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Background Korean government has established various policies to counter the low fertility rate since the mid-2000s, but it still has the lowest fertility rate among OECD member countries. This study investigated the relationship between changes in the Korean fertility rate and policies to encourage fertility. Methods This study utilized data of the total fertility rate of 250 local governments between 2014 and 2018, and a casebook of local government birth promotion policies. The dependent variable was fertility rate, and the independent variable was fertility promotion policy. Using SPSS 25.0 and M-plus 8.0 programs, descriptive statistical analysis and latent growth modeling were conducted. An unconditional quadratic function change model was selected as a final model of this study. Results The average of the initial fertility rate and the linear rate of change in the Korean fertility rate, and the rate of change of the quadratic function were all statistically significant, meaning that the fertility rate of decline increases over time. Also, the linear rate of change and the quadratic function change rate were significant, showing significant differences in the initial level and rate of change of the fertility rate between local governments. Among fertility policies, only the in-kind policy had a significant effect on the initial value of the fertility rate, meaning that the higher the number of in-kind policies, the higher the fertility rate. Conclusion This study is crucial as it examined the changes in the fertility rate of Korean local governments as well as the policy factors affecting the fertility rate at a quantitative level.

In this study, we contrast period and cohort approaches to answering the question: Is US fertility now below replacement? The answer would appear to be an unambiguous “yes” based on period trends in the total fertility rate (TFR). Since 2007, TFR has declined from 2.12, just above the replacement level set by demographic tradition at 2.10 births per woman, to 1.67 in 2022, leading many to speculate that the United States has now entered a sustained period of below-replacement fertility. A quite different picture emerges from cohort trends in the cumulative fertility rate (CFR), a cohort measure that is not subject to biases that can distort period TFRs. For older birth cohorts of US women—those born between 1959 and 1987 and who were thus age 33 or older in 2020—observed or projected CFRs at age 45 vary between 2.00 and 2.24 births per woman. For younger cohorts—those born between 1988 and 2010 and who were 10 to 32 as of 2020—we project CFRs at age 45 that are below 2.00, with these declines attributable to falling fertility at younger ages. We thus conclude that from a cohort perspective, the question “Is US fertility now below replacement” should be replaced by the question “Will lifetime fertility fall below replacement for the youngest cohorts of US women?”, with the answer to this latter question depending on the extent to which decreases observed at early ages in these cohorts will or will not be offset by future increases at later ages.

We describe a Bayesian projection model to produce country-specific projections of the total fertility rate (TFR) for all countries. The model decomposes the evolution of TFR into three phases: pre-transition high fertility, the fertility transition, and post-transition low fertility. The model for the fertility decline builds on the United Nations Population Division's current deterministic projection methodology, which assumes that fertility will eventually fall below replacement level. It models the decline in TFR as the sum of two logistic functions that depend on the current TFR level, and a random term. A Bayesian hierarchical model is used to project future TFR based on both the country's TFR history and the pattern of all countries. It is estimated from United Nations estimates of past TFR in all countries using a Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm. The post-transition low fertility phase is modeled using an autoregressive model, in which long-term TFR projections converge toward and oscillate around replacement level. The method is evaluated using out-of-sample projections for the period since 1980 and the period since 1995, and is found to be well calibrated.

Background The period fertility in China has declined to very low levels, and the completed cohort fertility rate (CFR) has also decreased significantly. However, the exact fertility rate remains controversial. While the tempo effect has played a significant role in China’s period fertility decline, child underreporting has to be taken into consideration in China’s fertility research. Methods By using the census data from 1982 to 2010, and the 1% population sample survey data from 1995 to 2015, we systematically analyzed China’s fertility and its trends since the 1980s using period fertility measures, adjusted period fertility measures, cohort fertility measures, and indirect estimation methods. Results The results show that marriage postponement significantly affects the TFR decline. Even after eliminating the tempo and parity structure effect, the adjusted TFR has fallen below 1.5, and the first-order fertility rate dropped to 0.9 in 2015. The CFR for women aged 45–49 declined from 5.37 in 1982 to 1.62 in 2015 mainly because of a decrease in fourth and higher-order births from 1982 to 1990, a decrease in second and third births from 1990 to 2000, and a decrease in second births from 2000 to 2015. Indirect estimation methods yielded a TFR in the range of 1.5–1.6 for the period 2000–2010 and an average TFR of 1.49 for the period 2011–2020. Conclusions The traditional norm of universal marriage and childbearing for Chinese women is changing. China’s fertility has been steadily declining, as measured by both period and cohort indicators. Following the historical change, fertility may continue to decline even after introducing the universal three-child policy in China in 2021.

In 1979, China introduced its unprecedented one-child policy, under which households exceeding the birth quota were penalized. However, estimating the effect of this policy on family outcomes turns out to be complicated. China had already enacted an aggressive family planning policy in the early 1970s, and its fertility rates had already dropped sharply before the enactment of the one-child policy. The one-child policy was also enacted at almost the same time as China's market-oriented economic reforms, which triggered several decades of rapid growth, which would also tend to reduce fertility rates. During the same period, a number of other developing countries in East Asia and around the world have also experienced sharp declines in fertility. Overall, finding defensible ways to identify the effect of China's one-child policy on family outcomes is a tremendous challenge. I expound the main empirical approaches to the identification of the effects of the one-child policy, with an emphasis on their underlying assumptions and limitations. I then turn to empirical results in the literature. I discuss the evidence concerning the effects of the one-child policy on fertility and how it might affect human capital investment in children. Finally I offer some new exploratory and preliminary estimates of the effects of the one-child policy on divorce, labor supply, and rural-to-urban migration.

Low fertility is not conducive to healthy population development. The total fertility rate (TFR) is influenced by the education expansion (measured by the proportion of non-student women, NSP), marriage delay (measured by the proportion of married women, MP), and marital fertility rate (MFR). This study decomposes the TFR change into the changes in NSP, MP, and MFR using China’s census and 1% population sample survey data. During 1990–2020, the changes in NSP, MP, and MFR contributed − 22%, − 90%, and 12%, respectively, to the changes in TFR. The continuous decline in NSP reduced the TFR, and the intensity continued to increase over time. As the primary negative driving force, the rapid decline in MP also consistently reduced the TFR. The marital fertility rate had a downward effect on the TFR before 2000 and an upward effect after 2000. The effects of NSP, MP, and MFR on the TFR varied with the birth order, age and region (among cities, towns, and villages). In summary, China’s TFR has considerably changed in combination with changes in NSP, MP, and MFR. Without effective measures, China’s TFR may further decline into the lowest-low fertility trap.

The study examined the adult sex ratio and fertility rate at Birhan Health and Demographic Surveillance System (HDSS) in the Amhara region of Ethiopia. Globally, the sex ratio at birth and total population remains stable, with approximately 105.6 boys born for every 100 girls and 101 males born for every 100 females, respectively. Ethiopia’s average population sex ratio is 101 males to 100 females. Fertility rates have declined globally since 1950, including in sub-Saharan Africa. Ethiopia’s fertility rate decreased from 6.4 in 1990 to 4.6 in 2016. The HDSS monitors health and demographic conditions in both rural and urban areas, providing an updated sampling frame for nested studies. We used both the HDSS and the open cohort data to calculate key indicators, including Crude Birth Rate (CBR), General Fertility Rate (GFR), Total Fertility Rate (TFR), and Adult Sex Ratio (ASR). The study’s strength lies in its comprehensive approach to pregnancy screening and birth outcome registration, yielding valuable data beyond traditional surveys. The mid-year population was 72,776, with a higher number of males (38,454) than females (34,322). Among individuals aged 15–24, women comprised 37.4% of the group, resulting in a sex ratio of 167.4 males per 100 females. For the broader reproductive age range (15–50 years), the sex ratio was 125 males per 100 females. In 2022, the TFR was 3.44 children per woman, reflecting a 25.22% decline compared to Ethiopia’s national TFR of 4.6 in 2016. Other key fertility indicators also demonstrated notable reductions: the CBR was 19.98 per 1000 population, and the GFR was 104.78 per 1000 women of reproductive age, marking decreases of 37.24% and 32.83%, respectively, from the 2016 national averages. The findings indicate a youthful population with a higher male-to-female ratio, particularly among younger age groups. Fertility rates are notably lower compared to national figures. The decline may be attributed to gendered migration patterns and reduced conception risk among migrants, influenced by improved living conditions in urban areas and temporary separation from partners.

BACKGROUND : This study further develops Goldstein et al.'s (2013) analysis of the fertility response to the Great Recession in western economies. OBJECTIVE : The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the fertility reaction to different indicators of the crisis. Beyond the structural labor market conditions, I investigate the dependence of fertility rates on economic policy uncertainty, government financial risk, and consumer confidence. METHODS : Following Goldstein et al. (2013), I use log-log models to assess the elasticity of age-, parity-, and education-specific fertility rates to an array of indicators. Besides the inclusion of a wider set of explanatory variables, I include more recent data (2000-2013) and I enlarge the sample to 31 European countries plus the United States. RESULTS : Fertility response to unemployment in some age-and parity-specific groups has been, in more recent years, larger than estimated by Goldstein et al. (2013). Female unemployment has also been significantly reducing fertility rates. Among uncertainty measures, the drop in consumer confidence is strongly related to fertility decline and in Southern European countries the fertility response to sovereign debt risk is comparable to that of unemployment. Economic policy uncertainty is negatively related to TFR even when controlling for unemployment. CONCLUSIONS : Theoretical and empirical investigation is needed to develop more tailored measures of economic and financial insecurity and their impact on birth rates. CONTRIBUTION : The study shows the nonnegligible influence of economic and financial uncertainty on birth rates during the Great Recession in Western economies, over and above that of structural labor market conditions.

The present study aimed to evaluate the clinical outcomes of magnetic-activated cell sorting (MACS) in sperm preparation for male subjects with a sperm DNA fragmentation index (DFI) ≥30%. A total of 86 patients who had undergone their first long-term long protocol were selected. The protocol involved in vitro fertilization (IVF) and intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) cycles, and the patients were divided into the MACS or control groups. The MACS group included sperm samples analyzed with MACS that were combined with density gradient centrifugation (DGC) and the swim-up (SU) technique (n = 39), and the control group included sperm samples prepared using standard techniques (DGC and SU; n = 41). No differences were noted with regard to basic clinical characteristics, number of oocytes retrieved, normal fertilization rate, cleavage rate, or transplantable embryo rate between the two groups in IVF/ICSI. In addition, the clinical pregnancy and implantation rates of the first embryo transfer cycles indicated no significant differences between the two groups. However, there was a tendency to improve the live birth rate (LBR) of the first embryo transfer cycle (63.2% vs 53.9%) and the cumulative LBR (79.5% vs 70.7%) in the MACS group compared with the control group. Moreover, the number of transferred embryos (mean ± standard deviation [s.d.]: 1.7 ± 0.7 vs 2.3 ± 1.6) and the transfer number of each retrieved cycle (mean ± s.d.: 1.2 ± 0.5 vs 1.6 ± 0.8) were significantly lower in the MACS group than those in the control group. Thus, the selection of nonapoptotic spermatozoa by MACS for higher sperm DFI could improve assisted reproductive clinical outcomes.

Rapid population growth in developing countries in the middle of the 20th century led to fears of a population explosion and motivated the inception of what effectively became a global population-control program. The initiative, propelled in its beginnings by intellectual elites in the United States, Sweden, and some developing countries, mobilized resources to enact policies aimed at reducing fertility by widening contraception provision and changing family-size norms. In the following five decades, fertility rates fell dramatically, with a majority of countries converging to a fertility rate just above two children per woman, despite large cross-country differences in economic variables such as GDP per capita, education levels, urbanization, and female labor force participation. The fast decline in fertility rates in developing economies stands in sharp contrast with the gradual decline experienced earlier by more mature economies. In this paper, we argue that population-control policies likely played a central role in the global decline in fertility rates in recent decades and can explain some patterns of that fertility decline that are not well accounted for by other socioeconomic factors.