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In this article, we consider the implications of the 'Prevent' strand of the government's counterterrorism strategy for the UK state's engagement with Muslims. We argue that the logics of Prevent have been highly problematic for state–Muslim engagement. Nevertheless, we suggest that the characterisation of state approaches to engaging Muslims as a form of discipline is incomplete without an analysis of: first, differences in practices, habits and perspectives across governance domains; second, variations in approach and implementation between levels of governance; and third, the agency of Muslims who engage with the state. Through this approach we show how attention to the situated practices of governance reveals the contested nature of governing through Prevent.

For years, the U.S. government has been waging counterterrorism campaigns against al-Qaida and other armed groups in safe havens and weak states. What explains the effectiveness of such campaigns? The variation in effectiveness may result from differences in select tactical, organizational, and technological capabilities of the counterterrorism state and its local partner, captured by the concept of the Legibility and Speed-of-Exploitation System (L&S). Empirical studies, including novel fieldwork data, on the U.S. drone war in Pakistan’s Waziristan region from 2004 to 2014 reveal the influence of the L&S on targeted groups. From 2004 to 2007, a lack of U.S. counterterrorism capabilities aligning with the L&S allowed both al-Qaida and the Pakistan Taliban to build their operational infrastructure, expand their bases, engage in extensive recruitment drives, and broker important local alliances. In contrast, as the United States made substantial improvements in the L&S from 2008 to 2014, the campaigns against both groups became increasingly effective. Both al-Qaida and the Pakistan Taliban experienced sustained reductions in operational capabilities, losses of bases, and high desertion rates; they also faced growing political challenges, including from within their own organizations. These findings contrast with the view that counterterrorism offers short-term gains at best and is counterproductive at worst.

Research on social movements shows a bias towards movements that oppose the status quo. Consequently, state–movement relations are primarily characterised as antagonistic. Where cooperative relationships are considered, the focus is on co-option and institutionalisation of movements. By contrast, this article focuses on social movements that support the status quo and how in their collaborations with governmental actors, they act as para-statal agencies. Drawing on findings from a multi-site ethnography examining the implementation of the UK Prevent counter-terrorism programme, I show how neoconservative think tanks and counter-extremism civil society organisations help to enact and extend Prevent as a distinct form of political repression. As such, this article gives close attention to the otherwise neglected role that non-state actors play in non-violent political repression. My argument builds on and extends emerging work analysing social movement activity beyond the prism of the ‘challengers versus authorities’ paradigm.

The United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation in Mali (MINUSMA) has become among the deadliest in UN history, suffering from attacks by violent extremists and terrorists. There are strong calls to give UN peacekeeping operations more robust mandates and equip them with the necessary capabilities, guidelines and training to be able to take on limited stabilisation and counter-terrorism tasks. This article conceptually develops UN counter-terrorism operations as a heuristic device, and compares this with the mandate and practices of MINUSMA. It examines the related implications of this development, and concludes that while there may be good practical as well as short-term political reasons for moving in this direction, the shift towards UN counter-terrorism operations will undermine the UN's international legitimacy, its role as an impartial conflict arbiter, and its tools in the peace and security toolbox more broadly, such as UN peacekeeping operations and special political missions.

Few studies have examined the sentencing outcomes of individuals convicted of terrorism or violent extremism-related offences in the United Kingdom (UK). Home Office data can tell us the number of persons arrested for terrorist-related activity and subsequent outcomes, such as charges and convictions by legislation, but this data does not provide a complete picture of the prosecution landscape for extremist actors in the UK. This is due in part to the existence of three distinct legal jurisdictions (England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland) and also to differences in the types of data collected and counting practices in operation. Moreover, the official data available publicly are only summary statistics, with no separate data for Scotland. This article addresses this research gap in our knowledge of the prosecution landscape for extremist actors in the UK by utilising data from an original dataset compiled by the research team from open sources on the sentencing outcomes of individuals (n=809) convicted of terrorism, terrorism-related, and violent extremism offences over a 21- year period (April 2001-March 2022). The analysis of this dataset has allowed us to test a range of hypotheses in relation to not only motivation but also offence type, gender, age, co-defendants and having multiple counts (i.e. facing multiple charges). Limitations of the study are also discussed

The lethality of lone-wolf terrorism has reached an all-time high in the United States. Isolated individuals using firearms with high-capacity magazines are committing brutally efficient killings with the aim of terrorizing others, yet there is little consensus on what connects these crimes and the motivations behind them. InThe Age of Lone Wolf Terrorism, terrorism experts Mark S. Hamm and Ramón Spaaij combine criminological theory with empirical and ethnographic research to map the pathways of lone-wolf radicalization, helping with the identification of suspected behaviors and recognizing patterns of indoctrination.Reviewing comprehensive data on these actors, including more than two hundred terrorist incidents, Hamm and Spaaij find that a combination of personal and political grievances lead lone wolves to befriend online sympathizers-whether jihadists, white supremacists, or other antigovernment extremists-and then announce their intent to commit terror when triggered. Hamm and Spaaij carefully distinguish between lone wolves and individuals radicalized within a group dynamic. This important difference is what makes this book such a significant manual for professionals seeking richer insight into the transformation of alienated individuals into armed warriors. Hamm and Spaaij conclude with an analysis of recent FBI sting operations designed to prevent lone-wolf terrorism in the United States, describing who gets targeted, strategies for luring suspects, and the ethics of arresting and prosecuting citizens.

The Islamic State in the West African province (ISWAP) has gained prominence in Lake Chad Basin by filling in the security, service delivery, and governance gaps in Cameroon, Nigeria, and Niger. This has won the group recruits and support in some communities, entrenching it in the region. Using the security-development-Governance nexus conceptual framework, this mixed methods study explores viable counter-terrorism measures in the Lake Chad Basin. The paper argues that although a military option is viable, combating underlying state failures and applying soft counter-terrorism measures will go a long way in restoring the state-community trust needed to defeat ISWAP.

This article considers the relationship between (mis)recognition, inequality and social activism through the lens of young Muslims’ response to their positioning as ‘suspect communities’. It draws on qualitative empirical research to suggest that the institutionalisation of misrecognition, including through the preventative (‘Prevent’) arm of UK counter-terrorism strategy, may mobilise young Muslims to resist ‘suspect’ status and make claims to the right to equal esteem. This forms part of the motivation towards social activism that mitigates the harm inflicted by misrecognition. However, the particular historical and cultural form of the institutionalisation of misrecognition, which renders ‘preventing Prevent’ a priority for young Muslims, may compound their status subordination. Drawing on critiques of the politics of recognition, and contextualising findings in debates on racism, anti-Muslim attitudes and societal securitisation, the article concludes that fighting misrecognition with recognition politics mis-places the role of power in subject formation and constrains young Muslims’ political agency.

The recent digital revolution led robots to become integrated more than ever into different domains such as agricultural, medical, industrial, military, police (law enforcement), and logistics. Robots are devoted to serve, facilitate, and enhance the human life. However, many incidents have been occurring, leading to serious injuries and devastating impacts such as the unnecessary loss of human lives. Unintended accidents will always take place, but the ones caused by malicious attacks represent a very challenging issue. This includes maliciously hijacking and controlling robots and causing serious economic and financial losses. This paper reviews the main security vulnerabilities, threats, risks, and their impacts, and the main security attacks within the robotics domain. In this context, different approaches and recommendations are presented in order to enhance and improve the security level of robotic systems such as multi-factor device/user authentication schemes, in addition to multi-factor cryptographic algorithms. We also review the recently presented security solutions for robotic systems.

The interaction of international counter-terrorism laws with IHL is an area of renewed focus, amid widespread concern that the former are being (mis)applied to criminalise the provision of humanitarian assistance envisaged under the latter. The Security Council has begun to consider this issue in resolutions adopted in March and July 2019, but difficult questions of law and fact remain. These questions have significant practical consequences - for humanitarian agencies and those they seek to assist, as well as for States that must weigh different, and possibly conflicting, legal obligations. Much of the analysis to date and the solutions proposed, pay insufficient attention to the specifics of each legal regime.