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This essay proposes an emotion-management perspective as a lens through which to inspect the self, interaction, and structure. Emotion, it is argued, can be and ofter is subject to acts of management. The individual often works on inducing or inhibiting feelings so as to render them \"appropriate\" to a situation. The emotion-management perspective draws on an interactive account of emotion. It differs from the dramaturgical perspective on the one hand and the psychoanalytic perspective on the other. It allows us to inspect at closer range than either of those perspectives the relation among emotive experience, emotion management, feeling rules, and ideology. Feeling rules are seen as the side of ideology that deals with emotion and feeling. Emotion management is the type of work it takes to cope with feeling rules. Meaning-making jobs, more common in the middle class, put more premium on the individual's capacity to do emotion work. A reexamination of class differences in child rearing suggest that middle-class families prepare their children for emotion management more and working-class families prepare them less. In this way each prepares its children to psychologically reproduce the class structure.

A field study of 25 strategic decision processes, together with a review of the related empirical literature, suggests that a basic structure underlies these \"unstructured\" processes. This structure is described in terms of 12 elements: 3 central phases, 3 sets of supporting routines, and 6 sets of dynamic factors. This paper discusses each of these elements in turn, and then proposes a general model to describe the interrelationships among them. The 25 strategic decision processes studied are then shown to fall into 7 types of path configurations through the model.

A need-satisfaction theoretical model has been ubiquitous in studies and writings on job attitudes and, by extension, motivation, job design, and other organizational performance improvement issues. An examination of such need models indicates that they are frequently formulated so as to be almost impossible to refute, and the research testing them has been beset with consistency and priming artifacts. Furthermore, available empirical data fails to support many of the crucial elements of need-satisfaction theories. An examination of the components of need-satisfaction models-needs, job characteristics, and job attitudes-indicates that all three have been incompletely considered. Need models may have persisted in part because of perceptual biases, their consistency with other theories of rational choice behavior, and because of what they seem to imply about human behavior. The models appear to deny, however, that people have the capacity to provide their own satisfactions by cognitively reconstructing situations.

In the understanding of managerial control over work, the labour process literature has been very influential. Recent critical contributions from the sociological tradition have, however, served to so fragment the underlying perspective that its coherence is now threatened. This paper seeks to demonstrate how a dialectical analysis can lay the basis for a viable amended approach. The need for a dialectical framework has often been urged–illustrations of such a perspective in operation, however, are rare. Using a series of examples, this paper argues that the dialectic of work control can be revealed by focussing on two phenomena: the 'levels' and 'circuits' of control.

This paper argues that worker participation has not evolved out of the humanization of capitalism, as is usually suggested, but has appeared cyclically. These cycles are traced over more than a century and are shown to correspond to periods when management authority is felt to be facing challenge. Participation is thus best understood as a means of attempting to secure labour's compliance. However, the framework of common interests upon which participation is premised is untenable, and in practice the efficiency of such schemes in Britain has been for the most part severely attenuated by the realities of structural conflict.

Impression management theory is used to derive hypotheses about the escalation of incidents involving aggression and violence among samples of the general population, ex-mental patients, and ex-criminal offenders. Respondents were interviewed about incidents they had been involved in at four levels of severity: incidents in which they were angry but did nothing about it; verbal disputes; incidents involving physical violence but no weapon; and incidents in which a weapon was used. The findings generally support impression management theory: (1) respondents were more likely to express their anger when they had been insulted, particularly when they were males; (2) the probability of physical violence was lower when participants gave accounts for their actions; (3) conflicts involving same-sex participants were generally more severe when an audience was present; and (4) instigation from third parties resulted in more severe incidents while third party mediation resulted in less subsequent aggression.

This paper presents a model of trust and its interaction with information flow, influence, and control, and reports on an experiment based on the model to test several hypotheses about problem-solving effectiveness. The subjects were managers and the independent variable was the individual manager's initial level of trust. Groups of business executives were given identical factual information about a difficult manufacturing-marketing policy problem; half the groups were briefed to expect trusting behavior, the other half to expect untrusting behavior. There were highly significant differences in effectiveness between the high-trust groups and the low-trust groups in the clarification of goals, the reality of information exchanged, the scope of search for solutions, and the commitment of managers to implement solutions. The findings indicate that shared trust or lack of trust apparently are a significant determinant of managerial problem-solving effectiveness.

ARGUMENTS & DATA FROM SEVERAL STUDIES ARE PRESENTED IN DISAGREEMENT WITH INTERPRETATIONS FOUND IN MAURICE ZEITLIN'S ARTICLE (SEE SA 22:5/74H0937). EMPIRICAL RESULTS DO SUPPORT THE THEORY OF THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP & CONTROL IN LARGE CORPORATIONS; CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS HAVE CAUSED THE DISPERSION OF STOCK OWNERSHIP. FAMILY CONTROL IS ASSOCIATED WITH FEWER FINANCIAL & NONFINANCIAL CORPORATIVE LINKS & WITH A LARGER PROPORTION OF DIRECTORS DRAWN FROM MANAGEMENT. MANAGEMENT CONTROL OF FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS SEEMS MORE PREVALENT AMONG THE LARGER BANKS, AS IN THE CASE OF NONFINANCIAL CORPORATIONS. ALTHOUGH SENIOR MANAGEMENT OFFICIALS RECEIVE LARGE SALARIES & OWN STOCK IN THEIR COMPANIES, THE MAGNITUDE OF THEIR WEALTH & SE BACKGROUNDS IS DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF THE PRINCIPAL STOCKHOLDERS; THEY DO NOT FORM A DISTINCT CLASS OF THEIR OWN NOR HAVE THEY BECOME INCORPORATED INTO THE CAPITALIST CLASS. VARIOUS MANAGEMENT STUDIES ARE INCONCLUSIVE AS TO WHETHER \"THE PROBLEM OF DIVERGENT ECONOMIC INTERESTS BETWEEN MANAGERS & OWNERS HAS BEEN EFFECTIVELY RESOLVED BY THE INCENTIVE SYSTEM OF THE LARGE CORPORATION.\" IN ON CLASS THEORY OF THE LARGE CORPORATION: RESPONSE TO ALLEN, MAURICE ZEITLIN (U WISCONSIN, MADISON) DEALS WITH THE FOLLOWING ISSUES RAISED BY ALLEN: (1) THE FACTUAL (EMPIRICAL) BASIS FOR MANAGEMENT CONTROL, (2) THE RELATION BETWEEN MANAGEMENT CONTROL & CORPORATE SIZE, (3) THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN CORPORATE & FINANCIAL INTERLOCKING & TYPES OF CORPORATE CONTROL, (4) THE TYPE OF CONTROL FOUND IN FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS, & (5) DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MANAGEMENT-CONTROLLED & OWNER-CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS' PROFIT LEVELS. 4 TABLES. J. N. MAYER.

The key assumption of managerial revolution theory--that ownership is separated from control in large corporations--has important consequences for theories of class structure and economic development. If managers do not act in the interest of proprietors, theories based on property ownership are obsolete. Furthermore, the growth patterns of capitalist societies would be altered if large corporations protect managerial interests rather than owner interests. We examined managerial revolution theory by studying the relationship between the dismissal of corporate chiefs and various structural variables (including five measures of manager/owner control) for 286 of the 300 largest industrial firms in 1964. Our results do not support managerial revolution theory. Profit performance most affects the probability that the chief will be fired, and type of control has little effect. Profit performance appears to be an effective constraint on the behavior of both managerially-controlled and owner-controlled firms.