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For decades, the Supreme Court has sharply divided in equal protection race discrimination cases. As commonly described, the Justices disagree about whether the Equal Protection Clause is properly interpreted through a colorblind anticlassification principle concerned with individualism or through an antisubordination principle concerned with inequalities in group status. This Article uncovers a third perspective on equal protection in the opinions of swing Justices who have voted to uphold and to restrict race conscious remedies because of concern about social divisiveness which, they believe, both extreme racial stratification and unconstrained racial remedies can engender. The Article terms this third perspective on equal protection concerned with threats to social cohesion the antibalkanization perspective. Employing this triadic model of equal protection, the Article demonstrates how Justice Kennedy reasons from antibalkanization values in the recent cases of Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 and Ricci v. DeStefano. There Justice Kennedy affirms race-conscious facially neutral laws that promote equal opportunity (such as disparate impact claims in employment discrimination laws) so long as the enforcement of such laws does not make race salient in ways that affront dignity and threaten divisiveness. The Article's triadic model identifies alternative directions equal protection doctrine might develop, and enables critique. A final section raises questions concerning the principle's logic and application. Have those who interpret equal protection with attention to balkanization enforced the principle in an effective and evenhanded way? In this spirit, the Article concludes by suggesting that the antibalkanization principle could be applied to cases of concern to minority communities that do not involve challenges to civil rights laws (for example, government use of race in suspect apprehension).

A philosophical battle is being waged for the soul of equal protection jurisprudence. One side sees discrimination as a comparative wrong occurring only where a law or policy fails to treat people as equals. The other side embraces a fundamentally noncomparative view that defines impermissible discrimination as a failure to treat each individual as she is entitled to be treated. This Article distinguishes between these conceptions, demonstrates why they are normatively distinct, and identifies specific and seemingly unrelated controversies in modern equal protection jurisprudence that are in fact manifestations of this single schism. The insights in this Article cannot resolve all of these doctrinal controversies, but they can reveal which controversies involve a philosophical muddling of the two competing conceptions and which will require the Supreme Court to choose.

This article examines the teaching of civic engagement in academic settings, focusing on its role in generating new knowledge and fostering social and personal action. The article proposes regulatory remedies to ensure a fair and balanced curriculum supporting diverse worldviews and productive discourse, promoting student civic participation. The legal principle of equal protection, enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment, serves as the foundation. The Fourteenth Amendment emphasizes equal treatment and opportunities for all, including access to a well-rounded education. By incorporating its principles into education, the article highlights the need to promote fair, civic education that empowers all students to participate actively in their communities. I recommend regulatory remedies to solidify education’s nature and foster a balanced curriculum. The proposed remedies ensure that various worldviews are embraced, promoting productive and amicable discourse among students. Creating an inclusive learning environment also allows students to engage in critical thinking and develop a deeper understanding of diverse perspectives, ultimately enhancing their civic participation. Furthermore, the article emphasizes the importance of regulatory safeguards against biased or exclusionary educational practices to ensure that all students have equal educational opportunities, regardless of their background or beliefs. By eliminating barriers and promoting a fair educational system, students can develop the necessary knowledge and skills to contribute to their communities actively. By incorporating the legal principle of equal protection with respect to perspectives represented on campus, the article advocates for legal and regulatory remedies to promote a fair and balanced curriculum that supports diverse worldviews.

When Brown v Board of Education prohibited racial segregation in public education, it inaugurated a great debate about equal citizenship and federalism that spanned the second half of the twentieth century. This article explores the relation of constitutional principle and politics in the ways we talk about the decision's meaning. It first revisits early debates over Brown to show how principled justifications for the decision were first forged in debates over its legitimacy. It shows that during the 1960s - when the Court first articulated the presumption that racial classifications are unconstitutional - the practical significance of this commitment was still inchoate. The article then considers how this story of constitutional principle and politics alters the understanding of equal protection law today. It concludes by reflecting on how these concerns have given shape to the Court's recent rulings on affirmative action and to other features of modern equal protection law.

Some constitutional questions implicate multiple, overlapping provisions of the Constitution's text. In resolving these questions, the Supreme Court typically addresses each of the relevant clauses in separate and sequential fashion, taking care not to let its analysis of one clause affect its analysis of any other. But every so often the Court takes a different approach, looking to the clauses in combination rather than in isolation. The Court has sometimes suggested, for instance, that two or more rights-based provisions might require the invalidation of government action, even where no single provision would do so on its own. The Court has also suggested that a federal law might fall too far outside the scope of Article I and too far within the scope of a rights-based provision to withstand constitutional attack. And the Court has very occasionally suggested that a congressional enactment might qualify as a necessary and proper means of enforcing multiple enumerated powers at once. In all of these cases, the Court has embraced (or at least tinkered with) forms of what I call \"combination analysis\"—justifying judicial outcomes by reference to multiple clauses acting together, as opposed to individual clauses acting alone. This Article presents a systematic examination of combination analysis in U.S. constitutional law. In so doing, it seeks to make four contributions to the burgeoning scholarly literature on the subject. First, the Article collects and taxonomizes existing examples of combination analysis in U.S. Supreme Court doctrine, demonstrating that combination arguments have enjoyed a wider range of application than has thus far been supposed. Second, the Article examines the conceptual structure of combination analysis, revealing some underappreciated functional similarities between combination-based constitutional reasoning and other more commonly accepted features of public law adjudication (including, for instance, arguments based on constitutional structure and arguments based on the constitutional avoidance canon). Third, the Article sorts through the practical pros and cons of combination analysis, shedding light on the questions of whether and (if so) when courts should advance combination arguments in the course of resolving a particular case. Finally, the Article offers some preliminary guidance regarding the implementation of combination analysis, identifying in particular four different types of \"combination errors\" that courts should strive to avoid. What emerges from the discussion is the conclusion that combination analysis represents a real and conceptually valid method of constitutional reasoning, which, at least under some circumstances, stands to benefit the development of constitutional law.

Professor Harry Kalven Jr once called the public forum \"the poor man's printing press.\" A significant feature of the modern regulatory apparatus governing access to the public forum, however, is that it often charges user fees to cover the costs of directing traffic, policing, and administering the public forum. And, as is the case any time the government puts a price on an activity, some people will be too poor to pay. This Comment asks whether the government must waive fees for indigent applicants for use of this \"poor man's printing press,\" and if so, when and why.

New Coronavirus pneumonia is eroding the world, and digital libraries are even more important. How to control the network security of digital library system? According to the requirements of equal protection 2.0, this paper analyzes the security requirements of digital library network, and puts forward the security protection technology of digital library system under equal protection 2.0 system from the four perspectives of secure communication network, secure area boundary, secure computing environment and security management center. Based on the security protection technology framework of equal protection 2.0, this paper studies the security evaluation method of digital library, and puts forward the security protection technology solution.

Suppose that you work on a state legislative committee charged with drafting maps of your state's electoral districts. Recently, constituents have contacted their representatives in the legislature to complain that the current district lines significantly dilute the influence of minority votes in some areas of the state. The constituents demand a change and warn that, in the event that no change is made, they will bring a lawsuit against the state under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. After studying the relevant law, your committee agrees that the current district plan may contravene § 2, which prohibits states from adopting plans that result in minority-vote dilution. To avoid litigation, your committee decides to draft a new district plan to remedy the § 2 violation. In choosing a strategy for drafting the remedial plan, your committee decides that it must account for racial demographics. After all, a strictly race-neutral methodology might fail to effectively correct the § 2 violation, or it might inadvertently give rise to a separate § 2 violation in another part of the state.

This article examines the impact of Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents (2000) and United States v. Morrison (2000) on the ways that Congress may enforce the Equal Protection Clause. At stake is the survival of the very institutional ecology in which legal and social understandings of equality have provoked, inspired, and shaped each other over the last 4 decades. Yet at no point in last term's cases did the Supreme Court identify or weigh the potential costs of disrupting this ecology. It is argued that restricting the participation of the representative branches in enforcing the Equal Protection Clause does not necessarily enhance the authority of the Court or the Constitution and may ultimately diminish the authority of both.

A central point of contention in the national debate over same-sex marriage is the importance of preserving tradition. That debate also features prominently in constitutional litigation over bans on same-sex marriage. Opponents of such bans argue that tradition is an illegitimate justification for the bans, while defenders of traditional marriage contend that tradition is not only a legitimate justification, but is in fact sufficiently important to withstand heightened judicial scrutiny. This Article assesses tradition as a justification for laws challenged on equal protection grounds, with a focus on laws that limit marriage to opposite-sex couples. The Article makes two main points. First, it concludes that a state's interest in preserving tradition—including the tradition of opposite-sex marriage—is probably legally sufficient to survive the most deferential standard of rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause. Second, this Article argues that courts should nonetheless view tradition with skepticism when it is offered to justify laws challenged on equal protection grounds. Tradition exhibits certain features, or \"indicia of suspectness,\" that counsel skepticism. Those features include tradition's speculative utility, rhetorical appeal, and manipulability. Additionally, tradition is especially suspicious when offered to justify laws that burden a group toward whom there has been a cultural shift from widespread societal disapproval in the past to substantial public tolerance today. In such circumstances, tradition may serve as a convenient justification for people who are actually motivated by now-repudiated attitudes toward the burdened group. For bans on same-sex marriage, this Article contends, courts should invalidate such laws unless, after careful scrutiny, courts are satisfied that the laws are motivated by legitimate, non-tradition-based interests.