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Cyber Threat sharing helps with defending against cyber attacks in a timely manner. Many frameworks have been proposed for CTI sharing such as Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX) and Trusted Automated Exchange of Intelligence Information (TAXII). However, CTI sharing in a controlled and automated manner is critical. In this paper, we demonstrate Relationship Based Access Control (ReBAC) as an appropriate model for CTI sharing. We also develop an approach for automated threat detection, generation and sharing of structured CTI and taking course of actions to mitigate cyber threats. Finally, we implement an Automated Cyber Defense System in a cloud based environment.

Provides policy and procedural guidance for reporting contacts, liaison, and intelligence exchanges by European Command elements of foreign governments and international organizations.

Discusses providing intelligence on economic targets to Iraq.

Discusses providing intelligence on economic targets to Iraq.

Executive Order 12333 of 4 December 1981 outlines restrictions on Intelligence collection directed against American citizens including prohibitions on [Physical surveillance; Physical searches; Electronic surveillance; Mail opening]; Executive Order 12333 of 4 December 1981 authorizes U.S. Intelligence agencies to cooperate with Law enforcement agencies by providing [Technical assistance; Intelligence officers] for Criminal investigations relating to [Terrorism; Narcotics trade]; Executive Order 12333 of 4 December 1981 prohibits the U.S. Intelligence community from Experimentation on human subjects and from participating in Assassination; Executive Order 12333 of 4 December 1981 defines U.S. Department of Defense responsibilities for carrying out Reconnaissance programs; Executive Order 12333 of 4 December 1981 defines U.S. Department of Energy responsibilities for Intelligence collection with respect to foreign [Energy requirements; Energy policy]; Executive Order 12333 of 4 December 1981 defines the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation responsibilities for conducting Counterintelligence operations; Executive Order 12333 of 4 December 1981 defines U.S. Department of Defense responsibilities for [Intelligence collection; Intelligence analysis; Information dissemination] of [Military intelligence; Foreign intelligence; Signals intelligence; Tactical intelligence]; Executive Order 12333 of 4 December 1981 defines the responsibilities of U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency for [Intelligence collection; Intelligence analysis] and development of [Military intelligence; Foreign intelligence; Counterintelligence] Intelligence products; Executive Order 12333 of 4 December 1981 defines U.S. National Security Agency responsibilities for [Intelligence collection; Intelligence analysis; Information dissemination] of Signals intelligence; Executive Order 12333 of 4 December 1981 defines the U.S. Department of the Treasury responsibility for Intelligence collection of foreign Economic intelligence; U.S. Department of the Treasury. Secret Service is responsible for detecting Electronic surveillance conducted against the [U.S. President; U.S. Executive Office of the President]; Executive Order 12333 of 4 December 1981 defines U.S. Central Intelligence Agency responsibilities for [Intelligence collection; Intelligence analysis; Information dissemination] of [Foreign intelligence; Counterintelligence; Special intelligence]; Executive Order 12333 of 4 December 1981 defines U.S. Department of State responsibilities for [Intelligence analysis; Information dissemination] of Foreign intelligence relating to U.S. Foreign policy; Executive Order 12333 of 4 December 1981 directs the U.S. National Security Council to provide guidance and review of all U.S. [Foreign intelligence; Counterintelligence; Special intelligence] programs; Executive Order 12333 of 4 December 1981 directs the U.S. Director of Central Intelligence to establish committees and boards to coordinate [Intelligence collection; Intelligence analysis; Information dissemination] of Foreign intelligence within the Intelligence community; Executive Order 12333 of 4 December 1981 directs the U.S. Director of Central Intelligence to act as advisor to the [U.S. President; U.S. National Security Council] and to develop Intelligence policy for the U.S. Intelligence community; Executive Order 12333 of 4 December 1981 defines the responsibilities of heads of [Government agencies; Intelligence agencies] regarding [Intelligence oversight; Illegal activities; Intelligence exchanges; Information security] and the protection of Intelligence sources

Schlesinger Review of the Intelligence Community recommends restructuring the United States Intelligence Board to ensure that feedback from consumers of Intelligence products is obtained; Schlesinger Review of the Intelligence Community recommends centralizing Management of the Defense intelligence community through the creation of the Director of Defense Intelligence; Schlesinger Review of the Intelligence Community concludes that centralization of all Signals intelligence activities under U.S. National Security Agency will reduce Costs and duplication; Schlesinger Review of the Intelligence Community recommends redefining the role of the United States Intelligence Board; Schlesinger Review of the Intelligence Community suggests changes to the U.S. Director of Central Intelligence Organization and functions which would strengthen Management and coordination of the Intelligence community; Schlesinger Review of the Intelligence Community recommends Reforms of the [Intelligence community; Defense intelligence community] [Organizational structures; Management personnel]; Schlesinger Review of the Intelligence Community recommends that the U.S. Director of Central Intelligence control Intelligence community [Budgets; Research and development; Intelligence oversight; National Intelligence Estimate] and evaluation of U.S. Intelligence policy and capabilities; Schlesinger Review of the Intelligence Community reports that inter-agency Intelligence exchanges of [Photographic intelligence; Signals intelligence; Human intelligence] and [Intelligence collection; Intelligence analysis] have been neglected; Schlesinger Review of the Intelligence Community concludes that Intelligence collection Technological development has not improved the quality of [Intelligence analysis; Intelligence products]; Schlesinger Review of the Intelligence Community concludes that the U.S. Director of Central Intelligence responsibilities for Management of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and as advisor to the U.S. President conflict with his role as coordinator of the Intelligence community; Schlesinger Review of the Intelligence Community concludes that the United States Intelligence Board is ineffective in coordinating the Intelligence community because it is dominated by those with Intelligence collection concerns rather than consumers of Intelligence products; Schlesinger Review of the Intelligence Community reviews the Costs and effectiveness of the U.S. Intelligence community; Schlesinger Review of the Intelligence Community reports that traditional distinctions between [National intelligence; Departmental intelligence; Tactical intelligence] are out of date and result in Intelligence community duplication of effort; Schlesinger Review of the Intelligence Community concludes that Intelligence community Budgets are produced without serious long-range Planning; Schlesinger Review of the Intelligence Community concludes that increased Costs for supporting the Intelligence community are due to increased use of expensive Technology without reductions of obsolete Intelligence collection methods; Schlesinger Review of the Intelligence Community recommends increasing Budgets for Research and development on new Sources and methods for [Intelligence analysis; Intelligence assessments]

Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities recommends that the Intelligence community concentrate on Intelligence collection concerning foreign Soviet Bloc [Technological development; Military policy]; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency denies allegations by Joseph McCarthy that $200 thousand were lost in Germany (Federal Republic) in 1948-1949; McGeorge Bundy declares that John K. Fairbank did not participate in Harvard University Defense contracts to prepare a study of Soviet citizens lifestyles for the U.S. Air Force. Air University; [U.S. Congress members; Business owners; Government officials] objections to the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities recommendations; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency reports that there were no Information security breaches regarding the case of Howard Louis Jamison who died while on a research assignment at the U.S. Library of Congress; Allen W. Dulles requests that Joseph McCarthy provide Evidence of Communists Infiltration in the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency as he alleged to the U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations; John L. McClellan informs Allen W. Dulles that the files he requested regarding Communists Infiltration of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency are in the possession of Joseph McCarthy rather than in the files of the U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations; Herbert C. Hoover directs that J. Edgar Hoover continue the Governmental investigations of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities; Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities recommends that U.S. Department of Defense change Organization and functions of [U.S. Air Force Security Service; U.S. Army Security Agency; U.S. National Security Agency. Central Security Service. Naval Security Group] to improve prestige and Management policy; Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities recommends creating a board to review [Communications intelligence; Electronic intelligence] activities which call for more [Intelligence officers; Electronic equipment; Intelligence facilities] than can be supplied from existing Budgets; Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities recommends creating a special commission composed of [Military personnel; Civilian personnel] Technical personnel to produce recommendations on the most effective utilization of U.S. [Communications; Electronic equipment; Technology] resources in case of [Warfare; State of emergency]; Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities recommends intensifying the [Training; Language training] programs for Intelligence officers involved in Covert operations; Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities recommends that U.S. National Security Council publish an interpretation of National Security Council Directive 5412/1 of 12 March 1955 which directs the U.S. Director of Central Intelligence to inform [Government officials; U.S. Congress; Military officers] of Intelligence operations which could affect them; Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities memos and notes from U.S. [Government agencies; Government officials] asked to comment on the recommendations; [U.S. Central Intelligence Agency; U.S. Department of Defense] agree with the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities recommendation that the U.S. Director of Central Intelligence. Intelligence Advisory Committee Libraries adopt a single index system; Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities recommends that the U.S. Director of Central Intelligence. Intelligence Advisory Committee develop new [Sources and methods; Electronic equipment] for [Intelligence collection; Intelligence analysis] and insure that Intelligence exchanges occur within the Intelligence community; Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities recommends that U.S. Communications Intelligence Board establish Communications intelligence Collection requirements which take the capabilities of other Intelligence sources into account; Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities recommends that U.S. National Security Agency receive a mandate and unlimited Funding to develop high level Communications intelligence Intelligence facilities; Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities recommends that U.S. National Security Agency tighten Information security procedures for Cryptography; U.S. Communications Intelligence Board opposes the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities recommendation that U.S. National Security Agency establish a single board to control [Communications intelligence; Electronic intelligence; Communications security] activities; Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities recommends that National Security Council Intelligence Directive 10 of 18 January 1949 be revised to assign responsibility for Intelligence collection of Scientific and technical intelligence to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency; Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities recommends that the Intelligence collection potential of the Defense Attach System be exploited; U.S. Department of Defense disagrees with the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities recommendations that the U.S. Army. Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence be elevated to the level of deputy chief of staff; Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities recommends that the U.S. Army increase use of Colleges and universities and outside Training to redress the shortage of Military personnel with fluency in foreign Languages; Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities recommends that the U.S. Navy improve its [Counterintelligence; Counterintelligence collection] programs; U.S. Department of Defense disagrees with the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities recommendation that a board should be created to supervise Declassification of information; Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities recommends that use of Aerial reconnaissance for Intelligence collection be increased; Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities recommends that U.S. Atomic Energy Commission responsibility for Intelligence collection and the composition of the U.S. Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee be defined in a National Security Council Intelligence Directive; Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities recommends that the U.S. Navy add Counterintelligence Intelligence officers to provide adequate Security for [Military personnel; Military facilities]; Documentation from U.S. Government agencies responding to the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities report is compiled; U.S. General Accounting Office press release announces the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities recommendations to create a U.S. Congress committee and a committee of private American citizens for Intelligence oversight of U.S. Foreign intelligence activities; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency disagrees with Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities recommendation that Covert operations be organized separately from Cold War Intelligence operations; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency concurs with the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities that an office of Basic intelligence should be created; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency disagrees with Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities recommendations regarding its Organizational structures and the responsibilities of the U.S. Director of Central Intelligence; Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities recommends the creation of the U.S. Director of Central Intelligence. Intelligence Advisory Committee. Committee on Scientific Intelligence; Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities recommends that U.S. Central Intelligence Agency implement new Security systems to reevaluate Intelligence officers every five years; Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities recommends increases in U.S. Central Intelligence Agency [Wages; Personnel benefits]; Allen W. Dulles reports that no U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Classified information is processed at the U.S. Government Printing Office main facility; Harvard University study of Soviet Union policy conducted for the U.S. Air Force. Air University concludes that Georgi M. Malenkov resignation will not result in significant change

Iraq wants U.S. to supply information on strategic economic infrastructure targets in Iran, especially electrical power plants and kerosene manufacturing plants.

John Poindexter requests \"thoughtful piece\" proposing scheme to provide intelligence to both Iran and Iraq.

Refers to intelligence exchange with Iraq.