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We describe two auction forms for search engine advertising and present two simple theoretical results concerning i) the estimation of click-through rates and ii) how to adjust the auctions for broad match search. We also describe some of the practical issues involved in implementing a VCG auction.

We consider the problem of how to apply a generalized second price (GSP) auction to a buyer–seller network. GSP auctions are often used to sell online ads where buyers care about the position or placement of the ad. GSP auctions can also be applied to wireless data transmissions with congestion where buyers care about the speed of data transmission; however, such an auction would take place over a network as a buyer could only purchase from a seller (or cell tower) that he was linked to (or was close to). Two GSP auctions over a network are considered: separate GSP auctions, and integrated GSP auctions with pauses. The efficiency of these auctions is examined with efficiency favoring the integrated auction with pauses.

The transition of the advertising market from traditional media to the internet has induced a proliferation of marketing agencies specialized in bidding in the auctions that are used to sell ad space on the web. We analyze how collusive bidding can emerge from bid delegation to a common marketing agency and how this can undermine the revenues and allocative efficiency of both the generalized second-price auction (GSP, used by Google, Microsoft Bing, and Yahoo!) and the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism (used by Facebook). We find that despite its well-known susceptibility to collusion, the VCG mechanism outperforms the GSP auction in terms of both revenues and efficiency. This paper was accepted by Gabriel Weintraub, revenue management and market analytics .

Sponsored advertising on search engines is one of the fastest growing online advertising marketplaces. The space available for paid ads, or positions, is sold using auctions and payment is calculated considering the number of clicks each position receives. Two mechanisms are generally used in position auctions: Generalized Second Price (GSP) (e.g. Google, Yahoo!) and Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) (e.g. Facebook). To understand which mechanism guarantees the highest payoff to market players (search engines and advertisers), a multi-agent simulation is developed in Netlogo. Using the generated data, a supervised learning-based analysis on search engines and bidders’ payoffs is made using linear regression models and regression trees. Results suggest that the average payoff for auctioneers (the search engines) and bidders (the advertisers), the price for each position, and first bidder’s payment, are significantly different in the GSP and VCG mechanisms. We also found the mechanism that generates the highest payoff for the search engine is the VCG, while for the bidders it is the GSP.

Sponsored search advertising is a significant revenue source for search engines. To ameliorate revenues, search engines often set fixed or variable reserve price to in influence advertisers＇ bidding. This paper studies the optimal reserve price for a generalized second-price auction （GSP） under both static and dynamic settings. We show that if advertisers＇ per-click value has an increasing generalized failure rate, the search engine＇s revenue rate is quasi-concave and hence there exists an optimal reserve price under both settings. Different from a static GSP auction where the optimal reserve price is proved to be constant, in a dynamic setting the optimal reserve price is dependent on not only advertisers＇ per-click values, but also the number of ad links sold. A search engine should gradually raise reserve price as more qualified advertisers arrive, and maintain the same threshold after all first-page positions are occupied.