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This book sees that the solution to a number of the problems of contemporary philosophy lies in the development of an alternative to Hume's metaphysics. This alternative would have real causal powers at its centre. This book sets about developing a thorough account of powers that might persuade those who remain, perhaps unknowingly, in the grip of Hume's assumptions. This book shows both that the notion of a power is central and that it could serve to dispel a number of long-standing philosophical problems. This book's account of powers is as realistic as any that has appeared so far, and shows that dispositions are as real as any other properties. Specifically, they do not depend on their manifestations for their existence; nevertheless, they are directed towards such manifestations. The book thus appropriates the notion of intentionality from Brentano and argues that it is the essential characteristic of powers. It offers a persuasive case for the existence of some basic and ungrounded powers, thus ruling out the reducibility of the dispositional to the non-dispositional. However, the book does allow that there are non-power properties as well as power properties. In this respect, the book's final position is dualistic.

One of the first book-length English-language treatments devoted to Francisco Suárez's metaphysics Long considered one of late scholasticism's most important thinkers, Francisco Suárez has, paradoxically enough, often been treated only in relation to other medieval authors or as a transitional figure in the shift from medieval to early modern philosophy. As such, his thought has often been obscured and framed in terms of an alien paradigm. This book seeks to correct such approaches and examines Suárez's metaphysical thinking as it stands on its own. Suárez is shown to be much more in line with his medieval predecessors who developed their accounts of being to express the theological commitments they had made. Central to Suárez's account is a fundamental existential orientation, one that many interpreters have overlooked in favour of an understanding of being as reduced to essence or to the thinkable. This publication is GPRC-labeled (Guaranteed Peer-Reviewed Content).

Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals from 1785 is one of the most important and influential texts in the whole history of philosophy. Its central purpose is to develop the categorical imperative. The present collected volume contains papers on central theoretical aspects. Key Features: * Contributions from leading international authorities in Kant research * A reflection of the current state of research together with new aspects

Parthood and composition are everywhere. The leg of a table is part of the table, the word \"Christmas\" is part of the sentence \"I wish you a merry Christmas\", the 13th century is part of the Middle Ages. The Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg compose Benelux, the body of a deer is composed of a huge number of cells, the Middle Ages are composed of the Early Middle Ages, High Middle Ages, and Late Middle Ages. Is there really a general theory covering every instance of parthood and composition? Is classical mereology this general theory? Are its seemingly counter-intuitive features serious defects? Mereology: A Philosophical Introduction addresses the multifaceted and lively philosophical debates surrounding these questions, and defends the idea that classical mereology is indeed the general and exhaustive theory of parthood and composition in the domain of concrete entities. Several examples of parthood and composition, involving entities of different kinds, are scrutinized in depth. Incidentally, mereology is shown to interact in a surprising way with metaontology. Presenting a well-organized and comprehensive discussion of parthood and related notions, Mereology: A Philosophical Introduction contributes to a better understanding of a subject central to contemporary metaphysics.

There are two axes of Leibniz’s philosophy about bodies that are deeply intertwined, as this paper shows: the scientific investigation of bodies due to the application of mathematics to nature - Leibniz’s mixed mathematics - and the issue of matter/bodies idealism. This intertwinement raises an issue: How did Leibniz frame the relationship between mathematics, natural sciences, and metaphysics? Due to the increasing application of mathematics to natural sciences, especially physics, philosophers of the early modern period used the reliability of mathematics to predict phenomena as the basis to infer the metaphysical outlook of nature. I argue that although Leibniz thought metaphysics must be scientifically informed and that mathematics is a valuable instrument to understand nature, metaphysics is more fundamental than mathematics and natural sciences. By highlighting the foundational relation between metaphysics and the sciences, this paper showcases an argument for the reality of bodies: the ideality of bodies, necessary for epistemic purposes, is not proof that they are not real. Deux axes de la philosophie de Leibniz sur les corps sont profondément entrelacés, comme le montre cet article: l’enquête scientifique des corps par l’application des mathématiques à la nature - les mathématiques mixtes de Leibniz - et la question de l’idéalisme de la matière et des corps. Cette entrelacement soulève une question: Comment Leibniz a-t-il défini la relation entre les mathématiques, les sciences naturelles et la métaphysique? En raison de l’application croissante des mathématiques aux sciences naturelles, en particulier à la physique, les philosophes de la période moderne ont utilisé la fiabilité des mathématiques pour prédire les phénomènes comme base pour déduire la perspective métaphysique de la nature. Je soutiens que, bien que Leibniz ait pensé que la métaphysique devait être scientifiquement informée et que les mathématiques étaient un instrument précieux pour comprendre la nature, la métaphysique est plus fondamentale que les mathématiques et les sciences naturelles. En soulignant la relation fondamentale entre la métaphysique et les sciences, cet article présente un argument en faveur de la réalité des corps : l’idéalité des corps, nécessaire à des fins épistémiques, n’est pas une preuve que ils ne sont pas réelle. Es gibt zwei Achsen der Leibniz’schen Philosophie über Körper, die eng miteinander verwoben sind, wie dieser Beitrag zeigt: die wissenschaftliche Untersuchbarkeit von Körpern aufgrund der Anwendung der Mathematik auf die Natur - Leibniz’ gemischte Mathematik - und die Frage des Idealismus von Materie und Körper. Diese Verflechtung wirft eine Frage auf: Wie gestaltete Leibniz das Verhältnis von Mathematik, Naturwissenschaften und Metaphysik? Aufgrund der zunehmenden Anwendung der Mathematik auf die Naturwissenschaften, insbesondere die Physik, nutzten Philosophen der frühen Neuzeit die Zuverlässigkeit der Mathematik bei der Vorhersage von Phänomenen als Grundlage für die Ableitung einer metaphysischen Sicht der Natur. Ich argumentiere, dass, obwohl Leibniz der Meinung war, dass die Metaphysik wissenschaftlich fundiert sein muss und dass die Mathematik ein wertvolles Instrument zum Verständnis der Natur ist, die Metaphysik grundlegender ist als Mathematik und Naturwissenschaften. Indem er die grundlegende Beziehung zwischen Metaphysik und Naturwissenschaften hervorhebt, zeigt dieser Aufsatz ein Argument für die Realität von Körpern auf: Die Idealität von Körpern, die für epistemische Zwecke notwendig ist, ist kein Beweis dafür, dass sie nicht real sind.

This volume is a collection of papers that advance our understanding of the metaphysics of powers — properties such as fragility and electric charge. The metaphysics of powers is a fast developing research field with fundamental questions at the forefront of current research, such as Can there be a world of only powers?　What is the manifestation of a power?　Are powers and their manifestations related by necessity? What are the prospects for dispositional accounts of causation? The papers focus on questions concerning the metaphysics of powers that cut across any particular subject-specific ontological domain -- whether philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, ethics, epistemology – investigating the metaphysical structure of powers, the nature of the manifestation of powers, the necessity or contingency of a power’s relation to its manifestations, and powers and causation.　A number of authors also engage in discussion with Humean and neo-Humean treatments of causation, thereby making contributions to a larger metaphysical debate beyond powers.　Additionally, the authors engage critically with the latest contributions to the debate on powers in the literature, thereby bringing together in a wholesome and analytical way the most recent and noteworthy theoretical developments in this research field.　 Introduction, Anna Marmodoro 1: On the Individuation of Powers, E.J. Lowe 2: Do Powers Need Powers to Make Them Powerful? From Pandispositionalism to Aristotle, Anna Marmodoro 3: Categories and the Ontology of Powers: A Vindication of the Identity Theory of Properties, Kristina Engelhard 4: Powerful Qualities, John Heil 5: Manifestations as Effects, Jennifer McKitrick 6: Puzzling Powers: The Problem of Fit, Neil Williams 7: Dispositions, Manifestations, and Causal Structure, Toby Handfield 8: Causal Powers and Categorical Properties, Brian Ellis 9: A Powerful Theory of Causation, Stephen Mumford and Rani Anjum 10: Causation and the Manifestation of Powers, Alexander Bird 11: Antidotes for Dispositional Essentialism, Markus Schrenk Notes on Contributors Bibliography Index Anna Marmodoro is a British Academy Post-Doctoral Fellow in Philosophy at the University of Oxford and a Junior Research Fellow at Corpus Christi College.

There are two axes of Leibniz’s philosophy about bodies that are deeply intertwined, as this paper shows: the scientific investigation of bodies due to the application of mathematics to nature - Leibniz’s mixed mathematics - and the issue of matter/bodies idealism. This intertwinement raises an issue: How did Leibniz frame the relationship between mathematics, natural sciences, and metaphysics? Due to the increasing application of mathematics to natural sciences, especially physics, philosophers of the early modern period used the reliability of mathematics to predict phenomena as the basis to infer the metaphysical outlook of nature. I argue that although Leibniz thought metaphysics must be scientifically informed and that mathematics is a valuable instrument to understand nature, metaphysics is more fundamental than mathematics and natural sciences. By highlighting the foundational relation between metaphysics and the sciences, this paper showcases an argument for the reality of bodies: the ideality of bodies, necessary for epistemic purposes, is not proof that they are not real. Deux axes de la philosophie de Leibniz sur les corps sont profondément entrelacés, comme le montre cet article: l’enquête scientifique des corps par l’application des mathématiques à la nature - les mathématiques mixtes de Leibniz - et la question de l’idéalisme de la matière et des corps. Cette entrelacement soulève une question: Comment Leibniz a-t-il défini la relation entre les mathématiques, les sciences naturelles et la métaphysique? En raison de l’application croissante des mathématiques aux sciences naturelles, en particulier à la physique, les philosophes de la période moderne ont utilisé la fiabilité des mathématiques pour prédire les phénomènes comme base pour déduire la perspective métaphysique de la nature. Je soutiens que, bien que Leibniz ait pensé que la métaphysique devait être scientifiquement informée et que les mathématiques étaient un instrument précieux pour comprendre la nature, la métaphysique est plus fondamentale que les mathématiques et les sciences naturelles. En soulignant la relation fondamentale entre la métaphysique et les sciences, cet article présente un argument en faveur de la réalité des corps : l’idéalité des corps, nécessaire à des fins épistémiques, n’est pas une preuve que ils ne sont pas réelle. Es gibt zwei Achsen der Leibniz’schen Philosophie über Körper, die eng miteinander verwoben sind, wie dieser Beitrag zeigt: die wissenschaftliche Untersuchbarkeit von Körpern aufgrund der Anwendung der Mathematik auf die Natur - Leibniz’ gemischte Mathematik - und die Frage des Idealismus von Materie und Körper. Diese Verflechtung wirft eine Frage auf: Wie gestaltete Leibniz das Verhältnis von Mathematik, Naturwissenschaften und Metaphysik? Aufgrund der zunehmenden Anwendung der Mathematik auf die Naturwissenschaften, insbesondere die Physik, nutzten Philosophen der frühen Neuzeit die Zuverlässigkeit der Mathematik bei der Vorhersage von Phänomenen als Grundlage für die Ableitung einer metaphysischen Sicht der Natur. Ich argumentiere, dass, obwohl Leibniz der Meinung war, dass die Metaphysik wissenschaftlich fundiert sein muss und dass die Mathematik ein wertvolles Instrument zum Verständnis der Natur ist, die Metaphysik grundlegender ist als Mathematik und Naturwissenschaften. Indem er die grundlegende Beziehung zwischen Metaphysik und Naturwissenschaften hervorhebt, zeigt dieser Aufsatz ein Argument für die Realität von Körpern auf: Die Idealität von Körpern, die für epistemische Zwecke notwendig ist, ist kein Beweis dafür, dass sie nicht real sind.

Metaphysics: The Basics is a concise and engaging introduction to the philosophical study of some of the most important and foundational aspects of the world in which we live. Concerned with questions about existence, time, identity, change, and other basic elements of our common-sense and scientific ways of thinking about the world, metaphysics has long fascinated people. But to the uninitiated, many of the issues and problems can appear bewilderingly complex and intractable. In this lively and lucid book, Michael Rea examines and explains the core questions in the study of metaphysics—questions such as: What is the relationship between an object and its properties, or between an object and its parts? This second edition has been thoroughly revised and includes a new chapter on the metaphysics of gender. With suggestions for further reading and a glossary of key terms, Metaphysics: The Basics is an ideal introduction for those coming to the subject for the first time. What is time, and is time travel possible? Are human beings free? What is it for an object or person to persist over time?