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A growing number of scholarly works in the field of archaeology and heritage studies have been investigating the role of culture in relationship management. By assessing the use of heritage and repatriation of archaeological finds by multinational Gazprom, a natural gas company, in the Russian Federation, this paper contributes to this heritage diplomacy research by critically repositioning some of its core paradigms and its predominant emphasis on interstate diplomatic processes. As explored in this paper, archaeology and heritage are cultural technologies that have to be framed in the broader statecraft policies of the nation state, and are enmeshed with different types of power and include a plethora of agents. By exploring a case study investigating the corporate security initiatives of a resource extraction and transport giant in Russia, this paper contributes to the extensive literature on neoliberalism, corporate social responsibility and federalism in newly developing economies.

We explore a major European competition decision, the 2012–18 Gazprom case, using a global gas market simulation model. We find that access to LNG markets alone is insufficient to counterbalance Gazprom’s strategic behaviour; central and eastern Europe (CEE) needs to be well interconnected with bidirectional flow capability. ‘Swap deals’ created by the decision facilitate CEE market integration, while limiting Gazprom’s potential market power. Such deals may increase the diversity of contracted gas and number of market players, but do not improve physical supply diversity. In the next five years, swap deals could marginally impact negatively the utilization of strategic assets in CEE, but since Gazprom’s commitments expire by mid-2026, utilization of these strategic assets may fall considerably, especially if Gazprom withholds supplies. As an unintended consequence, CEE markets may disintegrate from the rest of Europe. Avoiding such outcomes will require further gas market reforms, particularly, market design for gas transportation.

This assessment of the financial performance of PJSC Gazprom was carried out within the framework of modern theories of the cost of capital and capital structure: the Brusov–Filatova–Orekhova (BFO) theory and the Modigliani–Miller (MM) theory. Various methods for estimating the main parameter of both theories (BFO and MM), k0, the cost of equity, and WACC at zero leverage are discussed and applied. The analysis is based on data from official financial statements of PJSC Gazprom for the period from 2018 to 2022. Using the calculated values of k0, the main financial indicators were estimated, such as the cost of raising capital, the value of the company, and the cost of equity. The dependences of k0, k0*, WACC(L), V(L), and ke(L) of PJSC Gazprom on leverage level, L, for 2018–2022 were investigated. The results obtained are of forecast value, allowing a forecast of the values of financial indicators based on the particular capital structure of PJSC Gazprom.

Observers tend to interpret the contemporary Sino-Russian relationship in terms of strategic, purposeful cooperation driven by national interests and power-political considerations. The search for power and security, as well as balancing against the United States, have increasingly been pushing China and Russia closer together. The energy realm offers a distinct picture of the Sino-Russian relationship. The pace of cooperation has varied and depended on key domestic players in particular sectors. As a consequence, success stories have been accompanied by major setbacks. Energy cooperation encompasses both a meteoric rise of oil cooperation and the muddling through of gas cooperation. The foundations for close ties in the energy realm were laid well before the post-Crimean acceleration of Sino-Russian cooperation. More often than not, however, parochial interests of dominant state-owned and private enterprises rather than strategic considerations have driven this cooperation. Looking through the prism of energy cooperation, I emphasize the complexity of Russia and China as actors in international politics instead of approaching them as rational and unitary players.

The aim of the article is to reveal some aspects state regulation of natural monopoly in Russia, which are of paramount importance in economic and social life of the country. The optimal path to reforming the monopolized industries is currently a very topical question for Russia. The Russian government requires studying the foreign experience in this field and adapting it to the Russian conditions. Almost complete lack of transparency in the pricing of natural monopolies is one of the most important problems in Russia. In this connection, against the background of almost uncontrolled corruption in the country, the decision to increase tariffs for practically all services provided by monopolists, irrespective of the world prices for energy resources, causes distrust and just censures. The inefficient management of the state corporation Gazprom, a significant reduction in taxes transferred to the state budget, has not, until now, been the subject of thorough audit and critical analysis by the relevant government agencies. The Ministry of Energy does not attempt to reform the gas industry, for example, in the likeness of Scandinavian countries, where surprising results have been achieved in the operation of numerous energy suppliers. The increase of tax revenues to the country’s budget and the improvement of the quality of life of the population depend on to the scope of reforms of the industry the state will carry out based on a combination of administrative and economic control measures. Methods of investigation used: analysis, synthesis, comparative analysis.

Abstract—The article provides an assessment of the level of gasification in the country at the moment; according to various methods, it is 66–70%. The need for gasification was also assessed. The current potential was 76%, and the forecast for the period up to 2030 for different scenarios of housing construction is 66–71%. At the same time, there will be an increase in the consumption of natural gas by the population due to gasification by 17–23 billion cubic meters. The costs required to complete the gasification were estimated at the order of one trillion rubles. This is much higher than Gazprom’s current investment costs. Proposals have been made to increase funding for gasification and speed up this process. It is also concluded that gasification of the eastern regions, especially in places with difficult terrain and climate, should be carried out in a different way than in the western regions of the country, where the gas transportation infrastructure is already developed.

Prices of natural gas, coal, and electricity have risen to the highest level of the last ten years in the last quarter of 2021. It's possible to express that energy prices in 2021 were much higher, compared to the crisis of 2020's Covid-19 breakout's historical descent in the first few months. There are a few factors to this rally. The epidemic caused structural fractions on a global scale. But in general, there is no doubt that crisis factors, which mainly concern Europe, are not limited (with) recovery process in the economy. With this notion, the main structure of this work's subject aims to analyze the lead-up to the energy crisis that became apparent in 2021. Also, in the work, the energy crisis that's been occurring will be analyzed thoroughly, with the help of its dynamics and causes. Within the scope of the study, the Hatemi-J (2012) asymmetric causality test was run using the weekly stock closing data of EU natural gas prices (EUGP), Gazprom (XGASPR), and Equinor (XEQUNR) for the period 05.11.2017-28.11.2021. As a result of the analysis, a causal relationship between the variables was determined. However, the work will positively contribute to the literature, being a guide to the current situations and overcoming the similar crisis that might occur in the future.

Although the energy trade is the single most important element of nearly all European countries' relations with Russia, Europe has been divided by both worldview and practice. Why, in the face of the common challenge of dependence on imported Russian gas, have national reactions to such vulnerability varied so dramatically across the continent? And why have a handful of French, German, and Italian corporations somehow taken responsibility for formulating the energy strategy - and thus the Russia policy - for essentially all of Europe? The resolutions of these two puzzles are, I show, interlinked; they also demand theoretical innovation. With several case studies - of Gazprom's decision-making during the 2006 and 2009 gas crises, and of the response of western and central Europe to their gas dependence - I find that: firms are driving these political outcomes; those firms are motivated by profits but employ sociological conventions along their ways; and firms generally seek the necessary inter-firm, cross-border cooperation that will deliver corporate performance. Finally, I conclude that the field will ultimately require a framework that puts firms at its center.

Die durch die Ukraine führenden Transitleitungen für Erdgas sind kein politisch gegen Russland nutzbarer „Hebel“. Das gleiche gilt für die Pipeline Nord Stream 2. Diese Erdgasleitung stellt weder eine Bedrohung für die Ukraine oder andere Staaten dar, noch ist sie ein wirksames Sanktionsinstrument gegen Russland. Die Debatte um Nord Stream 2 lenkt davon ab, dass Deutschland ebenso wie viele andere EU-Länder ungern Sanktionen gegen Russland verhängen will, die auf jeden Fall spürbare negative Rückwirkungen auf die eigenen Volkswirtschaften hätten, von denen aber zugleich niemand weiß, ob sie Russlands Führung tatsächlich beeindrucken würden. The natural gas transit pipelines running through Ukraine are not a “lever” that can be used against Russia politically. The same applies to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. This natural gas pipeline does not pose a threat to Ukraine or other countries, nor is it an effective tool for sanctions against Russia. The debate about Nord Stream 2 distracts from the fact that Germany, along with many other EU countries, is reluctant to impose sanctions on Russia, which would in any case have tangible negative repercussions on their own economies. At the same time, however, nobody knows whether such sanctions would actually impress Russia’s leadership.

Die durch die Ukraine führenden Transitleitungen für Erdgas sind kein politisch gegen Russland nutzbarer „Hebel“. Das gleiche gilt für die Pipeline Nord Stream 2. Diese Erdgasleitung stellt weder eine Bedrohung für die Ukraine oder andere Staaten dar, noch ist sie ein wirksames Sanktionsinstrument gegen Russland. Die Debatte um Nord Stream 2 lenkt davon ab, dass Deutschland ebenso wie viele andere EU-Länder ungern Sanktionen gegen Russland verhängen will, die auf jeden Fall spürbare negative Rückwirkungen auf die eigenen Volkswirtschaften hätten, von denen aber zugleich niemand weiß, ob sie Russlands Führung tatsächlich beeindrucken würden. The natural gas transit pipelines running through Ukraine are not a “lever” that can be used against Russia politically. The same applies to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. This natural gas pipeline does not pose a threat to Ukraine or other countries, nor is it an effective tool for sanctions against Russia. The debate about Nord Stream 2 distracts from the fact that Germany, along with many other EU countries, is reluctant to impose sanctions on Russia, which would in any case have tangible negative repercussions on their own economies. At the same time, however, nobody knows whether such sanctions would actually impress Russia’s leadership.