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This article is the first panoramic survey of the various, idiosyncratic procedures relating to the removal for cause of EU institutional officeholders scattered throughout the Union’s primary and secondary law. After describing these provisions, the article argues that these procedures may be considered as impeachment. The article then examines the character of EU impeachment, concluding that it is conceptualised narrowly as addressing individual misbehaving officers, rather than as a means to address wider, systemic, policy-based threats to the EU and its values. The article also offers some observations regarding defects in the EU’s current impeachment provisions and suggests possible reforms.

Ethiopia, like most developing countries, has opted to deliver services such as basic education, primary health care, agricultural extension advice, water, and rural roads through a highly decentralized system (Manor 1999; Treisman 2007). That choice is based on several decades of theoretical analysis examining how a decentralized government might respond better to diverse local needs and provide public goods more efficiently than a highly centralized government. Ethiopia primarily manages the delivery of basic services at the woreda (district) level. Those services are financed predominantly through intergovernmental fiscal transfers (IGFTs) from the federal to the regional and then the woreda administrations, although some woredas raise a small amount of revenue to support local services. Since 2006, development partners and the government have cofinanced block grants for decentralized services through the Promoting Basic Services (PBS) Program. Aside from funding the delivery of services, the program supports measures to improve the quality of services and local governments capacity to deliver them by strengthening accountability and citizen voice.

This article focuses on the legislative careers of women and men in state legislative office to explore how the relationship between the private and public spheres affects career opportunities, choices, perceptions, and actions. The findings indicate that the intersection of private and public is configured differently in the lives of women and men. Among other results, women were found to perform double duty, holding primary responsibility for the work of home and children even though they have the same public responsibilities as their male counterparts. The implications of these findings for individuals, public policy choices, institutional operations, and social patterns are explored

In February 1965, when demonstrations still constituted the central tactic of the freedom struggle, Bayard Rustin forecast the direction in which the civil rights movement would head. Few civil rights proponents doubted the wisdom of organizing blacks to increase their political leverage. Blacks stood the best chances of winning election to office where they outnumbered whites, primarily at the local level. As the judicial and executive branches cleared sundry obstacles to minority political participation, southern blacks continued their slow but steady progress in winning public office. Although the majority of black elected officials were men, the 1970s saw a rapid rise of black women officeholders throughout the nation. While noteworthy breakthroughs were occurring among women and in small towns like Mayersville, perhaps more than any other major city in the South, Atlanta, Georgia, reflected the changing currents of black political development in the years following passage of the Voting Rights Act.

This chapter contains sections titled: The Cities as Self‐Government Units of the Empire The Provinces and Their State Office‐Holders Italy and Rome Rome as the Center of the Empire‐Wide Administration Further Reading References

In the fall of 1963, we moved back to Boston just before President Kennedy’s assassination, when I was appointed an Assistant U.S. Attorney for Massachusetts. I did not return to Mississippi until I began work on this book. Shortly after leaving the Jackson airport in late June of 1989, I stopped at one of the multitude of Waffle House restaurants that populate the South. There I saw an African American man seated with his arm around a blonde white woman. Neither seemed to fear imminent attack. That was a quick jump start in my realization of how much Mississippi had

Shortly after I reached Washington, the latter part of November 1875, I called on the president to pay my respects and to see him on business. The president had recently issued a Civil Service order which some of the federal office-holders evidently misunderstood.¹ Postmaster Purcell of Summit, an important town in my district, was one of that number. He was supposed to be Republican, having been appointed as such. But he not only refused to take any part in the campaign of 1875, he also declined to contribute a dollar to meet the legitimate expenses of the same. The President’s

Theft of public assets from developing countries is an immense problem with a staggering development impact. These thefts diverts valuable public resources from addressing the abject poverty and fragile infrastructure often present in such countries. Although the exact magnitude of the proceeds of corruption circulating in the global economy is impossible to ascertain, estimates demonstrate the severity and scale of the problem at $20 to $40 billion lost to developing countries each year. What this estimate does not capture are the societal costs of corruption and the devastating impact of such crimes on victim countries. Theft of assets by corrupt officials, often at the highest levels of government, weakens confidence in public institutions, damages the private investment climate, and divests needed funding available for core investment in such poverty alleviation measures as public health, education, and infrastructure. This study's key objective is to mobilize policy makers on the existing difficulties in stolen asset recovery actions and convince them to take action on the featured recommendations. Such action will enhance the capacity of practitioners to successfully recover stolen assets. Los países en desarrollo pierden aproximadamente $ 20-40 mil millones cada año por causa de sobornos, malversación de fondos y otras prácticas corruptas. Sólo una mínima parte se recupera. Esta enorme brecha en la recuperación real de los activos robados apunta a la presencia de importantes barreras que impiden su recuperación. Con el fin de llenar este vacío, la Iniciativa para la Recuperación de Activos Robados (StAR) ha lanzado Barreras para la recuperación de Activos, un análisis exhaustivo de estos impedimentos y su impacto negativo. La cooperación internacional es fundamental. La Convención de las Naciones Unidas contra la Corrupción es una plataforma clave para fomentar este tipo de acción colectiva, como lo demuestran los compromisos asumidos por los gobiernos, la sociedad civil y el sector privado aun así, varias de las barreras identificadas no pueden superarse a través de la convención. Basándose en la experiencia de profesionales con experiencia práctica, este estudio tiene por objeto orientar a los responsables de formulación de políticas y promover recomendaciones prácticas destinadas a ayudar a las jurisdicciones en la elaboración de políticas efectivas para recuperar energéticamente los activos robados. El G-20, las organizaciones internacionales, instituciones financieras, agencias de desarrollo y la sociedad civil tienen un papel clave que desempeñar en asegurar un progreso concreto en la implementación de estas recomendaciones. Le détournement des fonds publics représente un obstacle de plus en plus significatif au développement économique des pays émergents. En effet, la disparition de ces ressources publiques essentielles empêche de réduire la pauvreté et pérennise la fragilité des infrastructures de ces pays. S’il est impossible d’évaluer le montant exact des produits de la corruption dans le monde, les estimations témoignent de la gravité et de l’ampleur du problème. Chaque année, on considère que la corruption prive les pays en voie de développement de 20 à 40 milliards de dollars. Ces chiffres ne reflètent pas l’ensemble des coûts de la corruption, ni l’impact dévastateur de ces infractions sur les pays qui en sont victimes. Les détournements de fonds publics perpétrés par des agents publics corrompus, occupant souvent les plus hautes fonctions de l’Etat, sapent la confiance dans les institutions publiques, met à mal le climat nécessaire aux investissements privés, et empêche la mise en œuvre de mesures contre la pauvreté, notamment dans les domaines de la santé publique, de l’éducation et des infrastructures. Réalisée dans le cadre de l’initiative StAR (Stolen Asset Recovery), cette étude s’appuie sur l’expérience de praticiens du monde entier rompus au processus de recouvrement des avoirs, et sur des études effectuées indépendamment par des collaborateurs. Ainsi, une cinquantaine de praticiens originaires à la fois des Etats requérants et requis, traitant quotidiennement des dossiers de recouvrement d’avoirs, ont été consultés afin de passer en revue les conclusions de cette étude avant sa publication. Les obstacles sont classés en trois catégories distinctes qui feront chacune l’objet d’une section : les obstacles d’ordre général et les problèmes institutionnels ; les obstacles juridiques et exigences qui retardent l’entraide judiciaire et enfin, les obstacles opérationnels et les problèmes de communication.

The chapter then considers how the new context for coalition-making emerged during Kennedy's presidency, at a time when many in his administration were unhappy about the unbending nature of black political will. Two statutes with relatively untested voting rights provisions were at hand: the 1957 and 1960 Civil Rights Acts. Kennedy's sponsorship of the Voter Education Project (VEP) and of the Lawyers Committee on Civil Rights (LCCR) launched the various civil rights organizations on an arduous effort to implement these two Eisenhower-era statutes. But the endeavor flew apart. The statutes that the VEP and its grantee organizations sought to implement assumed that state and local officials would comply in good faith with federal law. Southern violence and obstructionism—as one set of Democratic officeholders fought a pitched battle against the other—made the Civil Rights Acts nearly impossible to implement in the Deep South. The party-in-waiting of 1948 met with brutal repression.