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Holmes exists is false. How can this be, when there is no one for the sentence to misdescribe? Part of the answer is that a sentence’s topic depends on context. The king of France is bald, normally unevaluable, is false qua description of the bald people. Likewise Holmes exists is false qua description of the things that exist; it misdescribes those things as having Holmes among them. This does not explain, though, how Holmes does not exist differs in cognitive content from, say, Vulcan does not exist. Our answer builds on an observation of Kripke’s: even if Holmes exists, he is not in this room, for we were all born too late. Holmes existe es falsa. ¿Cómo puede ser, cuando no hay nadie acerca de quien puede ser la oración? Parte de la respuesta es que el tema de la oración depende del contexto. Así como El rey de Francia es calvo, normalmente imposible de ser evaluada, es falsa qua descripción de la gente calva, Holmes existe es falsa qua descripción de las cosas que existen; describe mal esas cosas como si Holmes estuviera entre ellas. Esto no explica, sin embargo, cómo Holmes no existe difiere en valor cognitivo de, digamos, Vulcano no existe. Nuestra respuesta se construye a partir de una observación de Kripke: aun cuando Holmes exista, no está en este cuarto, porque todos nacimos demasiado tarde.

This paper explores trivalent truth conditions for indicative conditionals, examining the \"defective\" truth table proposed by de Finetti (1936) and Reichenbach (1935, 1944). On their approach, a conditional takes the value of its consequent whenever its antecedent is true, and the value Indeterminate otherwise. Here we deal with the problem of selecting an adequate notion of validity for this conditional. We show that all standard validity schemes based on de Finetti's table come with some problems, and highlight two ways out of the predicament: one pairs de Finetti's conditional (DF) with validity as the preservation of non-false values (TT-validity), but at the expense of Modus Ponens; the other modifies de Finetti's table to restore Modus Ponens. In Part I of this paper, we present both alternatives, with specific attention to a variant of de Finetti's table (CC) proposed by Cooper (Inquiry 11, 295–320, 1968) and Cantwell (Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 49, 245–260, 2008). In Part II, we give an indepth treatment of the proof theory of the resulting logics, DF/TT and CC/TT: both are connexive logics, but with significantly different algebraic properties.

We define a model for computing probabilities of right-nested conditionals in terms of graphs representing Markov chains. This is an extension of the model for simple conditionals from Wójtowicz and Wójtowicz (Erkenntnis, 1–35. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-019-00144-z, 2019). The model makes it possible to give a formal yet simple description of different interpretations of right-nested conditionals and to compute their probabilities in a mathematically rigorous way. In this study we focus on the problem of the probabilities of conditionals; we do not discuss questions concerning logical and metalogical issues such as setting up an axiomatic framework, inference rules, defining semantics, proving completeness, soundness etc. Our theory is motivated by the possible-worlds approach (the direct formal inspiration is the Stalnaker Bernoulli models); however, our model is generally more flexible. In the paper we focus on right-nested conditionals, discussing them in detail. The graph model makes it possible to account in a unified way for both shallow and deep interpretations of right-nested conditionals (the former being typical of Stalnaker Bernoulli spaces, the latter of McGee’s and Kaufmann’s causal Stalnaker Bernoulli models). In particular, we discuss the status of the Import-Export Principle and PCCP. We briefly discuss some methodological constraints on admissible models and analyze our model with respect to them. The study also illustrates the general problem of finding formal explications of philosophically important notions and applying mathematical methods in analyzing philosophical issues.

In five studies, we explored whether power increases moral hypocrisy (i.e., imposing strict moral standards on other people but practicing less strict moral behavior oneself). In Experiment I, compared with the powerless, the powerful condemned other people's cheating more, but also cheated more themselves. In Experiments 2 through 4, the powerful were more strict in judging other people's moral transgressions than in judging their own transgressions. A final study found that the effect of power on moral hypocrisy depends on the legitimacy of the power: When power was illegitimate, the moral-hypocrisy effect was reversed, with the illegitimately powerful becoming stricter in judging their own behavior than in judging other people's behavior. This pattern, which might be dubbed hypercrisy, was also found among low-power participants in Experiments 3 and 4. We discuss how patterns of hypocrisy and hypercrisy among the powerful and powerless can help perpetuate social inequality.

Kolodny argues that none of them work. The best way to resolve the paradox is to give a semantics for deontic modals and indicative conditionals that lets all see how the argument can be invalid even with its obvious logical form. This requires rejecting the general validity of at least one classical deduction rule.

Timothy Williamson has defended the claim that the semantics of the indicative ‘if’ is given by the material conditional. Putative counterexamples can be handled by better understanding the role played in our assessment of indicatives by a fallible cognitive heuristic, called the Suppositional Procedure. Williamson’s Suppositional Conjecture has it that the Suppositional Procedure is humans’ primaryway of prospectively assessing conditionals. This paper raises some doubts on the Suppositional Procedure and Conjecture.

We construct a causal-modeling semantics for both indicative and counterfactual conditionals. As regards counterfactuals, we adopt the orthodox view that a counterfactual conditional is true in a causal model M just in case its consequent is true in the submodel M *, generated by intervening in M, in which its antecedent is true. We supplement the orthodox semantics by introducing a new manipulation called extrapolation. We argue that an indicative conditional is true in a causal model M just in case its consequent is true in certain submodels M *, generated by extrapolating M, in which its antecedent is true. We show that the proposed semantics can account for some important minimal pairs nicely and naturally. We also prove a theorem showing under what conditions intervention and extrapolation will yield the same result, and thus explain how counterfactual and indicative conditionals would behave in a causal-modeling semantics.

In Part I of this paper, we identified and compared various schemes for trivalent truth conditions for indicative conditionals, most notably the proposals by de Finetti (1936) and Reichenbach (1935, 1944) on the one hand, and by Cooper (Inquiry, 11, 295–320, 1968) and Cantwell (Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 49, 245–260, 2008) on the other. Here we provide the proof theory for the resulting logics DF/TT and CC/TT, using tableau calculi and sequent calculi, and proving soundness and completeness results. Then we turn to the algebraic semantics, where both logics have substantive limitations: DF/TT allows for algebraic completeness, but not for the construction of a canonical model, while CC/TT fails the construction of a Lindenbaum–Tarski algebra. With these results in mind, we draw up the balance and sketch future research projects.

Since the publication of David Lewis' Counterfactuals, the standard line on subjunctive conditionals with impossible antecedents (or counterpossibles) has been that they are vacuously true. That is, a conditional of the form 'If p were the case, q would be the case' is trivially true whenever the antecedent, p, is impossible. The primary justification is that Lewis' semantics best approximates the English subjunctive conditional, and that a vacuous treatment of counterpossibles is a consequence of that very elegant theory. Another justification derives from the classical lore than if an impossibility were true, then anything goes. In this paper we defend non-vacuism, the view that counterpossibles are sometimes non-vacuously true and sometimes non-vacuously false. We do so while retaining a Lewisian semantics, which is to say, the approach we favor does not require us to abandon classical logic or a similarity semantics. It does however require us to countenance impossible worlds. An impossible worlds treatment of counterpossibles is suggested (but not defended) by Lewis (Counterfactuals. Blackwell, Oxford, 1973), and developed by Nolan (Notre Dame J Formal Logic 38:325-527, 1997), Kment (Mind 115:261-310, 2006a: Philos Perspect 20:237-302, 2006b), and Vander Laan (In: Jackson F, Priest G (eds) Lewisian themes. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004). We follow this tradition, and develop an account of comparative similarity for impossible worlds.

In this paper we consider conditional random quantities (c.r.q.'s) in the setting of coherence. Based on betting scheme, a c.r.q. XǀH is not looked at as a restriction but, in a more extended way, as XH + ℙ(XǀH) Hc; in particular (the indicator of) a conditional event EǀH is looked at as EH + P(EǀH)Hc. This extended notion of c.r.q. allows algebraic developments among c.r.q.'s even if the conditioning events are different; then, for instance, we can give a meaning to the sum XǀH + YǀK and we can define the iterated c.r.q. (XǀH)ǀK. We analyze the conjunction of two conditional events, introduced by the authors in a recent work, in the setting of coherence. We show that the conjoined conditional is a conditional random quantity, which may be a conditional event when there are logical dependencies. Moreover, we introduce the negation of the conjunction and by applying De Morgan's Law we obtain the disjoined conditional. Finally, we give the lower and upper bounds for the conjunction and disjunction of two conditional events, by showing that the usual probabilistic properties continue to hold.