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We derive the optimal labor contract for a levered firm in an economy with perfectly competitive capital and labor markets. Employees become entrenched under this contract and so face large human costs of bankruptcy. The firm's optimal capital structure therefore depends on the trade-off between these human costs and the tax benefits of debt. Optimal debt levels consistent with those observed in practice emerge without relying on frictions such as moral hazard or asymmetric information. Consistent with empirical evidence, persistent idiosyncratic differences in leverage across firms also result. In addition, wages should have explanatory power for firm leverage.

Globalisation, the shift from manufacturing to services as a source of employment, and the spread of information-based systems and technologies have given birth to a new economy, which emphasises flexibility in the labour market and in employment relations. These changes have led to the erosion of the standard (industrial) employment relationship and an increase in precarious work - work which is poorly paid and insecure. Women perform a disproportionate amount of precarious work. This collection of original essays by leading scholars on labour law and women's work explores the relationship between precarious work and gender, and evaluates the extent to which the growth and spread of precarious work challenges traditional norms of labour law and conventional forms of legal regulation.The book provides a comparative perspective by furnishing case studies from Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Quebec, Sweden, the UK, and the US, as well as the international and supranational context through essays that focus on the IMF, the ILO, and the EU. Common themes and concepts thread throughout the essays, which grapple with the legal and public policy challenges posed by women's precarious work.

Although there has been substantial literature on the economic impact of labour legislation in the world, the number of studies related to Vietnam is, surprisingly, very small. Our article provides the first evidence on the link between labour law and various labour market outcomes using the Vietnamese context. We examine how labour supply, earnings and social protection outcomes adjusted to labour contract reform under the 2012 Labour Code. The study uses three waves of the Vietnam Labour Force Survey to examine both medium-term and short-term impacts of the reform. Difference-in-differences and fixed-effect techniques are utilised. Overall, we find that the law change significantly affected hours worked, work absenteeism, monthly allowance and incidence of bonuses among contracted workers. However, the effects on workers' monthly wages, overtime remuneration and other allowances, and the social protection-related outcomes were not clear in the short run.

Based on a survey of 1,268 firms in 12 cities, this article empirically studies unions’ effects on worker welfare in China. Regressions carried out on a rich set of specifications show that unionization is significantly associated with higher hourly wages and larger pension coverage and weakly associated with lower monthly working hours. Further econometric analysis finds that unions promote individual and collective contracts. The effect of collective contracts vanishes when unions are present, whereas individual contracts have independent and positive effects. In addition, unions have effects on workers’ welfare independent of collective and individual contracts.

Recent work in global history has defined the long-distance labor migration of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, following the demise of Trans-Atlantic slavery, as a global phenomenon. Though an important component of migration studies as well as the history of globalization, this framework struggles to consider the significance of indentured migration from India to the sugar plantations overseas. In the view of Adam McKeown, the indentured were insignificant to global historical change, given that they constituted less than ten percent of global migration between 1846 and 1940. In order to establish the significance of indenture, this essay highlights the uniqueness of the indenture system in terms of workers’ rights and welfare as well as the legal framework that provided a new language of freedom and contract. Under this system, laborers bargained with colonial authority, a process, which was fulfilled through the amendment in the legislations. By highlighting this element of the history of indentured labor, this essay aims to inspire further research into the detailed legal history of the process.

This paper investigates the causal effect of employment protection on inventor mobility. Taking the enactment of China’s Labor Contract Law in 2008 as a quasi-natural experiment, our difference-in-difference estimate utilizes two-dimensional variations: firm ownership (i.e., SOEs vs. non-SOEs) and year (i.e., before and after 2008). Using combined data on patent applications filed at the State Intellectual Property Office of China and listed manufacturing companies over 2004–2012, we find that the law plays a sizeable positive role in reducing the likelihood of inventor mobility. This effect is more pronounced for firms with higher labor intensity, stricter law enforcement, higher innovation dependence, lower R&D team stability, and inventors that work outside the core of R&D networks. Further, we provide consistent evidence for two plausible mechanisms for the positive effect: limiting the ability of employers to unfairly dismiss inventors and substituting low-skilled workers with inventors. In addition, the law causes firms to obtain more high-quality patents and reduces bankruptcy risk. Overall, our findings shed new light on the economic effects of labor protection in a typical emerging market.

We investigate the effects of two reforms of temporary employment using panel data on Italian firms. We exploit variation in their implementation across regions and sectors for identification. Our results show that the reform of apprenticeship contracts increased job turnover and induced the substitution of external staff with firms' apprentices, with an overall productivity-enhancing effect. The reform of fixed-term contracts instead did not produce the intended results: it induced a substitution of temporary employees in favour of external staff and reduced capital intensity, generating productivity losses. We estimate substitution elasticities across various types of temporary contracts that are consistent with this interpretation.

There is growing interest in the use of loss contracts that offer performance incentives as up-front payments that employees can lose. Standard behavioral models predict a trade-off in the use of loss contracts: employees will work harder under loss contracts than under gain contracts, but, anticipating loss aversion, they will prefer gain contracts to loss contracts. In a series of experiments, we test these predictions by measuring performance and preferences for payoff-equivalent gain and loss contracts. We find that people indeed work harder under loss than gain contracts, as the theory predicts. Surprisingly, rather than a preference for the gain contract, we find that people actually prefer loss contracts. In exploring mechanisms for our results, we find suggestive evidence that people do anticipate loss aversion but select into loss contracts as a commitment device to improve performance, using one bias, loss aversion, to address another, dynamic inconsistency. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2402 . This paper was accepted by Teck-Hua Ho, behavioral economics .

This paper provides the first experimental test of Edward Lazear's (1979) model of deferred compensation. We examine the relationship between firms' wage offers and workers' effort supply in a multiperiod environment. If firms can ex ante commit to a wage schedule with deferred compensation, workers should respond by supplying sufficient effort to avoid dismissal. We contrast this full-commitment case to controls with no commitment and computer-generated wages in order to examine the roles of monetary incentives, social preferences, and reciprocity. Finally, we examine a setup without formal commitment, but where firms can build a reputation for paying deferred wages.

We analyze a large, anonymous labour market in which firms motivate their workers via relational contracts. The market is frictionless and features on-the-job search, in that all acceptable vacancies are immediately filled and the employed compete with the unemployed for vacancies. While firms and workers are ex ante identical, the unique equilibrium exhibits a continuous distribution of contracts in which high wage firms have higher retention rates, more motivated workers and higher productivity. The model thus generates dispersion in wages, productivity and human resource strategies, and gives rise to endogenous job ladders. An exogenous increase in on-the-job search increases the quantity of jobs but decreases their quality; with sufficient on-the-job search there is full employment, and wage dispersion rather than unemployment motivates workers.