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The politics of the executive, legislative veto players and foreign debt
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Journal Article
The politics of the executive, legislative veto players and foreign debt
2019
Overview
Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to examine a curvilinear effect of legislative constraints on foreign debt. Design/methodology/approach - A cross-sectional, time-series data analysis of 68 developing countries during the period from 1981 to 1999 was performed. Findings - Foreign borrowing is most likely to increase at both low and high levels of legislative constraints, while it is most likely to decrease at moderate levels. Originality/value - The paper is a first-cut empirical analysis of a curvilinear relationship between legislative constraints and foreign debt.
