Explore the vast range of titles available.

We explain why the line between dynamic and operational (or ordinary) capabilities is unavoidably blurry, draw implications for capabilities that promote economically important but seemingly gradual change, and provide recommendations for future research that takes these issues into account.

Coercive control is central to distinguishing between Johnson's (2008) 2 main types of intimate partner violence: (a) coercive controlling violence and (b) situational couple violence. Approaches to assessing coercive control, however, have been inconsistent. Using data from 2 projects involving divorcing mothers (N = 190), the authors compared common analytic strategies for operationalizing coercive control and classifying types of violence. The results establish advantages to measuring coercive control in terms of frequency versus number of tactics, illustrate the use of both hierarchical and k-means clustering methods to identify patterns of coercive control and evaluate clustering solutions, and offer a suggested cutoff for classifying violence types in general samples of separated women using the Dominance–Isolation subscale of the widely used Psychological Maltreatment of Women Inventory (Tolman, 1992). Finally, the authors demonstrate associations between types of violence and theoretically relevant variables, including frequency and severity of violence, harassment and violence after separation, fear, and perceived threat.

The World Health Organization (WHO) defines unsafe abortion as a procedure for terminating a pregnancy performed by persons lacking the necessary skills or in an environment not in conformity with minimal medical standards, or both. This definition embodies concepts first outlined in a 1992 WHO Technical Consultation. Although widely used, it is inconsistently interpreted. In this paper, the authors discuss its correct interpretation and operationalization. WHO's definition of unsafe abortion was conceptualized within the framework of emerging guidelines on the management of the complications of induced abortion and was intended to be interpreted within that context. This linkage to technical guidelines is crucial for its correct interpretation.

While there has been wide-ranging commitment to the One Health approach, its operationalisation has so far proven challenging. One Health calls upon the human, animal and environmental health sectors to cross professional, disciplinary and institutional boundaries, and to work in a more integrated fashion. At the global level, this paper argues that this vision is hindered by dysfunctions characterising current forms of global health governance (GHG), namely institutional proliferation, fragmentation, competition for scarce resources, lack of an overarching authority, and donor-driven vertical programmes. This has contributed, in part, to shortcomings in how One Health has been articulated to date. An agreed operational definition of One Health among key global institutions, efforts to build One Health institutions from the ground up, comparative case studies of what works or does not work institutionally, and high-level global support for research, training and career opportunities would all help to enable One Health to help remedy, and not be subsumed by, existing dysfunctions in GHG.

Proponents of mechanistic explanation all acknowledge the importance of organization. But they have also tended to emphasize specificity with respect to parts and operations in mechanisms. We argue that in understanding one important mode of organization—patterns of causal connectivity—a successful explanatory strategy abstracts from the specifics of the mechanism and invokes tools such as those of graph theory to explain how mechanisms with a particular mode of connectivity will behave. We discuss the connection between organization, abstraction, and mechanistic explanation and illustrate our claims by looking at an example from recent research on so-called network motifs.

This paper applies conceptual engineering to deal with four objections that have been levelled against operationalism in psychology. These objections are: (i) operationalism leads to harmful proliferation of concepts, (ii) operationalism goes handin-hand with untenable antirealism, (iii) operationalism leads to arbitrariness in scientific concept formation, and (iv) operationalism is incompatible with the usual conception of scientific measurement. Relying on a formulation of three principles of conceptual engineering, I will argue that there is a useful form of operationalism that does not fall prey to these four objections.

While the changes in psychiatric diagnosis introduced by Diagnostic and Statistical Manual third edition (DSM-III) have had major benefits to the field of psychiatry, the reification of its diagnostic criteria and the widespread adoption of diagnostic literalism have been problematic. I argue that, at root, these developments can be best understood by contrasting two approaches to the relationship between DSM disorders and their criteria. In a constitutive relationship, criteria definitively define the disorder. Having a disorder is nothing more than meeting the criteria. In an indexical relationship, the criteria are fallible indices of a disorder understood as a hypothetical, tentative diagnostic construct. I trace the origins of the constitutive model to the philosophical theory of operationalism. I then examine a range of historical and empirical results that favor the indexical over the constitutive position including (i) evidence that individual criteria for DSM-III were selected from a broader pool of possible symptoms/signs, (ii) revisions of DSM have implicitly assumed an indexical criteria-disorder relationship, (iii) the indexical position allows DSM criteria to be wrong and misdiagnose patients while such a result is incoherent for a constitutive model, an implausible position, (iv) we assume an indexical criteria-scale relationships for many personality and symptom measures commonly used in psychiatric practice and research, and (v) empirical studies suggesting similar performance for DSM and non-DSM symptoms for major depression. I then review four reasons for the rise of the constitutive position: (i) the ‘official’ nature of the DSM criteria, (ii) the strong investment psychiatry has had in the DSM manual and its widespread use and success, iii) lack of a clear pathophysiology for our disorders, and (iv) the absence of informative diagnostic signs of minimal clinical importance. I conclude that the constitutive position is premature and reflects a conceptual error. It assumes a definitiveness and a literalism about the nature of our criteria that is far beyond our current knowledge. The indexical position with its tentativeness and modesty accurately reflects the current state of our field.

Currently, there is an intense debate on the pressures facing public professionals during policy implementation. Frequently, professionals have difficulty identifying with new policies, resulting in diminished policy performance. The author examines this problem using the concept of \"policy alienation' and develops and tests a scale for its measurement. Policy alienation is associated conceptually with five subdimensions: strategic powerlessness, tacticalpowerlessness, operationalpowerlessness, societal meaninglessness, and client meaninglessness. A policy alienation scale was using a survey of 478 Dutch health care professionals implementing a new financial policy, diagnosis related groups. The resulting 23-item policy alienation scale demonstrated good psychometric qualities. A reliable and valid policy alienation scale can help in understanding and enhancing policy performance.

Measurement realism, the view that measurement targets quantitative attributes and that not all attributes are quantitative, has come under attack both from metrologists and philosophers. In this paper, I take a close look at two influential arguments against measurement realism: the argument from obsolescence and the argument from coordination. I concede that these arguments do challenge the epistemological position traditionally taken by measurement realists, but argue that the metaphysical core of measurement realism survives the challenge posed by these arguments. This metaphysical core is vital to maintaining a clear and ambitious standard for successful measurement.

Recent work in the philosophy of scientific concepts has seen the simultaneous revival of operationalism and development of patchwork approaches to scientific concepts. We argue that these two approaches are natural allies. Both recognize an important role for measurement techniques in giving meaning to scientific terms. The association of multiple techniques with a single term, however, raises the threat of proliferating concepts (Hempel, 1966 ). While contemporary operationalists have developed some resources to address this challenge, these resources are inadequate to account for the full range of complex behaviors of scientific concepts. We adopt show how the patchwork approach’s repertoire of inter-patch relations can expand the resources available to the operationalist. We focus on one especially important type of inter-patch relation: sharing a general reasoning strategy. General reasoning strategies serve two important functions: (1) they bind together distinct patches of scientific concepts, and (2) they provide normative guidance for extending concepts to new domains.