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Grounded in the upper echelons perspective and stakeholder theory, this study establishes a link between CEO hubris and corporate social responsibility (CSR). We first develop the theoretical argument that CEO hubris is negatively related to a firm's socially responsible activities but positively related to its socially irresponsible activities. We then explore the boundary conditions of hubris effects and how these relationships are moderated by resource dependence mechanisms. With a longitudinal dataset of S&P 1500 index firms for the period 2001-2010, we find that the relationship between CEO hubris and CSR is weakened when the firm depends more on stakeholders for resources, such as when its internal resource endowments are diminished as indicated by firm size and slack, and when the external market becomes more uncertain and competitive. The implications of our findings for upper echelons theory and the CSR research are discussed.

This article comments on the recent study “CEO hubris and firm pollution: state and market contingencies in a transitional economy” of Zhang et al. (J Bus Ethics 161(2):459–478, 2020) in this journal. We very much appreciate the valuable initiative of Zhang et al. to study the potential effect of CEO characteristics on corporate pollution. At the same time, we are concerned with the authors’ interpretation of the regression results and their operationalization of CEO hubris. We hope to contribute to the literature on managerial hubris in two ways. First, we repair the authors’ inferences and conclusions about the actual effect of CEO hubris on firm pollution with respect to their conflicting regression results. Second, we unpack and clarify the authors’ vulnerable operationalization of CEO hubris. We hope to stimulate more research on (1) the (tricky) relationship between CEO hubris and firm pollution, and (2) managerial hubris more generally through a more rigorous operationalization and measurement of hubris.

Research Summary: While prior studies have predominantly shown that CEO narcissism and hubris exhibit similar effects on various strategic decisions and outcomes, this study aims to explore the mechanisms underlying how narcissistic versus hubristic CEOs affect their firms differently. Specifically, we investigate how peer influence moderates the CEO narcissism/hubris—corporate social responsibility (CSR). With a sample of S&P 1500 firms for 2003-2010, we find that the positive relationship between CEO narcissism and CSR is strengthened (weakened) when board-interlocked peer firms invest less (more) intensively in CSR than a CEO's own firm; the negative relationship between CEO hubris and CSR is strengthened when peer firms are engaged in less CSR than a CEO's own firm. Managerial Summary: Some CEOs are more narcissistic while others may be more hubristic, but these two groups of CEOs hold different attitudes toward the extent to which their firms should engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR). Our findings with a large sample of U.S. publically listed firms suggest that narcissistic CEOs care more about CSR, but hubristic CEOs care less. Interestingly, when narcissistic CEOs observe their peer firms engaging in more or less CSR than their own firms, they tend to respond in an opposite manner; in contrast, hubristic CEOs will only engage in even less CSR when their peers also do not emphasize CSR. Our findings point to a fundamental difference between CEO narcissism and hubris in terms of how they affect firms' CSR decisions based on their social comparison with peer firms.

This article explores the link between CEOs' language and hubristic leadership. It is based on the precepts that leaders' linguistic utterances provide insights into their personality and behaviours; hubris is associated with unethical and potentially destructive leadership behaviours; if it is possible to identify linguistic markers of CEO hubris then these could serve as early warnings sign and help to mitigate the associated risks. Using computational linguistics, we analysed spoken utterances from a sample of hubristic CEOs and compared them with non-hubristic CEOs. We found that hubristic CEOs' linguistic utterances show systematic and consistent differences from the linguistic utterances of non-hubristic CEOs. Demonstrating how hubristic leadership manifests in CEO language contributes to wider research regarding the diagnosis and prevention of the unethical and potentially destructive effects of hubristic leadership. This research contributes to the wider study of hubris and unethical leadership by applying a novel method for identifying linguistic markers and offers a way of militating against the risk of unethical and destructive CEO behaviours induced or aggravated by hubristic leadership.

This study focuses on CEO hubris and its effect on corporate unethical behaviour—pollution in particular, and in addition examines critical institutional contingencies [state ownership (SO), political connection (PC) and industrial competition] which may moderate this effect. With data from over-polluting listed firms based on the real-time pollution monitoring system in transitional China from 2015 to 2017, we find that CEO hubris is significantly positively related to firm pollution, and that the moderating role of SO is not significant, that PC positively moderates the hubris-pollution relationship and that industrial competition negatively moderates this relationship. These findings contribute to research on the upper echelon theory, institutional theory and the growing literature on emerging economies.

This theoretical article introduces the construct of CEO celebrity in order to explain how the tendency of journalists to attribute a firm's actions and outcomes to the volition of its CEO affects such firm. In the model developed here, journalists celebrate a CEO whose firm takes strategic actions that are distinctive and consistent by attributing such actions and performance to the firm's CEO. In so doing, journalists over-attribute a firm's actions and outcomes to the disposition of its CEO rather than to broader situational factors. A CEO who internalizes such celebrity will also tend to believe this over-attribution and become overconfident about the efficacy of her past actions and future abilities. Hubris arises when CEO overconfidence results in problematic firm decisions, including undue persistence with actions that produce celebrity.

This study focuses on CEO hubris and its detrimental effect on corporate financial performance along with an examination of critical corporate governance contingencies (CEO power and board vigilance) that may moderate the negative effect. From 654 observations of 164 Korean firms over the years 2001-2008, we found that CEO power exacerbated the negative effect of CEO hubris on corporate financial performance, whereas board vigilance mitigated it. This study provides empirical evidence that entrenchment problems arising from CEO hubris would be exacerbated as CEOs become more powerful, but weakened as board of directors become more vigilant. Theoretical contributions and practical implications will be discussed.

This study examines the determinants of financial performance from a managerial perspective capturing managerial outcomes such as managerial hubris, meetings, risk and compensation. This study utilises the ex post facto methodology. Using a panel ordinary least square regression, the findings demonstrate that a higher frequency of board meetings has a detrimental effect on financial performance, resulting in a 3% decline for each additional meeting. This is a result of an abundance of meetings, mental exhaustion from making too many decisions, and excessive control over tasks and processes. Managerial remuneration has a negative influence on financial performance, resulting in a 21% decline for each unit increase. Nevertheless, despite a substantial 83% decline in performance, management hubris does not have a meaningful impact on financial outcomes. Finally, exercising careful and wise decision-making while taking risks promotes the development of new ideas and the capacity to adjust to new circumstances, resulting in a significant 29% growth. The study's findings indicate that implementing strategic risk management may improve financial performance. This suggests that pay should be in line with long-term goals and that fostering a culture of transparent communication and efficient governance is crucial for minimising adverse effects and fostering sustainable growth outcomes.

This study uses unobtrusive measures of the narcissism of chief executive officers (CEOs)--the prominence of the CEO's photograph in annual reports, the CEO's prominence in press releases, the CEO's use of first-person singular pronouns in interviews, and compensation relative to the second-highest-paid firm executive--to examine the effect of CEO narcissism on a firm's strategy and performance. Results of an empirical study of 111 CEOs in the computer hardware and software industries in 1992-2004 show that narcissism in CEOs is positively related to strategic dynamism and grandiosity, as well as the number and size of acquisitions, and it engenders extreme and fluctuating organizational performance. The results suggest that narcissistic CEOs favor bold actions that attract attention, resulting in big wins or big losses, but that, in these industries, their firms' performance is generally no better or worse than firms with non-narcissistic CEOs.

PurposeThere is growing interest in how hubris bias shapes managerial and entrepreneurial judgments and decisions and, in turn, firm strategy and performance. Based on a 44-years dataset of articles reaching the beginning of 2023, the authors offer a synthesis of hubris research published within business journals.Design/methodology/approachThe authors implement a mixed-method approach offering a content representation of 600 peer-reviewed articles extracted from Scopus. The authors conduct a bibliometric investigation – employing Excel, VOSViewer and Biblioshiny software – and perform a qualitative review.FindingsThe analysis unveils four thematic clusters: hubris bias in financial policies (Cluster 1), hubris bias in restructuring deals (Cluster 2), hubris bias in entrepreneurial contexts (Cluster 3) and hubris bias in strategic decision-making (Cluster 4). Moreover, the authors infer that hubris research in business predominantly developed from three disciplinary perspectives – finance, entrepreneurship and strategic management – and progressed with limited interdisciplinary dialogue.Practical implicationsThe authors call practitioners' attention to the impact of the hubris bias in forming financial, entrepreneurial and strategic choices. Managers get conscious of the risks of hubristic choices; hence, they implement organizational practices that move forward with unbiased (or less biased) judgments and decisions.Originality/valueThe authors offer an up-to-date and comprehensive view of hubris research in business. Furthermore, the authors provide an integrative framework and a research agenda.