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On 28 September 2011, at a gathering convened by Maastricht University and the International Commission of Jurists, a group of experts in international law and human rights adopted the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The experts came from universities and organizations located in all regions of the world and included current and former members of international human rights treaty bodies, regional human rights bodies, and former and current Special Rapporteurs of the United Nations Human Rights Council. Adapted from the source document.

IV. Károly eckartsaui nyilatkozatát követően a kor neves jogászai körében az 1723. évi I. és II. törvénycikk hatályának kérdése erős polarizálódást váltott ki, főképp a nemzeti jog legitimistái és a szabad királyválasztók között. Tanulmányomban a Pragmatica Sanctio előzményeit, értelmezéseit, illetve a trónfosztó törvény – az 1921. évi XLVII. törvénycikk – hatálybalépését megelőző és az azután következő véleményeket, felfogásokat vizsgáltam.

Within legal scholarship and practice, among the most pervasive tasks is the interpretation of texts. And within legal interpretation, perhaps the most pervasive inquiry is the search for “ordinary meaning.” Jurists often treat ordinary meaning analysis as an empirical inquiry, aiming to discover a fact about how people understand language. When evaluating ordinary meaning, interpreters rely on dictionary definitions or patterns of common usage, increasingly via “legal corpus linguistics” approaches. However, the most central question about these popular methods remains open: Do they reliably reflect ordinary meaning? This Article presents experiments that assess whether (a) dictionary definitions and (b) common usage data reflect (c) how people actually understand language today. The Article elaborates the implications of two main experimental results. First, neither the dictionary nor legal corpus linguistics methods reliably track ordinary people’s judgments about meaning. This finding shifts the argumentative burden to jurists who rely on these tools to identify “ordinary meaning” or “original public meaning”: these views must articulate and demonstrate a reliable method of analysis. Moreover, this divergence illuminates several interpretive fallacies. For example, advocates of legal corpus linguistics often contend that the nonappearance of a specific use in a corpus indicates that the use is not part of the relevant term’s ordinary meaning. The experiments reveal this claim to be a “Nonappearance Fallacy.” Ordinary meaning exceeds datasets of common usage — even very large ones. Second, dictionary and legal corpus linguistics verdicts diverge dramatically from each other. Part of that divergence is explained by the finding that broad dictionary definitions tend to direct interpreters to extensive interpretations, while data of common usage tends to point interpreters to more prototypical cases. This divergence suggests two different criteria that are often relevant in interpretation: a more extensive criterion and a more narrow criterion. Although dictionaries and legal corpus linguistics might, in some cases, help us identify these criteria, a hard legal-philosophical question remains: Which of these two criteria should guide the interpretation of terms and phrases in legal texts? Insofar as there is no compelling case to prefer one, the results suggest that dictionary definitions, legal corpus linguistics, or even other more scientific measures of meaning may not be equipped in principle to deliver simple and unequivocal answers to inquiries about the socalled “ordinary meaning” of legal texts.

During the reign of Elizabeth I the ecclesial and legal ‘revolution’ under Henry VIII, to establish in England a national church under the royal supremacy, was converted into a ‘settlement’. It steered a course between radical puritans and recusant Catholics. Clothed in legal propriety, this settlement was articulated both juristically and theologically by the great Richard Hooker (d. 1600). After the return to Rome under Mary, the Elizabethan Acts of Parliament re-established the English Church, revived legislation made under Henry VIII and Edward VI, and imposed uniformity in worship. The period also sees the use of ‘soft-law’, like Articles, Admonitions, and Advertisements. Parliament rejects the Reformatio Legum Ecclesiasticarum in 1571, but Canons were passed piecemeal in 1571, 1575, 1585, and 1598. The turn of the Welsh Tudors to rule ended in 1603. The Scottish Stuarts came next. The reign of James I (1603–1625) saw bitter dispute between the King and the common lawyers over the royal supremacy in matters ecclesiastical. But there was one lasting legal landmark: the Canons Ecclesiastical 1603/4. This new code was studied theologically by a contemporary cleric, Francis Mason. Whilst several notable civilians from that time have become well-known – such as John Cowell (d. 1611), Daniel Dun (d. 1617), Clement Colmore (d. 1619), and Thomas Ridley (d. 1629), Francis Mason is largely unknown. However, he is very worthy of inclusion in the canon of Anglican priest-jurists. What follows sketches the life and career of Mason, outlines his treatise on the Canons, and discusses that treatise in a wider context, including comparing it with a similar work by Bishop Edward Stillngfleet (d. 1699).

The paper examines the way jurists, since the glosses, until Jacques Cujas, analyzed the definition of feud within the interpretation of common law, in the light of the Oberto dell'Orto's writings. By this perspective, this author reviews aspects of the feudary real situation as an useful domain, grounding the usufruct's technical inadequacy to express it, as well as analyzing the fiefs' later characterization as quasi-dominium, found mainly in legal thought of sixteenth and seventeenth centuries' jurists. Keywords: Medieval Law. Common Law. Glossaries. Fiefs. Cujas. O texto examina o modo como os juristas, dos glosadores a Jacques Cujas, analisaram a definicao de feudo na interpretacao do direito comum a luz dos escritos de Oberto dell'Orto. Nessa perspectiva, o autor reve aspectos da situacao real do feudatario como dominio util, afirmando a inadequacao tecnica do usufruto para expressa-la, analisa a posterior caracterizacao dos feudos como quase-dominium, presente, sobretudo, em alguns juristas entre os seculos XVI e XVII. Palavras-chave: Direito Medieval. Direito Comum. Glosadores. Feudos. Cujas.

Aḍud al-Dawla is considered one of the most prominent rulers of the Buyid dynasty due to the rare combination of qualities he possessed—qualities seldom found in a single individual. When the Buyid state is mentioned, ʿAḍud al-Dawla stands at the forefront of its kings because of his political, economic, architectural, scientific, and literary achievements. The greatness of the Buyid state was epitomized by its ruler, ʿAḍud al-Dawla. He was known for his strength and for being resolute and strict in matters that affected him personally or related to the security of his kingdom—he would never show leniency in such cases, handling them with determination and firmness. However, he was tolerant and gracious toward scholars and men of letters. The study includes an introduction, a preface, and a brief overview of ʿAḍud al-Dawla’s early political life. It encompasses his full name, titles, lineage, and epithets, as well as his most notable traits and the opinions of historians, as well as with insights from his contemporaries, including scholars, poets, and jurists. It also addresses the circumstances of his death. The study adopts the historical method by collecting information about the views of historians and their contemporaries, followed by an analysis to understand their impact on the intellectual and scientific spheres.  

In this study, the researcher deals with (the views of Imamiyya scholars in the ownership of the state), which aims first: to indicate the evidence of those who said from Imamiyya scholars that the state does not own the funds it possesses, and that they are what is called (the unknown owner), according to the denial of the human personality of the state, and this saying is famous among jurists, and they also said that these funds are disposed of according to the provisions of the unknown owner prescribed in the books of jurisprudence, that they must be charity, or taken as a gift by the legitimate ruler, and the like provisions. On the other hand, we find that there are those who said the ownership of the state and proved the human personality of the state, and therefore that the funds in the possession of the state are not from the unknown owner, but are funds whose owner cannot be accessed for several reasons, so the state is one of the custodians of these funds, whether this state is legitimate or illegitimate, and it is the most common in Islamic countries, as well as non-Islamic, and each of the disputing parties has relied on several evidence that the researcher tries to review and discusses and any evidence accepted, and any other evidence to reach the desired result of the study.