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Pensions and deferred compensation represent substantial components of CEO incentives. We study stockholder and bondholder reactions to companies' initial reports of CEOs' inside debt positions following a 2007 SEC disclosure reform. We find that bond prices rise, equity prices fall, and the volatility of both securities drops for firms whose CEOs have sizeable defined benefit pensions or deferred compensation. Similar changes occur for credit default swap spreads and exchange-traded options. The results indicate a reduction in firm risk, a transfer of value from equity toward debt, and an overall destruction of enterprise value when CEOs' inside debt holdings are large.

US citizens and resident aliens are subject to income taxation on worldwide income, as well as giftand estate taxation on worldwide assets. Avoiding those rules by becoming a non-resident alien can yield substantial US tax benefits. In order to minimize the US tax benefits of expatriating, a variety of special rules apply to certain individuals who relinquish their US citizenship or cease to be \"long-term residents\" of the United States. This article discusses the special income tax rules applicable to \"covered expatriates.\"

Using a field experiment in a 401(k) plan, we measure the effect of disseminating information about peer behavior on savings. Low-saving employees received simplified plan enrollment or contribution increase forms. A randomized subset of forms stated the fraction of age-matched coworkers participating in the plan or age-matched participants contributing at least 6% of pay to the plan. We document an oppositional reaction: the presence of peer information decreased the savings of nonparticipants who were ineligible for 401(k) automatic enrollment, and higher observed peer savings rates also decreased savings. Discouragement from upward social comparisons seems to drive this reaction.

The chief executive officer (CEO) of a corporation and his or her executive team are responsible for the management of the business and its continued operating and financial success. The CEO and executive team are almost always highly compensated and the relative total compensation has mushroomed over time. Most of the compensation now is designed to be performance-based, but leading to charges that executives have incentives to manipulate corporate earnings and stock price in the short-term for their own self interests. The compensation at some companies became so egregious (Enron and other tech-bubble failures or Citigroup and other banks during the subprime meltdown) that compensation again became a major public policy issue subject to federal regulation. (Popular outrage and calls for government action against well-paid CEOs has been common at least since the 1930s.)

Some years ago, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) provided a process for corrections of errors that commonly occur in retirement plans through the Employee Plans Compliance Resolution System (EPCRS). Notification by email to the person responsible for payroll that late deposits occurred, which has created a compliance issue and must be corrected immediately, serves the purpose of informing the plan sponsor there is an error, but may ignore the human side and the reality that we can be a little scary to some people. Or that a Form 5500 filed through the Department of Labor (DOL) Delinquent Filer Voluntary Compliance Program will give them a blessing by both the DOL and the IRS as if it were filed timely.

In this paper, we provide efficient estimators and honest confidence bands for a variety of treatment effects including local average (LATE) and local quantile treatment effects (LQTE) in data-rich environments. We can handle very many control variables, endogenous receipt of treatment, heterogeneous treatment effects, and function-valued outcomes. Our framework covers the special case of exogenous receipt of treatment, either conditional on controls or unconditionally as in randomized control trials. In the latter case, our approach produces efficient estimators and honest bands for (functional) average treatment effects (ATE) and quantile treatment effects (QTE). To make informative inference possible, we assume that key reduced-form predictive relationships are approximately sparse. This assumption allows the use of regularization and selection methods to estimate those relations, and we provide methods for postregularization and post-selection inference that are uniformly valid (honest) across a wide range of models. We show that a key ingredient enabling honest inference is the use of orthogonal or doubly robust moment conditions in estimating certain reducedform functional parameters. We illustrate the use of the proposed methods with an application to estimating the effect of 401(k) eligibility and participation on accumulated assets. The results on program evaluation are obtained as a consequence of more general results on honest inference in a general moment-condition framework, which arises from structural equation models in econometrics. Here, too, the crucial ingredient is the use of orthogonal moment conditions, which can be constructed from the initial moment conditions. We provide results on honest inference for (function-valued) parameters within this general framework where any high-quality, machine learning methods (e.g., boosted trees, deep neural networks, random forest, and their aggregated and hybrid versions) can be used to learn the nonparametric/high-dimensional components of the model. These include a number of supporting auxiliary results that are of major independent interest: namely, we (1) prove uniform validity of a multiplier bootstrap, (2) offer a uniformly valid functional delta method, and (3) provide results for sparsitybased estimation of regression functions for function-valued outcomes.

We conduct an experiment with commercial bank loan officers to test how performance compensation affects risk assessment and lending. High-powered incentives lead to greater screening effort and more profitable lending decisions. This effect is muted, however, by deferred compensation and limited liability, two standard features of loan officer compensation contracts. We find that career concerns and personality traits affect loan officer behavior, but show that the response to incentives does not vary with traits such as risk-aversion, optimism, or overconfidence. Finally, we present evidence that incentives distort the assessment of credit risk, even among professionals with many years of experience.