Explore the vast range of titles available.

Abstract This article discusses the social identity approach (social identity theory and self-categorization theory) for understanding children’s ingroup biases in attitudes and behaviors. It is argued that developmental research on ingroup bias will be enhanced by more fully considering the implications of this approach. These implications include (a) the conceptualization of group identity, (b) the importance of social reality and children’s epistemic motivation, (c) the role of processes of normative influence and social projection, and (d) the relevance of moral considerations. These four implications have not been fully considered in the developmental literature but indicate that the social identity approach offers the possibility for theoretically integrating and empirically examining various processes involved in children’s ingroup biases.

Over the past two decades, there has been a marked increase in partisan social polarization, leaving scholars in search of solutions to partisan conflict. The psychology of intergroup relations identifies empathy as one of the key mechanisms that reduces intergroup conflict, and some have suggested that a lack of empathy has contributed to partisan polarization. Yet, empathy may not always live up to this promise. We argue that, in practice, the experience of empathy is biased toward one’s ingroup and can actually exacerbate political polarization. First, using a large, national sample, we demonstrate that higher levels of dispositional empathic concern are associated with higher levels of affective polarization. Second, using an experimental design, we show that individuals high in empathic concern show greater partisan bias in evaluating contentious political events. Taken together, our results suggest that, contrary to popular views, higher levels of dispositional empathy actually facilitate partisan polarization.

Three experiments (total N = 140) tested the hypothesis that 5-year-old children's membership in randomly assigned \"minimal\" groups would be sufficient to induce intergroup bias. Children were randomly assigned to groups and engaged in tasks involving judgments of unfamiliar in-group or out-group children. Despite an absence of information regarding the relative status of groups or any competitive context, in-group preferences were observed on explicit and implicit measures of attitude and resource allocation (Experiment 1), behavioral attribution, and expectations of reciprocity, with preferences persisting when groups were not described via a noun label (Experiment 2). In addition, children systematically distorted incoming information by preferentially encoding positive information about in-group members (Experiment 3). Implications for the developmental origins of intergroup bias are discussed.

This study investigated the motivational and social-cognitive foundations (i.e., inequality aversion, in-group bias, and theory of mind) that underlie the development of sharing behavior among 3-to 9-year-old Chinese children (N = 122). Each child played two mini-dictator games against an in-group member (friend) and an outgroup member (stranger) to divide four stickers. Results indicated that there was a small to moderate agerelated increase in children's egalitarian sharing with strangers, whereas the age effect was moderate to large in interactions with friends. Moreover, 3-to 4-year-olds did not treat strangers and friends differently, but 5-to 6-year-old and older children showed strong in-group favoritism. Finally, theory of mind was an essential prerequisite for children's sharing behavior toward strangers, but not a unique predictor of their sharing with friends.

Humans often favour ingroup members over others, a bias that drives discrimination and intergroup conflicts. Hostile relations between groups and homogeneity within groups may affect such ingroup bias. In an experiment with members of three natural groups in Ethiopia, we vary intergroup relations (neutral versus enmity) and exploit the natural variation in the homogeneity of groups (homogeneous versus heterogeneous) to identify their effect on in- and outgroup concerns. We find that ingroup bias largely manifests as positive concern for ingroupmembers combined with no concern for outgroup members. Enmity has no effect on ingroup bias, whereas ingroup concern is amplified in homogeneous groups. Group homogeneity, thus, is the primary driver of concerns for others in our study's context. Our results are relevant to understanding the consequences of exclusionary group identities. This article is part of the theme issue 'Intergroup conflict across taxa'.

Across seven experiments and one survey ( n  = 4,282), people consistently overestimated out-group negativity towards the collective behaviour of their in-group. This negativity bias in group meta-perception was present across multiple competitive (but not cooperative) intergroup contexts and appears to be yoked to group psychology more generally; we observed negativity bias for estimation of out-group, anonymized-group and even fellow in-group members’ perceptions. Importantly, in the context of US politics, greater inaccuracy was associated with increased belief that the out-group is motivated by purposeful obstructionism. However, an intervention that informed participants of the inaccuracy of their beliefs reduced negative out-group attributions, and was more effective for those whose group meta-perceptions were more inaccurate. In sum, we highlight a pernicious bias in social judgements of how we believe ‘they’ see ‘our’ behaviour, demonstrate how such inaccurate beliefs can exacerbate intergroup conflict and provide an avenue for reducing the negative effects of inaccuracy. Lees and Cikara show a negativity bias in group meta-perceptions—how we believe ‘they’ see ‘our’ behaviour—demonstrate how such inaccurate, pessimistic beliefs exacerbate intergroup conflict; and they provide an avenue for reducing the negative effects of inaccuracy.

We study ingroup bias—the preferential treatment of members of one's group—in naturally occurring data, where economically significant allocation decisions are made under a strong non-discriminatory norm. Data come from Israeli small claims courts during 2000—2004, where the assignment of a case to an Arab or Jewish judge is effectively random. We find robust evidence for judicial ingroup bias. Furthermore, this bias is strongly associated with terrorism intensity in the vicinity of the court in the year preceding the ruling. The results are consistent with theory and lab evidence according to which salience of group membership enhances social identification.

System-justification theory (SJT) proposes that people have an inherent motive to support societal systems, even at the expense of their personal and group interests. However, the evidence for this system-justification motive is mixed, and a close examination of the relevant propositions yields some important theoretical inconsistencies. To address this mixed evidence and theoretical inconsistency, we introduce a social identity model of system attitudes (SIMSA). SIMSA integrates a cluster of different social identity processes and proposes that system justification can occur among members of low-status groups (a) because of a passive reflection of social reality, (b) as a form of in-group bias (at the superordinate level), and (c) in the hope that in-group advancement is possible in the future within the prevailing system. We conclude that SIMSA provides a more comprehensive and theoretically consistent explanation of system justification than SJT.

In suggesting that new nations often coalesce in the decades following war, historians have posed an important psychological question: Does the experience of war generate an enduring elevation in people's egalitarian motivations toward their in-group? We administered social-choice tasks to more than 1,000 children and adults differentially affected by wars in the Republic of Georgia and Sierra Leone. We found that greater exposure to war created a lasting increase in people's egalitarian motivations toward their in-group, but not their out-groups, during a developmental window starting in middle childhood (around 7 years of age) and ending in early adulthood (around 20 years of age). Outside this window, war had no measurable impact on social motivations in young children and had only muted effects on the motivations of older adults. These \"war effects\" are broadly consistent with predictions from evolutionary approaches that emphasize the importance of group cooperation in defending against external threats, though they also highlight key areas in need of greater theoretical development.

Abstract Symbolic valuation is an important but overlooked aspect of gendered processes of inequality in the occupation structure. Prior work has largely focused on the material valuation of gendered work, such as how much predominantly-female versus predominantly-male occupations pay. Less research has examined the symbolic valuation of work, such as how prestigious predominantly-female versus predominantly-male occupations are. What research has examined this question has remained inconclusive at best. Drawing on insights into and techniques from the sociology of culture and cognition, this study examines the role of an occupation’s gender composition in how Americans judge the prestige of jobs, testing key predictions from theories of gender and status. Using 2012 General Social Survey and federal occupation-level data, it finds evidence for a segregation premium: people view gender-segregated occupations as the most symbolically valuable jobs. Both men and women reward gender-segregated occupations with symbolic value, although there is evidence of a gendered in-group bias in which women in particular see women’s work as more prestigious, while men see men’s work as more prestigious.