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This report brings together the results of an eight-part series of presentations by leading experts in issues directly related to microfinance institutional sustainability. It is intended for microfinance institution (MFI) board members, managers, and staff members as well as for government regulators, supervisors, and donor staff members. The first four chapters include topics in risk management: (1) risk management systems, (2) good governance, (3) interest rates, and (4) micro-insurance. The last four chapters include four topics in new product development and efficient delivery methodologies: (5) housing microfinance, (6) micro-leasing, (7) disaster preparedness products and systems, and (8) new technologies. The objectives of the series were as follows: i) to strengthen MFIs by disseminating innovative approaches in risk management, cost control, governance, and new technologies; ii) to promote a South-South exchange of experiences and lessons learned; iii) to promote greater ties among the MFIs in the region and between MFIs and government supervisors and regulators; and iv) to highlight the Bank's ability to mobilize international technical expertise in microfinance.

Using a unique set of data on fund use by China＇s listed companies, this paper examines how macroeconomic uncertainty works on corporate investment. The study shows that macroeconomic uncertainty affects corporate investment behavior through the three channels of external demand, liquidity demand and long-term fund demand, However, the result is influenced by expectations and can differ across firms depending on their economic cycle, shareholder character, industrial character and the financial constraints they are exposed to. Specifically, high macroeconomic uncertainty can weaken the positive roles of these channels, especially those of external demand and liquidity demand, in driving corporate investment. During economic upturns, the effect of these channels is the most evident among state-owned firms, manufacturing firms and low cash dividend firms. The lessons from this study are that macroeconomic policies should be leveraged taking account of the channels through which economic shocks find their way, and monetary policies have to be implemented by targeting microscopic fund demand.

PurposeThis study aims to demonstrate and measure the impact of liquidity shocks on a bank’s solvency, especially when the bank does not hold sufficient liquid assets.Design/methodology/approachThe proposed model is an extension of Merton’s (1974) model. It assesses the bank’s probability of default over one or two (short) periods relative to liquidity shocks. The shock scenarios are materialised by different net demands for the withdrawal of funds (NDWF) and may lead the bank to sell illiquid assets at a depreciated value. We consider the possibility of second-round effects at the beginning of the second period by introducing the probability of their occurrence. This probability depends on the proportion of illiquid assets put up for sale following the initial shock in different dependency scenarios.FindingsWe observe a positive relationship between the initial NDWF and the bank’s probability of default (particularly over the second period, which is conditional on the second-round effects). However, this relationship is not linear, and a significant proportion of liquid assets makes it possible to attenuate or even eliminate the effects of shock scenarios on bank solvency.Practical implicationsThe proposed model enables banks to determine the necessary level of liquid assets, allowing them to resist (i.e. remain solvent) different liquidity shock scenarios for both periods (including eventual second-round effects) under the assumptions considered. Therefore, it can contribute to complementing or improving current internal liquidity adequacy assessment processes (ILAAPs).Originality/valueThe proposed microprudential approach consists of measuring the impact of liquidity risk on a bank’s solvency, complementing the current prudential framework in which these two topics are treated separately. It also complements the existing literature, in which the impact of liquidity risk on solvency risk has not been sufficiently studied. Finally, our model allows banks to manage liquidity using a solvency approach.

The composition and role of a startup board are very different from that of an established corporation. Many public company board members today lament the amount of time consumed at and between meetings focusing on compliance and regulatory \"check‐box\" issues. In the startup context these priorities are inverted, that is, minimal downside focus, and maximal growth focus. A high‐growth startup board will be highly engaged and all members, from differing perspectives, will have an intense and mutually aligned focus on growth and value creation. It needs to ensure a company's CEO and management team balances the demands of fundraising against those of actually running the business. The startup board, in contrast, always has an eventual exit, and path to that exit, top of mind. The construction of venture backed startup boards can, albeit unintentionally, create public relations time bombs around diversity.

This paper explores the impact of investor flows and financial market conditions on returns in crude oil futures markets. I argue that informational frictions and the associated speculative activity may induce prices to drift away from \"fundamental\" values, and may result in price booms and busts. Particular attention is given to the interplay between imperfect information about real economic activity, including supply, demand, and inventory accumulation, and speculative activity in oil markets. Furthermore, I present new evidence that there were economically and statistically significant effects of investor flows on futures prices, after controlling for returns in the United States and emerging-economy stock markets, a measure of the balance sheet flexibility of large financial institutions, open interest, the futures/spot basis, and lagged returns on oil futures. The largest impacts on futures prices were from intermediate-term growth rates of index positions and managed-money spread positions. Moreover, my findings suggest that these effects were through risk or informational channels distinct from changes in convenience yield. Finally, the evidence suggests that hedge fund trading in spread positions in futures impacted the shape of term structure of oil futures prices. This paper was accepted by Wei Xiong, finance.

I propose and test a capital-flow-based explanation for some well-known empirical regularities concerning return predictability—the persistence of mutual fund performance, the \"smart money\" effect, and stock price momentum. First, I construct a measure of demand shocks to individual stocks by aggregating flow-induced trading across all mutual funds, and document a significant, temporary price impact of such uninformed trading. Next, given that mutual fund flows are highly predictable, I show that the expected part of flow-induced trading positively forecasts stock and mutual fund returns in the following year, which are then reversed in subsequent years. The main findings of the paper are that the flow-driven return effect can fully account for mutual fund performance persistence and the smart money effect, and can partially explain stock price momentum.

This paper compares how recent waves of private equity real estate investment have reshaped the rental housing markets in New York and Berlin. Through secondary analysis of separate primary research projects, we explore financialisation's impact on tenants, neighbourhoods, and urban space. Despite their contrasting market contexts and investor strategies, financialisation heightened existing inequalities in housing affordability and stability, and rearranged spaces of abandonment and gentrification in both cities. Conversely cities themselves also shaped the process of financialisation, with weakened rental protections providing an opening to transform affordable housing into a new global asset class. We also show how financialisation's adaptability in the face of changing market conditions entails ongoing, but shifting processes of uneven development. Comparative studies of financialisation can help highlight geographically disparate, but similar exposures to this global process, thus contributing to a critical urban politics of finance that crosses boundaries of space, sector and scale.

A popular view is that the surge in the real price of oil during 2003-08 cannot be explained by economic fundamentals, but was caused by the increased financialization of oil futures markets, which in turn allowed speculation to become a major determinant of the spot price of oil. This interpretation has been driving policy efforts to tighten the regulation of oil derivatives markets. This survey reviews the evidence supporting this view. We identify six strands in the literature and discuss to what extent each sheds light on the role of speculation. We find that the existing evidence is not supportive of an important role of speculation in driving the spot price of oil after 2003. Instead, there is strong evidence that the co-movement between spot and futures prices reflects common economic fundamentals rather than the financialization of oil futures markets.

In response to Morningstar’s release of carbon risk (CR) scores in May 2018, (environmentally) sustainable mutual funds in the U.S. showed a greater reduction in their portfolio CR relative to conventional funds. The observed causal impact of this third-party disclosure is consistent with the funds’ primary investment objectives. Differences in fund names, potentially driven by marketing considerations, appear irrelevant to the behavior of sustainable funds. Conventional funds that are signatories to the UN’s Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) or those with secondary sustainability mandates behave more like other conventional funds rather than sustainable funds. These funds appear relatively insensitive to disclosures as their sustainability considerations are superseded by other primary investment criteria. Fiduciary and legal bonding influences fund managers’ response to sustainability disclosures. Sustainable funds lower their CR score by reducing exposure to fossil fuels, not by increasing exposure to renewables.

CEPI estimates that developing up to three vaccines in the next 12–18 months will require an investment of at least US$2 billion.4 This estimate includes phase 1 clinical trials of eight vaccine candidates, progression of up to six candidates through phase 2 and 3 trials, completion of regulatory and quality requirements for at least three vaccines, and enhancing global manufacturing capacity for three vaccines. In addition to direct government contributions, innovative finance mechanisms have been successful in raising funds for vaccines in the past and should be used to fund the development of COVID-19 vaccines.8,9 The International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm) raises funds with vaccine bonds, which turn long-term contributions by donors into available cash.8 IFFIm was created to support Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, but could be used to finance CEPI's COVID-19 vaccine efforts. Investments should proceed in tandem to build national systems for delivery of potential vaccines—eg, using domestic financing and external financing from the World Bank Group's $14 billion COVID-19 Fast Track Facility13 and reallocations from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Gavi, and Global Financing Facility grants for service delivery.