindeki sermaye grupları arasındaki mücadelenin Türk siyasi hayatına yansımalarının olduğu iddia edilmiş Türk siyasal hayatında sermaye ve siyaset arası ilişkileri incelemede TOBB'un önemli bir kurum olduğu üzerinde durulmuştur.

The dominant role of the authoritarian state in Chinese volunteerism has been noted but little examined in the scholarly literature. This study illuminates the ways in which the Chinese state controls and administers volunteerism and volunteering through a detailed analysis of the governance of volunteering in Beijing. Drawing on participant observation, interviews and archival research, we analyse how Beijing administers volunteering and its structures through the work of its administrative authority for managing volunteering in regulation and public policy, management structure, resources, internal operations, monitoring and evaluation. We argue that Beijing has built a comprehensive apparatus to manage and control volunteering through a Party- and state-controlled, multi-layered and centralized management structure. However, this state corporatist structure carries within it the seeds for over-formal controls and conflicts between official, professional service providers and the increasing number of volunteers throughout Chinese society.

The article contributes to discussions on the nature, extent and depth of neo-corporatist political arrangements in Slovenia before the 2008 crisis by analysing the interests held by the respective dominant social bloc(s) as they emerged in the early 1990s and are most clearly expressed in strategic documents of the state. Our analysis shows that beneath the neo-corporatist structure and certain neo-Keynesian policies as the outcome of the social partnership, a strong technocratic, political and capitalist orientation to introduce greater liberalisation in the areas of employment and social policy was already present long before 2004, a year usually seen as when the neo-corporatist consensus started to crumble after a new rightwing government came to power and Slovenia joined the EU and NATO.

PurposeThe major purpose of this paper is to answer the overarching questions of how multinational corporations (MNCs) address the multiple institutional logics of accountability and pressures of the field in which they operate and how the dominant logic changes and shifts in response to such pressures pre- and post-disaster situation.Design/methodology/approachIn-depth interpretive textual analyses of multiple longitudinal data sets are conducted to study the case of the Fundão dam disaster. The data sources include historical documents, academic articles and public institutional press releases from 2000 to 2016, covering the environment leading to the case study incident and its aftermath.FindingsThe findings reveal how MNCs' plurality of and, at times, conflicting institutional logics shape the organizational behaviors, actions and nonactions of actors pre-, peri- and post-disaster. More specifically, the predominance bureaucracy embedded in the state-corporatist logic of the host country before a disaster allows the strategic subunit of an MNC to continue operating while causing various forms of environmental damage until a globally visible disaster triggers a reversal in the dominant logic toward the embrace of wider, global, emergent social and environmental accountability.Originality/valueThis paper contributes to discussions regarding the need to explore in depth of how MNCs respond to multiple institutional pressures in practice. This study extends the literature concerning disaster accountability, state-corporatism and logic-shifting by exploring how MNCs respond to the plurality of institutional logics and pressures over time and showing how, in some cases, logics not only reinforce but also contrast with each other and how a globally exposed disaster may trigger a shift in the dominant logic governing MNCs' responses.

In the study of civil society, Tocqueville-inspired research has helped illuminate important connections between associations and democracy, while corporatism has provided a robust framework for understanding officially approved civil society organizations in authoritarian regimes. Yet neither approach accounts for the experiences of ostensibly illegal grassroots nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in an authoritarian state. Drawing on fieldwork in China, I argue that grassroots NGOs can survive in an authoritarian regime when the state is fragmented and when censorship keeps information local. Moreover, grassroots NGOs survive only insofar as they refrain from democratic claims-making and address social needs that might fuel grievances against the state. For its part, the state tolerates such groups as long as particular state agents can claim credit for any good works while avoiding blame for any problems. Grassroots NGOs and an authoritarian state can thus coexist in a \"contingent symbiosis\" that-far from pointing to an inevitable democratization-allows ostensibly illegal groups to operate openly while relieving the state of some of its social welfare obligations. Adapted from the source document.

Germany’s traditional nonprofit sector, rooted in membership associations that served as intermediaries between citizens and government, is a story of the past. The organizations have either suffered from a significant decrease in membership, or they have turned into business-like organisations. As a result, welfare partnership is still in place. However, the partners have significantly changed: governments are enchanted with the logic of the market; nonprofit organizations are no longer part of civil society but proxies of corporate enterprises, and volunteering is welcomed by the government as a substitute for cheap labour.

Recent years have seen a revival of debates about the role of business and the sources of business power in postindustrial political economies. Scholarly accounts commonly distinguish between structural sources of business power, connected to its privileged position in capitalist economies, and instrumental sources, related to direct forms of lobbying by business actors. The authors argue that this distinction overlooks an important third source of business power, which they conceptualize as institutional business power. Institutional business power results when state actors delegate public functions to private business actors. Over time, through policy feedback and lock-in effects, institutional business power contributes to an asymmetrical dependence of the state on the continued commitment of private business actors. This article elaborates the theoretical argument behind this claim, providing empirical examples of growing institutional business power in education in Germany, Sweden, and the United States.