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140,607 result(s) for "FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATION"
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Is One Watchdog Better Than Three? International Experience with Integrated Financial Sector Supervision
Over the past two decades, there has been a clear trend toward integrating the regulation and supervision of banks, nonbank financial institutions, and securities markets. This paper reviews the international experience with integrated supervision. We survey the theoretical arguments for and against the integrated supervisory model, and use data on compliance with international standards to assess the validity of some of these arguments. We find that (i) full integration is associated with higher quality of supervision in insurance and securities and greater consistency of supervision across sectors, after controlling for the level of development; and (ii) fully integrated supervision is not associated with a significant reduction in supervisory staff.
The First Legal Mortgagor: a Consumer Without Adequate Protection?
This article contends that the UK government’s attempt to create a well-functioning consumer credit market will be undermined if it fails to reform the private law framework relating to the first legal mortgage. Such agreements are governed by two distinct regulatory regimes that are founded upon very different conceptions of the mortgagor. The first, the regulation of financial services overseen by the Financial Conduct Authority, derives from public law and is founded upon a conception of the mortgagor as “consumer.” The other is land law, private law regulation implemented by the judiciary and underpinned by a conception of the mortgagor as “landowner.” Evidence suggests that the operation of these two regimes prevents mortgagors from receiving fair and consistent treatment. The current reform of financial services regulation therefore will change only one part of this governance regime and will leave mortgagors heavily reliant upon a regulator that still has to prove itself. What this article argues is that reform of the rules of private law must also be undertaken with the aim of initiating a paradigm shift in the conception of the mortgagor from “landowner” to “consumer.” Cultural shifts of this kind take time, but the hope is that this conceptual transformation will occur in time to deter the predicted rise in mortgage possessions.
Equivalence Decisions in the EU and UK Financial Services Sectors Post-Brexit
Financial services are largely left out of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement that was reached at the end of December 2020. The issue of cross-border market access for financial services firms based in the EU and in the UK could be resolved by the adoption of mutual equivalence decisions. The UK made a number of equivalence decisions pre-Brexit to allow EU-based financial services firms access to the UK market. The EU has not reciprocated. Consequently, UK-based financial services firms have moved business into the EU to maintain client access. The article discusses advantages and disadvantages of the EU and the UK’s different strategies as regards market access and whether equivalence decisions in the area of financial services can be used to build up a trustful relationship between the EU and the UK post-Brexit. Equivalence decisions, Brexit, pre-Brexit regulation, post-Brexit regulation, financial services regulation, Joint UK-EU Financial Regulatory Forum, market efficiency, market relocation, Singapore-on-Thames, systemic risks
Beyond placement, layering and integration – the perception of trade-based money laundering risk in UK financial services
Purpose The purpose of this study was to investigate the perception of trade-based money laundering in Letters of Credit (“L/C”) transactions among trade finance practitioners in the UK banking sector and to compare it to the perception of the same risk by the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”), the regulator of the UK’s banking sector. Design/methodology A survey was used to carry out research among financial services professionals engaged in trade finance in the UK. Findings This paper contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. First, it investigates the perception of trade-based money laundering risk from the perspective of financial services professionals, which has not previously been done. Second, it argues that the perception of trade-based money laundering in financial services is overly focussed on placement, layering and integration, and that the full extent of the offence under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 is less well known. It further found that financial services firms need to improve their understanding of the nature of trade-based money laundering under UK law. Practical implications This study argues that the financial services sector’s perception of trade-based money laundering risk in trade finance is underdeveloped and makes suggestions on how to improve it. Originality/value It provided unique insight into the perception of trade-based money laundering risk among financial services professionals.
BigTech and the changing structure of financial intermediation
We consider the drivers and implications of the growth of ‘BigTech’ in finance – i.e. the financial services offerings of technology companies with established presence in the market for digital services. BigTech firms often start with payments. Thereafter, some expand into the provision of credit, insurance and money management products, either directly or in cooperation with financial institution partners. Focusing on credit, we show that BigTech firms lend more in countries with less competitive banking sectors and less stringent bank regulation. Analysing the case of Argentina, we find support for the hypothesis that BigTech lenders, by acquiring a vast amount of non-traditional information, have an advantage in credit assessment relative to a traditional credit bureau. They also serve unbanked borrowers, and may have an advantage in contract enforcement. It is too early to judge the extent of BigTech’s eventual advance into the provision of financial services. However, the early evidence allows us to pose pertinent questions that bear on their impact on financial stability and overall economic welfare.
Does Macro-Prudential Regulation Leak? Evidence from a UK Policy Experiment
The regulation of bank capital as a means of smoothing the credit cycle is a central element of forthcoming macro-prudential regimes internationally. For such regulation to be effective in controlling the aggregate supply of credit it must be the case that: (i) changes in capital requirements affect loan supply by regulated banks, and (ii) unregulated substitute sources of credit are unable to offset changes in credit supply by affected banks. This paper examines micro evidence—lacking to date—on both questions, using a unique data set. In the UK, regulators have imposed time-varying, bank-specific minimum capital requirements since Basel I. It is found that regulated banks (UK-owned banks and resident foreign subsidiaries) reduce lending in response to tighter capital requirements. But unregulated banks (resident foreign branches) increase lending in response to tighter capital requirements on a relevant reference group of regulated banks. This \"leakage\" is substantial, amounting to about one-third of the initial impulse from the regulatory change.
A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation
Many observers have argued that the regulatory framework in place prior to the global financial crisis was deficient because it was largely “microprudential” in nature. A microprudential approach is one in which regulation is partial equilibrium in its conception and aimed at preventing the costly failure of individual financial institutions. By contrast, a “macroprudential” approach recognizes the importance of general equilibrium effects, and seeks to safeguard the financial system as a whole. In the aftermath of the crisis, there seems to be agreement among both academics and policymakers that financial regulation needs to move in a macroprudential direction. In this paper, we offer a detailed vision for how a macroprudential regime might be designed. Our prescriptions follow from a specific theory of how modern financial crises unfold and why both an unregulated financial system, as well as one based on capital rules that only apply to traditional banks, is likely to be fragile. We begin by identifying the key market failures at work: why individual financial firms, acting in their own interests, deviate from what a social planner would have them do. Next, we discuss a number of concrete steps to remedy these market failures. We conclude the paper by comparing our proposals to recent regulatory reforms in the United States and to proposed global banking reforms.
The rise of shadow banking: Evidence from capital regulation
We investigate the connections between bank capital regulation and the prevalence of lightly regulated nonbanks (shadow banks) in the U.S. corporate loan market. For identification, we exploit a supervisory credit register of syndicated loans, loan-time fixed effects, and shocks to capital requirements arising from surprise features of the U.S. implementation of Basel III. We find that less-capitalized banks reduce loan retention, particularly among loans with higher capital requirements and at times when capital is scarce, and nonbanks step in. This reallocation is associated with important adverse effects during the 2008 crisis: loans funded by nonbanks with fragile liabilities are less likely to be rolled over and experience greater price volatility.
On the Impact of Regulating Commissions: Evidence from the Indian Mutual Funds Market
Commissions-motivated agents have historically helped the development of many markets, but research suggests brokers motivated by commissions sometimes steer consumers towards inappropriate products. This issue is particularly important in household financial markets where consumers may be unable to evaluate products on their own. While reforms attempting to limit commission payments have been undertaken worldwide, little research has evaluated the impact of these reforms. We study a major Indian investor protection reform that attempted to reduce commissions tied to mutual fund sales by banning the distribution fees that mutual funds had previously earmarked for commissions. We analyze the policy impact by comparing funds charging high versus low distribution fees pre-reform and find no evidence that the reform itself reduced fund flows. We argue that the most plausible explanation is that the Indian asset management industry maintained substantial commissions to brokers through other revenue sources apart from the banned distribution fees.