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Abstract This article discusses the social identity approach (social identity theory and self-categorization theory) for understanding children’s ingroup biases in attitudes and behaviors. It is argued that developmental research on ingroup bias will be enhanced by more fully considering the implications of this approach. These implications include (a) the conceptualization of group identity, (b) the importance of social reality and children’s epistemic motivation, (c) the role of processes of normative influence and social projection, and (d) the relevance of moral considerations. These four implications have not been fully considered in the developmental literature but indicate that the social identity approach offers the possibility for theoretically integrating and empirically examining various processes involved in children’s ingroup biases.

Over the past two decades, there has been a marked increase in partisan social polarization, leaving scholars in search of solutions to partisan conflict. The psychology of intergroup relations identifies empathy as one of the key mechanisms that reduces intergroup conflict, and some have suggested that a lack of empathy has contributed to partisan polarization. Yet, empathy may not always live up to this promise. We argue that, in practice, the experience of empathy is biased toward one’s ingroup and can actually exacerbate political polarization. First, using a large, national sample, we demonstrate that higher levels of dispositional empathic concern are associated with higher levels of affective polarization. Second, using an experimental design, we show that individuals high in empathic concern show greater partisan bias in evaluating contentious political events. Taken together, our results suggest that, contrary to popular views, higher levels of dispositional empathy actually facilitate partisan polarization.

Three experiments (total N = 140) tested the hypothesis that 5-year-old children's membership in randomly assigned \"minimal\" groups would be sufficient to induce intergroup bias. Children were randomly assigned to groups and engaged in tasks involving judgments of unfamiliar in-group or out-group children. Despite an absence of information regarding the relative status of groups or any competitive context, in-group preferences were observed on explicit and implicit measures of attitude and resource allocation (Experiment 1), behavioral attribution, and expectations of reciprocity, with preferences persisting when groups were not described via a noun label (Experiment 2). In addition, children systematically distorted incoming information by preferentially encoding positive information about in-group members (Experiment 3). Implications for the developmental origins of intergroup bias are discussed.

This study investigated the motivational and social-cognitive foundations (i.e., inequality aversion, in-group bias, and theory of mind) that underlie the development of sharing behavior among 3-to 9-year-old Chinese children (N = 122). Each child played two mini-dictator games against an in-group member (friend) and an outgroup member (stranger) to divide four stickers. Results indicated that there was a small to moderate agerelated increase in children's egalitarian sharing with strangers, whereas the age effect was moderate to large in interactions with friends. Moreover, 3-to 4-year-olds did not treat strangers and friends differently, but 5-to 6-year-old and older children showed strong in-group favoritism. Finally, theory of mind was an essential prerequisite for children's sharing behavior toward strangers, but not a unique predictor of their sharing with friends.

System-justification theory (SJT) proposes that people have an inherent motive to support societal systems, even at the expense of their personal and group interests. However, the evidence for this system-justification motive is mixed, and a close examination of the relevant propositions yields some important theoretical inconsistencies. To address this mixed evidence and theoretical inconsistency, we introduce a social identity model of system attitudes (SIMSA). SIMSA integrates a cluster of different social identity processes and proposes that system justification can occur among members of low-status groups (a) because of a passive reflection of social reality, (b) as a form of in-group bias (at the superordinate level), and (c) in the hope that in-group advancement is possible in the future within the prevailing system. We conclude that SIMSA provides a more comprehensive and theoretically consistent explanation of system justification than SJT.

Across seven experiments and one survey ( n  = 4,282), people consistently overestimated out-group negativity towards the collective behaviour of their in-group. This negativity bias in group meta-perception was present across multiple competitive (but not cooperative) intergroup contexts and appears to be yoked to group psychology more generally; we observed negativity bias for estimation of out-group, anonymized-group and even fellow in-group members’ perceptions. Importantly, in the context of US politics, greater inaccuracy was associated with increased belief that the out-group is motivated by purposeful obstructionism. However, an intervention that informed participants of the inaccuracy of their beliefs reduced negative out-group attributions, and was more effective for those whose group meta-perceptions were more inaccurate. In sum, we highlight a pernicious bias in social judgements of how we believe ‘they’ see ‘our’ behaviour, demonstrate how such inaccurate beliefs can exacerbate intergroup conflict and provide an avenue for reducing the negative effects of inaccuracy. Lees and Cikara show a negativity bias in group meta-perceptions—how we believe ‘they’ see ‘our’ behaviour—demonstrate how such inaccurate, pessimistic beliefs exacerbate intergroup conflict; and they provide an avenue for reducing the negative effects of inaccuracy.

We study ingroup bias—the preferential treatment of members of one's group—in naturally occurring data, where economically significant allocation decisions are made under a strong non-discriminatory norm. Data come from Israeli small claims courts during 2000—2004, where the assignment of a case to an Arab or Jewish judge is effectively random. We find robust evidence for judicial ingroup bias. Furthermore, this bias is strongly associated with terrorism intensity in the vicinity of the court in the year preceding the ruling. The results are consistent with theory and lab evidence according to which salience of group membership enhances social identification.

Social identity theory posits that group membership influences individual behavior by fostering a sense of belonging and promoting normative conformity within groups. While much research has shown a link between ingroup identification and ingroup bias, the role of ingroup norms in moderating this association remains less explored. Specifically, how varying norms (egalitarianism vs. favoritism) affect bias in individuals with high ingroup identification requires further investigation. To address this gap, we examined whether ingroup norms alter the strength of the identification-bias relationship in two studies ( N  = 322). We investigated how non-WEIRD real-life group members’ ingroup bias was driven by their identification levels and perceived ingroup norm in Study 1 with a correlational design, and we experimentally manipulated ingroup norms in a simulated group discussion in Study 2. Both studies demonstrated that under a favoritism norm, participants with high ingroup identification showed greater ingroup bias, whereas this bias was deflated under an egalitarianism norm. However, contrary to our hypothesis, we did not find evidence that participants with high ingroup identification showed lower ingroup bias under the egalitarianism norm. We discuss these findings and suggest that fostering egalitarian norms within groups may reduce ingroup bias and discrimination, offering insight for interventions aimed at promoting intergroup harmony.

In suggesting that new nations often coalesce in the decades following war, historians have posed an important psychological question: Does the experience of war generate an enduring elevation in people's egalitarian motivations toward their in-group? We administered social-choice tasks to more than 1,000 children and adults differentially affected by wars in the Republic of Georgia and Sierra Leone. We found that greater exposure to war created a lasting increase in people's egalitarian motivations toward their in-group, but not their out-groups, during a developmental window starting in middle childhood (around 7 years of age) and ending in early adulthood (around 20 years of age). Outside this window, war had no measurable impact on social motivations in young children and had only muted effects on the motivations of older adults. These \"war effects\" are broadly consistent with predictions from evolutionary approaches that emphasize the importance of group cooperation in defending against external threats, though they also highlight key areas in need of greater theoretical development.

Humans demonstrate a clear bias toward members of their own group over members of other groups in a variety of ways. It has been argued that the motivation underlying this in-group bias in adults may be favoritism toward one's own group (in-group love), derogation of the out-group (out-group hate), or both. Although some studies have demonstrated in-group bias among children and infants, nothing is known about the underlying motivations of this bias. Using a novel game, we found that in-group love is already present in children of preschool age and can motivate in-group-biased behavior across childhood. In contrast, out-group hate develops only after a child's sixth birthday and is a sufficient motivation for in-group-biased behavior from school age onward. These results help to better identify the motivation that underlies in-group-biased behavior in children.