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"LABOR CONTRACTS"
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Labour law reform and labour market outcomes in Vietnam
Although there has been substantial literature on the economic impact of labour legislation in the world, the number of studies related to Vietnam is, surprisingly, very small. Our article provides the first evidence on the link between labour law and various labour market outcomes using the Vietnamese context. We examine how labour supply, earnings and social protection outcomes adjusted to labour contract reform under the 2012 Labour Code. The study uses three waves of the Vietnam Labour Force Survey to examine both medium-term and short-term impacts of the reform. Difference-in-differences and fixed-effect techniques are utilised. Overall, we find that the law change significantly affected hours worked, work absenteeism, monthly allowance and incidence of bonuses among contracted workers. However, the effects on workers' monthly wages, overtime remuneration and other allowances, and the social protection-related outcomes were not clear in the short run.
Journal Article
Guide to RIBA professional services contracts 2018
An indispensable companion for anyone using the RIBA Professional Services Contracts 2018.
Book
Labor Contract Law and inventor mobility: evidence from China
This paper investigates the causal effect of employment protection on inventor mobility. Taking the enactment of China’s Labor Contract Law in 2008 as a quasi-natural experiment, our difference-in-difference estimate utilizes two-dimensional variations: firm ownership (i.e., SOEs vs. non-SOEs) and year (i.e., before and after 2008). Using combined data on patent applications filed at the State Intellectual Property Office of China and listed manufacturing companies over 2004–2012, we find that the law plays a sizeable positive role in reducing the likelihood of inventor mobility. This effect is more pronounced for firms with higher labor intensity, stricter law enforcement, higher innovation dependence, lower R&D team stability, and inventors that work outside the core of R&D networks. Further, we provide consistent evidence for two plausible mechanisms for the positive effect: limiting the ability of employers to unfairly dismiss inventors and substituting low-skilled workers with inventors. In addition, the law causes firms to obtain more high-quality patents and reduces bankruptcy risk. Overall, our findings shed new light on the economic effects of labor protection in a typical emerging market.
Journal Article
Human Capital, Bankruptcy, and Capital Structure
We derive the optimal labor contract for a levered firm in an economy with perfectly competitive capital and labor markets. Employees become entrenched under this contract and so face large human costs of bankruptcy. The firm's optimal capital structure therefore depends on the trade-off between these human costs and the tax benefits of debt. Optimal debt levels consistent with those observed in practice emerge without relying on frictions such as moral hazard or asymmetric information. Consistent with empirical evidence, persistent idiosyncratic differences in leverage across firms also result. In addition, wages should have explanatory power for firm leverage.
Journal Article
Do People Anticipate Loss Aversion?
There is growing interest in the use of loss contracts that offer performance incentives as up-front payments that employees can lose. Standard behavioral models predict a trade-off in the use of loss contracts: employees will work harder under loss contracts than under gain contracts, but, anticipating loss aversion, they will prefer gain contracts to loss contracts. In a series of experiments, we test these predictions by measuring performance and preferences for payoff-equivalent gain and loss contracts. We find that people indeed work harder under loss than gain contracts, as the theory predicts. Surprisingly, rather than a preference for the gain contract, we find that people actually prefer loss contracts. In exploring mechanisms for our results, we find suggestive evidence that people do anticipate loss aversion but select into loss contracts as a commitment device to improve performance, using one bias, loss aversion, to address another, dynamic inconsistency.
Data, as supplemental material, are available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2402
.
This paper was accepted by Teck-Hua Ho, behavioral economics
.
Journal Article
Temporary Employment, Job Flows and Productivity: A Tale of Two Reforms
We investigate the effects of two reforms of temporary employment using panel data on Italian firms. We exploit variation in their implementation across regions and sectors for identification. Our results show that the reform of apprenticeship contracts increased job turnover and induced the substitution of external staff with firms' apprentices, with an overall productivity-enhancing effect. The reform of fixed-term contracts instead did not produce the intended results: it induced a substitution of temporary employees in favour of external staff and reduced capital intensity, generating productivity losses. We estimate substitution elasticities across various types of temporary contracts that are consistent with this interpretation.
Journal Article
Do Women Avoid Salary Negotiations? Evidence from a Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment
One explanation advanced for the persistent gender pay differences in labor markets is that women avoid salary negotiations. By using a natural field experiment that randomizes nearly 2,500 job seekers into jobs that vary important details of the labor contract, we are able to observe both the extent of salary negotiations and the nature of sorting. We find that when there is no explicit statement that wages are negotiable, men are more likely to negotiate for a higher wage, whereas women are more likely to signal their willingness to work for a lower wage. However, when we explicitly mention the possibility that wages are negotiable, these differences disappear completely. In terms of sorting, we find that men, in contrast to women, prefer job environments where the “rules of wage determination” are ambiguous. This leads to the gender gap being much more pronounced in jobs that leave negotiation of wage ambiguous.
This paper was accepted by Gérard P. Cachon, behavioral economics.
Journal Article
Urban Residence Intention of Ethnic Minority Floating Population
This study attempts to show the influencing factors that affect the residence intention of the ethnic minority floating population, explores the ways to promote their citizenization, improves the \"quality\" of the new type of urbanization, and achieves communication and integration of all ethnic groups in the city. Results show that the male’s intention is higher than that of the female, a stable marriage relationship is beneficial to the intention to stay in the city, and the Hukou system still exerts a significant influence on the residential intention of the population. Signing a labor contract has a positive impact on the intention to stay in the city, which is stronger among the minority floating population in the province than that of inter-provincial migration population. Social interaction and psychological adaptation further strengthen the intention of the minority floating population to stay in the city. Therefore, in promoting the urbanization of minority floating population, efforts are needed to deepen the household registration system, improve the level of social security and pay more attention to social interaction and psychological adaptation, so as to forge a strong sense of community among the Chinese people.
Journal Article
Mobility Constraint Externalities
Covenants not to compete are often included in employment agreements between firms and employees, justified by each party’s voluntary “freedom to contract.” However, noncompetes may also generate externalities for all individuals in the market, including those who have not signed such agreements. We theorize that enforceable noncompetes increase frictions in the labor market by increasing uncertainty and recruitment costs and by curtailing entrepreneurship. We find that in state-industry combinations with a higher incidence and enforceability of noncompetes, workers—including those unconstrained by noncompetes—receive relatively fewer job offers, have reduced mobility, and experience lower wages. The results offer policymakers a reason to restrict noncompetes beyond axiomatic appeals to a worker’s “freedom of contract” and highlight labor market frictions that may impact firm-level human capital strategies.
Journal Article