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We study the role of establishment-specific wage premiums in generating recent increases in West German wage inequality. Models with additive fixed effects for workers and establishments are fit into four subintervals spanning the period from 1985 to 2009. We show that these models provide a good approximation to the wage structure and can explain nearly all of the dramatic rise in West German wage inequality. Our estimates suggest that the increasing dispersion of West German wages has arisen from a combination of rising heterogeneity between workers, rising dispersion in the wage premiums at different establishments, and increasing assortativeness in the assignment of workers to plants. In contrast, the idiosyncratic job-match component of wage variation is small and stable over time. Decomposing changes in mean wages between different education groups, occupations, and industries, we find that increasing plant-level heterogeneity and rising assortativeness in the assignment of workers to establishments explain a large share of the rise in inequality along all three dimensions.

The gender segregation of occupations is an enduring feature of the labour market, and pay in female-dominated occupations remains lower than in male-dominated occupations. However, recent changes in the occupational structure have possibly altered the relationship between occupational segregation and the gender pay gap. Women's skills are increasingly in demand, and this is reducing the gender wage gap. We explore this premise using individual-and occupation-level Labour Force Survey and household panel data from Britain augmented with an innovative proxy indicator of productivity across occupations. The wage effects of occupational feminization are not as high as previously shown once this indicator is taken into account. Additionally, we find evidence that such wage effects are evolving into more complex processes, including differing impacts for graduates and non-graduates as well as for employees in graduate and nongraduate jobs. Claims that gender segregation is losing importance as a structuring factor in labour-market outcomes are therefore accurate. However, this applies mostly to women in jobs requiring high-level skills. Segregation continues to lower pay substantially for women in occupations requiring limited skills.

This study explores whether potential employers have the same information about worker ability as the incumbent firm. I develop a model of asymmetric learning that nests the symmetric learning case and allows the degree of asymmetry to vary. I then show how predictions in the model can be tested with compensation data. Using the NLSY, I test the model and find strong support for asymmetric information. My estimates imply that in one period, outside firms reduce the average expectation error over worker ability by only a third of the reduction made by incumbent firms.

Recent laboratory and field experiments suggest that women are less effective than men in a competitive environment. I examine how teachers' performance is affected by a competitive environment and its gender mix. Teachers participated in a tournament that provided cash bonuses based on test performance of their classes. I find no evidence of gender differences in performance under competition in any gender mix environment, or in teachers' knowledge of the programme and in effort and teaching methods. Women, however, were more pessimistic about the effectiveness of teachers' performance pay and more realistic than men about their likelihood of winning bonuses.

In many sectors, pay is regulated to be equal across heterogeneous geographical labor markets. When the competitive outside wage is higher than the regulated wage, there are likely to be falls in quality. We exploit panel data from the population of English hospitals in which regulated pay for nurses is essentially flat across the country. Higher outside wages significantly worsen hospital quality as measured by hospital deaths for emergency heart attacks. A 10 percent increase in the outside wage is associated with a 7 percent increase in death rates. Furthermore, the regulation increases aggregate death rates in the public health care system.

In the 1970s, European unemployment started increasing. It increased further in the 1980s, to reach a plateau in the 1990s. It is still high today, although the average unemployment rate hides a high degree of heterogeneity across countries. The focus of researchers and policy makers was initially on the role of shocks. As unemployment remained high, the focus has progressively shifted to institutions. This paper reviews the interaction of facts and theories, and gives a tentative assessment of what we know and what we still do not know. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]

We analyse worker self-selection, with a special focus on teachers, to explore whether worker composition is generally endogenous. We analyse laboratory experimental data to provide causal evidence on particular sorting patterns. Our field data analysis focuses specifically on selection patterns of teachers. We find that teachers are more risk averse than employees in other professions, indicating that relatively risk averse individuals sort into teaching occupations under the current system. Using survey measures on trust and reciprocity we find that teachers trust more and are less negatively reciprocal than other employees, and establish differences in personality based on the Big Five concept.

We ask whether employer learning in the wage-setting process depends on skill type and skill importance to productivity, using measures of seven premarket skills and data for each skill's importance to occupation-specific productivity. Before incorporating importance measures, we find evidence of employer learning for each skill type, for college and high school graduates, and for blue- and white-collar workers, but no evidence that employer learning varies significantly across skill or worker type. When we allow parameters identifying employer learning and screening to vary by skill importance, we identify tradeoffs between learning and screening for some (but not all) skills.

Can differences in equilibrium beliefs among otherwise identical individuals account for a substantial degree of wage inequality? This paper shows that this is possible if two conditions are met. First, people learn about the distribution of wage offers from the experience of their peers, and second, people believe that wage offers are stationary even though offers that arrive later tend to have higher wages than offers that arrive earlier. Peer groups can then end up with different stable beliefs that lead to intergroup wage differences. The non-stationarity of offers is rationalized in a model where firms can either advertise their job openings or not, and where advertised ones have more influence on more inexperienced job searchers. A statistic is proposed whose application to existing studies suggests that the non-stationarity considered here is present in data.

Three types of theories have been used to explain the wage premium in foreign firms: the theories of heterogeneous workers, heterogeneous learning, and heterogeneous firms. We set up a model that explicitly encompasses two of these theories, and that can illustrate the third. This unifying framework allows us to rigorously compare the predictions of the different theories. Thus, it is a useful tool for interpreting new and existing empirical evidence. We illustrate the usefulness of the model on matched employer—employee data, and we find considerable support for all three theories. In particular, the theory of heterogeneous workers can explain up to 75 percent of the premium.