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Countries around the world are enacting pay transparency policies to combat pay discrimination. Since 2000, 71 percent of OECD countries have done so. Most are enacting transparency horizontally, revealing pay between coworkers doing similar work within a firm. While these policies have narrowed coworker wage gaps, they have also led to counterproductive peer comparisons and caused employers to bargain more aggressively, lowering average wages. Other pay transparency policies, without directly targeting discrimination, have benefited workers by addressing broader information frictions in the labor market. Vertical pay transparency policies reveal to workers pay differences across different levels of seniority. Empirical evidence suggests these policies can lead to more accurate and more optimistic beliefs about earnings potential, increasing employee motivation and productivity. Cross-firm pay transparency policies reveal wage differences across employers. These policies have encouraged workers to seek jobs at higher paying firms, negotiate higher pay, and sharpened wage competition between employers. We discuss the evidence on effects of pay transparency, and open questions.

We reassess the effect of minimum wages on US earnings inequality using additional decades of data and an IV strategy that addresses potential biases in prior work. We find that the minimum wage reduces inequality in the lower tail of the wage distribution, though by substantially less than previous estimates, suggesting that rising lower tail inequality after 1980 primarily reflects underlying wage structure changes rather than an unmasking of latent inequality. These wage effects extend to percentiles where the minimum is nominally nonbinding, implying spillovers. We are unable to reject that these spillovers are due to reporting artifacts, however.

Even though firms play a key role in shaping wages, wage inequality and the gender wage gap, firms have so far only featured to a limited extent in the policy debates around these issues. The evidence in this volume shows that around one third of overall wage inequality can be explained by gaps in pay between firms rather than differences in the level and returns to workers’ skills. Gaps in firm pay reflect differences in productivity and wage setting power. To address high wage inequality while fostering high and sustainable growth, worker-centred policies (e.g. education, adult learning) need to be complemented with firm-oriented policies. This involves notably: (1) policies that promote the productivity catch-up of lagging firms, which would not only raise aggregate productivity and wages but also reduce wage inequality; (2) policies that reduce wage gaps at given productivity gaps without limiting efficiency-enhancing reallocation, especially the promotion of worker mobility; and (3) policies that reduce the wage setting power of firms with dominant positions in local labour markets, which would raise wages and reduce wage inequality without adverse effects on employment and output.

We test the hypothesis that information technology (IT) workers accept a compensating differential to work with emerging IT systems and that employers that invest in these systems can, in turn, capture greater value from the wages they pay. We show that much of the utility IT workers derive from these systems is from skills acquired on the job. This is principally true for younger workers at employers where skill development is encouraged, and the effects are stronger in thicker markets where workers with newer skills have more outside options. An analysis of the text in online employer reviews supports the notion that IT workers value access to interesting IT systems above most other employer attributes. These findings are important because (1) they provide evidence of how worker preferences can influence corporate IT investment decisions, (2) they shed light on factors influencing IT skill development, and (3) they point to a potentially important explanation for returns from IT investments. This paper was accepted by Chris Forman, information systems.

Employment contracts are often incomplete, leaving many responsibilities subject to workers' discretion. High work morale is therefore essential for sustaining voluntary cooperation and high productivity in firms. We conducted a field experiment to test whether workers reciprocate wage cuts and raises with low or high work productivity. Wage cuts had a detrimental and persistent impact on productivity, reducing average output by more than 20%. An equivalent wage increase, however, did not result in any productivity gains. The results from an additional control experiment with high monetary performance incentives demonstrate that workers could still produce substantially more output, leaving enough room for positive reactions. Altogether, these results provide evidence consistent with a model of reciprocity, as opposed to inequality aversion.

Rent-sharing by workers can reduce the incentives for investment if some of the returns to sunk capital are captured in higher wages. We propose a simple measure of this \"holdup\" effect based on the size of the wage offset for firm-specific capital accumulation. Using Social Security earnings records for workers in the Veneto region of Italy linked to detailed financial data for their employers, we find strong evidence of rent-sharing, with an elasticity of wages with respect to potential rents per worker of around 4%, arising mainly at larger firms with higher price-cost margins. On the other hand, we find little evidence that bargaining lowers the return on investment. Instead, firm-level bargaining appears to split the rents after deducting the full cost of capital.

This paper reviews the role of locus of control in the labor market. I begin with a discussion of the conceptual origins of locus of control, including its relationship to related concepts such as self-efficacy, motivation, and self-control. The relationship between locus of control and labor market success is then summarized. In doing so, I pay careful attention to what we know about three potential mechanisms - human capital investments, hiring decisions, and optimal incentive contracts - through which locus of control might operate. Finally, the broader implications of these relationships for public policy and future research are discussed.

This paper studies the judicial, political, and intellectual battles over minimum wages from the early state laws of the 1910s through the peak in the real federal minimum in 1968. Early laws were limited to women and children and were ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court between 1923 and 1937. The first federal law in 1938 initially exempted large portions of the workforce and set rates that became effectively obsolete during World War II. Later amendments raised minimum rates, but coverage did not expand until 1961. The states led the way in rates and coverage in the 1940s and 50s and again since the 1980s. The most contentious questions of today—the impact of minimum wages on earnings and employment—were already being addressed by economists in the 1910s. By about 1960, these discussions had surprisingly modern concerns about causality but did not have modern econometric tools or data.

We develop and estimate a structural model that incorporates a sizeable public sector in a labor market with search frictions. The wage distribution and the employment rate in the public sector are taken as exogenous policy parameters. Overall wage distribution and employment rate are determined within the model, taking into account the private sector’s endogenous response to public sector employment policies. Job turnover is sector specific and transitions between sectors depend on the worker’s decision to accept alternative employment in the same or different sector by comparing the value of employment in the current and prospective jobs. The model is estimated on British data by a method of moments. We use the model to simulate the impact of various counterfactual public sector wage and employment policies.

This article develops a model that incorporates workers' fair wage preferences into a general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous firms. In a setting where the wage considered to be fair by workers depends on the productivity of the firm they are working in, we study the determinants of profits, involuntary unemployment and within-group wage inequality. We use this model to investigate the effects of globalization, thereby pointing to distributional conflicts that have so far not been accounted for: a simultaneous increase of average profits and involuntary unemployment as well as a surge in within-group wage inequality.