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result(s) for
"Legislative veto"
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Law Production in Multiparty Presidentialism: Veto Player Theory and its Application to Korea
2022
In this article, I offer a theory of lawmaking in multiparty presidential systems with different legislative institutions. I present a model that combines Krehbiel's pivotal politics theory with Tsebelis's veto players theory. This model simplifies various institutional veto players into the de facto veto players. I analyze the model to explain how the government type (unified versus divided governments), the legislative rules (majoritarian versus supermajoritarian rules), and the party system (two-party versus multiparty systems) affect legislative productivity. I apply the theoretical results obtained to solve the puzzle about the nondifferential legislative performance between unified and divided governments in the National Assembly. I test a hypothesis stating that the distance between the ideological positions of the agenda-setter and the de facto veto players has a negative effect on the proportion of controversial bills enacted between the 16th and the early 21st National Assemblies.
Journal Article
The Power of American governors : winning on budgets and losing on policy
\"To assess whether American governors can effectively govern, the authors draw on strategic models, interviews with governors, and new datasets to show that that governors can be powerful actors in the lawmaking process, but that what they're bargaining over - the budget or policy bills - shapes both how they play the game and how often they win\"-- Provided by publisher.
A Primer on the National Defense Authorization Act
2022
In a historic move, President Trump vetoed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) in 2020, claiming that it failed to include certain critical national security measures and contradicted efforts to put America first in national security and foreign policy actions.1 Lawmakers on both sides of the aisle spoke out against the President's veto and his accompanying demands for changes to the legislation.2 Signifying the importance of the NDAA to national security, the Senate easily turned aside the veto in an extraordinary New Year's Day session.3 Congress ultimately overrode President Trump's veto with the Senate voting 81-13 and the House voting 322-87.4 This extraordinary series of events reveals the emphasis lawmakers and their constituents place on the NDAA each year. In other words, the NDAA is much more than simply authorizing legislation. Because of its potential to generate significant change, JAs should try to follow the NDAA each year to be prepared for the potential reforms that can impact both military structure and process. \"29 Statements of Administration Policy Statements of Administration Policy are the means by which the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) formally communicates the administration's views on a particular piece of legislation.30 These SAPs provide a mechanism for an administration to go on record with its justifications for objecting to, supporting, opposing, or in some cases, threatening a veto of certain legislation.31 To be effective, the OMB must release a SAP at such a time in the legislative process to maximize the administration's influence on the policy outcome.32 Release of a SAP when the legislation is with the House Rules Committee,33 or on the floor of the House or Senate, is usually considered optimal.34 Within the DoD, the Office of Legislative Counsel (OLC) prepares the initial draft of the SAP after soliciting input across the Office of the Secretary of Defense.35 Then, OLC works with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs (AS-D(LA)) to refine the draft and coordinate staffing of the product throughout DoD.36 Once there is a consensus, DoD forwards the approved input to OMB for coordination and White House review.37 The OMB will then forward the complete SAP to the White House for final coordination and approval.38 Occasionally, the administration will strongly oppose a provision in the bill, in which case the OMB may authorize language stating that the President's senior advisors will recommend that he veto the bill if Congress does not modify or remove the provisions.39 DoD generally reserves SAP input to address only those provisions that would have a significant negative impact, because of the high level of coordination required. Many of the individuals who would have to be notified are no longer in the military and MCIOs would have to conduct a search for their current contact information. [...]the 180-day timeframe is not feasible.40 Legislative Appeals The appeals process is another opportunity by which DoD, in coordination with the administration, can submit detailed concerns and objections to specific NDAA provisions to Congress.41 With respect to the National Defense Authorization Act, DoD typically reserves appeals for issues that do not rise to the level that would require a SAP input but are problematic nonetheless.42 Appeals are primarily for highlighting differences between the House and Senate bills and expressing a preference for one approach over the other.43 They can also address technical issues with legislative text in similar House and Senate provisions to ensure that the final language does not have unintended impacts that are contrary to the congressional intent for the provision.44 As part of the FY22 NDAA appeals process, the Army submitted an appeal to address a House provision that would clarify the qualifications for attorneys who provide legal services to Families enrolled in the Exceptional Family Member Program.45 This provision would have imposed a requirement that such attorneys have experience in the practice of education law in the state in which the military installation is located (and
Journal Article
Reassessing the Legislative Veto: The Statutory President, Foreign Affairs, and Congressional Workarounds
by
Bradley, Curtis A
in
Administrative discretion
,
Border walls
,
Congressional-executive relations
2021
Abstract
A chief reason that the President is insufficiently constrained when exercising statutorily-delegated power, it is claimed, is the Supreme Court’s disallowance of legislative vetoes in its decision in INS v. Chadha, a claim that intensified during the Trump administration. This article challenges this account, arguing that the availability of the legislative veto was less important before Chadha to congressional-executive relations than legal scholars commonly assume, and that, to the extent that the legislative veto was (or would have become) important for checking some exercises of statutorily-delegated authority, Congress has developed a host of effective workarounds in the years since Chadha.
Journal Article
Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis
1999
This article investigates hypotheses generated by the veto players' theory. The fundamental insight of this theory is that an increase in the number of veto players (for all practical purposes, in parliamentary systems the number of parties in government) and their ideological distance from one another will reduce the ability of both government and parliament to produce significant laws. In addition, the number of significant laws increases with the duration of a government and with an increase in the ideological difference between current and previous government. These propositions are tested with legislative data (both laws and government decrees) on working time and working conditions identified in two legislative sources: the NATLEX computerized database in Geneva (produced by the International Labour organization) and Blanpain's International Encyclopedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations. The data cover fifteen West European countries for the period 1981–91. The evidence corroborates the proposed hypotheses.
Journal Article
Filibuster
2013,2007,2006
Parliamentary obstruction, popularly known as the \"filibuster,\" has been a defining feature of the U.S. Senate throughout its history. In this book, Gregory J. Wawro and Eric Schickler explain how the Senate managed to satisfy its lawmaking role during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, when it lacked seemingly essential formal rules for governing debate.
What prevented the Senate from self-destructing during this time? The authors argue that in a system where filibusters played out as wars of attrition, the threat of rule changes prevented the institution from devolving into parliamentary chaos. They show that institutional patterns of behavior induced by inherited rules did not render Senate rules immune from fundamental changes.
The authors' theoretical arguments are supported through a combination of extensive quantitative and case-study analysis, which spans a broad swath of history. They consider how changes in the larger institutional and political context--such as the expansion of the country and the move to direct election of senators--led to changes in the Senate regarding debate rules. They further investigate the impact these changes had on the functioning of the Senate. The book concludes with a discussion relating battles over obstruction in the Senate's past to recent conflicts over judicial nominations.
Chapter 12 Bankruptcy, section 1232 v section 553: Setoff as an Effective Veto?
2022
A recent district com! case in the Eighth Circuit utilized the legislative history of the Family Farmer Clarification Act of 2017 to argue that the IRS's and Iowa Department of Revenue's (IDR) use of their right to setoff (section 553) acted as an effective veto. The court gave an expansive reading to the effects of section 1232, holding that it conflicted with section 553 and that section 1232 controlled. This decision was reversed on appeal, but the appellate court did not address if this use of setoff acted as an effective veto for otherwise viable bankruptcy plans.This Note will address whether these sections should be read in conflict with one another and if the right to setoff acts as a veto power in this context. If an effective veto power exists, then small farmers may face a new barrier to successfully filing for Chapter 12 bankruptcy and saving their farms. This Note will start by providing background on the farming industry, Chapter 12 bankruptcy, and the court decision before delving into whether the right to setoff in this context acts as an effective veto.
Journal Article
The politics of the executive, legislative veto players and foreign debt
2019
Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to examine a curvilinear effect of legislative constraints on foreign debt. Design/methodology/approach - A cross-sectional, time-series data analysis of 68 developing countries during the period from 1981 to 1999 was performed. Findings - Foreign borrowing is most likely to increase at both low and high levels of legislative constraints, while it is most likely to decrease at moderate levels. Originality/value - The paper is a first-cut empirical analysis of a curvilinear relationship between legislative constraints and foreign debt.
Journal Article